On Thu, 28 Oct 2010 15:42:31 +0800, Gergely Imreh email@example.com wrote:
On 28 October 2010 14:59, Justin Davis firstname.lastname@example.org wrote:
On Wed, Oct 27, 2010 at 5:14 AM, Pierre Schmitz email@example.com wrote:
On Wed, 27 Oct 2010 11:40:19 +0300, Ionuț Bîru firstname.lastname@example.org wrote:
As i said earlier in a reply to Loui, maybe we can do it better.Having https only for login and then redirecting to http is like not having it at all.
Ionut, This is a ridiculous claim. Maybe we should tell that to amazon, newegg, and oh I don't know... 99% of websites on the planet? Most sites use https only for logins and transactions. Publicly available information like aur comments, aur packages, images, etc don't really need encryption. Just about everything sent to/from the AUR is not sensitive information. Except login passwords. I would be pissed off if amazon had the same point of view. What if amazon decided that their https for logins and credit cards was the same as not having it at all and removed it?
As the discussion gets more technical, it is good to see what the people who actually know all about these issues have to say. I think it is very education (well, for me at least) to read Firesheep's author's comment on the people's reactions, and how there are many bad solutions that look like good ones. Eg. the "Why is it hard to stay safe - Forced SSL/HTTPS for posting of Login/Password credentials only" section. http://codebutler.com/firesheep-a-day-later
Re: Amazon and others, just because the big guys do it, does not mean they do it right.
Simply using https for all connections is the easiest and best solution imho. Everything in between is either insecure or inconvenient for the users. And I also don't see the need for it. Every sane http client should handle a http redirect and https. If it does not it's just a bug in the client. Of course it is unfortunate that this wasn't tested by the clyde author before.
Pierre, How is sending publicly available information unencrypted insecure? It does not warrant a need for additional security in the first place. If someone wants to see what comments you post on a package they go look at the package's page. They don't have to sniff your traffic. I am secure in my AUR traffic's triviality.
Please correct me if I'm wrong, it's not just about sniffing, it's about hijacking your session. Eg. one could record your logging in, then come back later, and orphan your packages (a "better" bad case), or update it with malicious code (a worse one) while it looks like it was you.... Not saying one would do that, but if we are throwing around hypotheticals...
I am sitting in a (switched) network with over 1000 clients day for day. I really like the idea of having full-forced-TLS-encryption on websites. It is the only save way I can be sure that noone is sniffing my traffic with a simple arp-spoof. I don't care that other people know what sites I visit (I have a Facebook account and use the "Like" buttons, that says all) but I care that there could be someone in this building who has control over my traffic (whatever his reason may be). Therefore I agree to Greg's statement above and stronly disagree to Justin's. It is not about getting information that is public none the less. It is simply not the right way to get it and should be prevented. One user +1 from me for https-only on all Arch websites (in the hope the servers can handle that).