Hi, here you have some more detailed informations (see quote). Greetings, Neal Am 02.04.2014 23:40, schrieb Benny Baumann:
Hi,
mit freundlichen Gruessen / best regards Neal Thomas Oakey CAcert Assurer, CAcert Event Organisation CAcert.org - Free Certificates E-Mail: neal@cacert.org
Am 02.04.2014 17:55, schrieb Daniel Micay:
Hi,
well until now all of this wasn't a problem, so why has it now become one? It's becoming clearer that CAcert isn't going to be passing a third
On 02/04/14 11:31 AM, Neal Oakey wrote: party audit any time soon. Our only view into it is the open-source code We are lacking man-power to work on solving the issues found by the currently running audit. Details at https://blog.cacert.org/2014/03/cacert-appoints-internal-auditor/ they've made available, and messy wiki documentation. The quality of the Anybody is free to help clean it up ... code is not exactly comforting - whoever wrote most of it didn't seem to be aware of prepared statements... Which were not available when most of the code was written. And changing
And well if you have a look at startssl, well they may be offering free certs but only single domain and just use the plain "things".
* It doesn't allow commercial usage * "only" valid for 1 year A CAcert certificate isn't trusted in most major browsers or operating systems, regardless of whether Arch ships it. That's a bigger StartSSL isn't any safer just because most browsers ship them. And given
Am 02.04.2014 18:33, schrieb Neal Oakey: the code now - which is being worked on (cf. bug #1260) will take time and draw manpower from other places. their history (3 days from founding to entering the browser stores - you're kidding me, right)?
And based on their crypto profile on the website (what their server offers) you won't gain any confidence either.
inconvenience and makes it quite useless for commercial usage. This Oh, funny. I know first hand that Allianz insurance and Edigas consortium accept CAcert as advanced signatures and thus for legally signing your business mails. Not to mention all the other businesses using CAcert: https://blog.cacert.org/2013/07/natural-gas-industry-accepts-cacert-gas-indu... http://rootca.allianz.com/en/secumail_calist.htm http://wiki.cacert.org/OrganisationAssurance/OrganisationList?highlight=%28C...
Doesn't look like it for me ... ;-)
isn't the only example of a free TLS certificate anyway. Free beer vs. free speech ...
* located in Israel (don't know if this should be good or bad) CAcert is located in Australia. Both are US allies and cooperate with US spying, if your point has something to do with the NSA. It's not like Australia doesn't have an active spy agency. Funny. Isn't like Israel is any safer from spying. Not to mention the US where Verisign, GoDaddy, GeoTrust, ... and many other big players reside.
Furthermore you should note that there is a motion which was passed recently by CAcert Inc.'s board to move the incorperation to another country. Which doesn't change the fact that even now the root keys are neither in the US nor in Australia - both information which CAN be found on the CAcert wiki: http://wiki.cacert.org/Brain/CAcertInc/Committee/MeetingAgendasAndMinutes/20140112?highlight=(\bCategoryBoardMinutes\b) And the whereabouts of the keys can be found by looking at the documentation of the infrastructure systems.
There maybe still quite a few things that have to be worked on at CAcert but still I currently would say, that I rather trust CAcert signed certs than any other. Which I currently do on all my systems; all other certificates are handled TOFU.
I mean look at all this fuckup that these firms are doing:
... some have been removed already:
* Revoking Trust in one ANSSI Certificate (*.google.com) * Revoking Trust in Two TurkTrust Certificates (*.google.com) * Revoking Trust in DigiCert Sdn. Bhd Intermediate Certificate Authority (week certs) * Fraudulent *.google.com Certificate ... => DigiNotar Removal Follow Up * Firefox Blocking Fraudulent Certificates ... => Comodo Certificate Issue -- Follow Up
... but I still see many problems:
* Chromium still has (all|many) of the cert, which I listed above * still including many 1024 bit keys! (*1) * to many CAs have issued other RootCA (like for e.g.: Tekecom > DFN > every fucking university in Germany (*2)) * and how far we still can trust CAs from America, where the NSA seams to be fiddling around in the security of all important firms, I can't really say The US government is far from the only country with spy agencies. The CA system won't protect you from national governments, but it does a pretty good job providing protection from other entities. A certificate authority like CAcert without even a minimum level of security or auditing in place is a liability when it comes to this. Having a set of CAs known for having issued fake certificates aren't much better either - even IF they happen to have found somebody signing
You're free to add it if you trust them. Debian and Mozilla don't trust them, and Pierre has made it clear that he's not in a position to vouch for them either. Debian removed them based on arguments sufficient to clear half of the Mozilla store. Not to mention that the "there might be bugs in their software" argument would cause the Mozilla store to be empty - some outcome I'd really prefer to see as it'd be the ONLY honest one. them credibility on some piece of paper. Chromium no longer relies on the CA system for Google domains at all, it simply pins the certificates instead. See Which simply doesn't scale. http://www.certificate-transparency.org/ for an example of the work that's been done on to the CA system. It's a technical solution with Google's political capital behind it. A CA not implementing it will have EV (shiny green bar) revoked, and this happens to be a major source of revenue for them. $$$
*1:
/usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/Digital_Signature_Trust_Co._Global_CA_1.crt: 1024 bit /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/Digital_Signature_Trust_Co._Global_CA_3.crt: 1024 bit /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/Equifax_Secure_CA.crt: 1024 bit /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/Equifax_Secure_eBusiness_CA_1.crt: 1024 bit /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/Equifax_Secure_Global_eBusiness_CA.crt: 1024 bit /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/NetLock_Business_=Class_B=_Root.crt: 1024 bit /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/NetLock_Express_=Class_C=_Root.crt: 1024 bit /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/Thawte_Premium_Server_CA.crt: 1024 bit /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/Thawte_Server_CA.crt: 1024 bit /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/Verisign_Class_1_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority.crt: 1024 bit /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/Verisign_Class_1_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority_-_G2.crt: 1024 bit /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/Verisign_Class_2_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority_-_G2.crt: 1024 bit /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/Verisign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority_2.crt: 1024 bit /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/Verisign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority.crt: 1024 bit /usr/share/ca-certificates/mozilla/Verisign_Class_3_Public_Primary_Certification_Authority_-_G2.crt: 1024 bit *2: if you ask me, this is just waiting for miss usage, as every university (or person which could get access to there CAs) in Germany could issue a cert for [your-bank.com] Trusting CAcert in addition to these certificate authorities will not improve the situation. At least these certificate authorities are competent enough to pass third party audits. Given how most IT departments in German universities are chronically under-funded I doubt signing you some certificate would cost too much ... And be it that on of the 64k SANs on the CSR accidentially works for some banking website ... how unfortunate. Most IT departments lack the
And idea is, that CAcert will be implementing something like this too. Given enough manpower things would be drastically faster though. practicl knowledge of how to securely operate a CA and given the high number of apprentices I really doubt you have to search for too long to get such a CSR signed.
Regards, BenBE.