On 06/11/2015 11:59 PM, Giancarlo Razzolini wrote:
In the case of stolen/lost, it buy you a lot of time. Or you are aware of some cryptanalisys development I'm not aware of.
I am not, but everything depends on your threat model. If you are targeted via an "evil-maid", or a cold-boot attack, FDE may be doomed. In addition to that, passphrase-protection on SSH keys has been weak for a long time, because a single MD5(IV || passphrase) is applied to generate the AES key used to encrypt the SSH key [1]. OpenSSL 6.5 introduced a new KDF [2] using bcrypt, enabled by default for ed25519 keys but not for RSA keys, so you may want to upgrade your keys to use the new KDF manually.
Now, if your machine is compromised, then I think that you might have bigger worries than the keys used to publish some packages on AUR.
Agreed :) [1] https://martin.kleppmann.com/2013/05/24/improving-security-of-ssh-private-ke... [2] http://www.tedunangst.com/flak/post/new-openssh-key-format-and-bcrypt-pbkdf