On Mon, Feb 21, 2011 at 04:42:49PM +0100, Dieter Plaetinck wrote:
On Mon, 21 Feb 2011 16:35:33 +0100 Lukas Fleischer email@example.com wrote:
On Mon, Feb 21, 2011 at 03:46:47PM +0100, Dieter Plaetinck wrote:
On Mon, 21 Feb 2011 14:50:39 +0100 Lukas Fleischer firstname.lastname@example.org wrote:
The only issue that might affect the end users as well is "ZIP bombs". Most users will probably notice such a thing before it is entirely extracted, just interrupt tar(1)/gzip(1) and send a removal request to aur-general, however.
hmmm. some good points. I guess I could try the suggested approach and see how I like it. However, now that you bring up the "zip bombs", do you think it's feasible to scan for them serverside without compromising security and/or making things needlessly complicated? it would be useful for clients if that one aspect could be filtered out in advance.
I don't think this is possible without decompressing the tarball which is again vulnerable to (D)DoS.
hmm maybe we mean different things. you are talking about exhausting ram/cpu/time, right?
Yes, like having two 1GB large files `tar -czf`'ed and uploading the resulting tarball to the AUR. I don't think that can be detected without being vulnerable to DoS attacks.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zip_bomb In that case, sure, just leave it to the client. the problem is trivial enough.
I was talking about bad filenames (like ../../foo, /foo, /root/foobar, /tmpl/blah, and whatever else is posible) that might be prevented with `tar -t`