In order to use WKD in pacman -U/--upgrade operations, we need to get the packager information from the .PKGINFO within the package. That has obvious security implications. e.g. something like this could convince a user to download a different key to what they expect: packager = foo bar <>^[[2K^[[0G:: Import PGP key DEADBEEF, "foo <bar> While downloading an untrusted key has little impact due to the web-of-trust model used by pacman, this could be bad in combination with an exploit that allowed trust of keys in the keyring to be altered. To be safe, do not use WKD when installing using -U. Fixes FS#73703. Signed-off-by: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org> --- lib/libalpm/be_package.c | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/libalpm/be_package.c b/lib/libalpm/be_package.c index e837ffb8..203c98c1 100644 --- a/lib/libalpm/be_package.c +++ b/lib/libalpm/be_package.c @@ -721,7 +721,6 @@ int SYMEXPORT alpm_pkg_load(alpm_handle_t *handle, const char *filename, int ful int validation = 0; char *sigpath; alpm_pkg_t *pkg_temp; - char *packager; CHECK_HANDLE(handle, return -1); ASSERT(pkg != NULL, RET_ERR(handle, ALPM_ERR_WRONG_ARGS, -1)); @@ -747,13 +746,7 @@ int SYMEXPORT alpm_pkg_load(alpm_handle_t *handle, const char *filename, int ful char *key = k->data; if(_alpm_key_in_keychain(handle, key) == 0) { pkg_temp = _alpm_pkg_load_internal(handle, filename, full); - if(pkg_temp) { - packager = pkg_temp->packager; - - } else { - packager = NULL; - } - if(_alpm_key_import(handle, packager, key) == -1) { + if(_alpm_key_import(handle, NULL, key) == -1) { fail = 1; } _alpm_pkg_free(pkg_temp); -- 2.35.1