On 08/08/14 03:43 AM, Ralf Mardorf wrote:
In the past, what packages provided by AUR needed signing, because after uploading somebody manipulated the packages? AFAIK https for the AUR downloads and checksums for the upstream downloads in the past didn't cause that often serious trouble, IIRC it usually was safe.
Is there such a security mechanism, if we build from ABS?
The AUR has had SQL injection vulnerabilities in the past. It has also had a fair number of CSRF / XSS vulnerabilities allowing actions to be taken on behalf of package maintainers.
It's being well maintained now, but it's still written in a language with many easy ways to shoot yourself in the foot. AFAIK (too lazy to check) it also doesn't have a captcha or similar mechanism to defend against someone brute forcing the password of a specific user.
The checksums are just blindly updated when either a new release is done or upstream decides to fiddle with the last release. The ideal is having a signed package (either binary or source) with signatures for the upstream sources and the new makepkg feature allowing the correct fingerprint to be added in the PKGBUILD.