[arch-commits] Commit in coreutils/trunk (5 files)
Allan McRae
allan at archlinux.org
Fri Aug 17 01:12:26 UTC 2012
Date: Thursday, August 16, 2012 @ 21:12:26
Author: allan
Revision: 165378
upstream update, su moved to util-linux, file in /bin now symlinks to /usr/bin, remove unneeded patches
Modified:
coreutils/trunk/PKGBUILD
coreutils/trunk/coreutils.install
Deleted:
coreutils/trunk/0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch
coreutils/trunk/coreutils-pam.patch
coreutils/trunk/su.pam
---------------------------------------------------------------+
0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch | 135 ---
PKGBUILD | 39
coreutils-pam.patch | 428 ----------
coreutils.install | 14
su.pam | 9
5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 610 deletions(-)
Deleted: 0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch
===================================================================
--- 0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch 2012-08-17 00:20:08 UTC (rev 165377)
+++ 0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch 2012-08-17 01:12:26 UTC (rev 165378)
@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-From 6124a3842dfa8484b52e067a8ab8105c3875a4f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jim Meyering <meyering at redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 May 2012 19:43:00 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ls: color each symlink-to-relative-name in / properly
-
-In order for ls --color to color each symlink, it must form the name
-of each referent and then stat it to see if the link is dangling, to
-a directory, to a file, etc. When the symlink is to a relative name,
-ls must concatenate the starting directory name and that relative name.
-When, in addition, the starting directory was "/" or "/some-name",
-the result was ill-formed, and the subsequent stat would usually fail,
-making the caller color it as a dangling symlink.
-* src/ls.c (make_link_name): Don't botch the case in which
-dir_name(NAME) == "/" and LINKNAME is relative.
-* tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color: New file. Test for the above.
-* tests/Makefile.am (TESTS): Add it.
-* NEWS (Bug fixes): Mention it.
-Reported by Mike Frysinger in http://bugs.gnu.org/11453
-Bug introduced by commit v8.16-23-gbcb9078.
----
- NEWS | 5 ++++
- src/ls.c | 9 +++++++-
- tests/Makefile.am | 1 +
- tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 4 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
- create mode 100755 tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color
-
-diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
-index 6c620b3..f9e9c70 100644
---- a/NEWS
-+++ b/NEWS
-@@ -2,6 +2,11 @@ GNU coreutils NEWS -*- outline -*-
-
- * Noteworthy changes in release ?.? (????-??-??) [?]
-
-+** Bug fixes
-+
-+ ls --color would mis-color relative-named symlinks in /
-+ [bug introduced in coreutils-8.17]
-+
-
- * Noteworthy changes in release 8.17 (2012-05-10) [stable]
-
-diff --git a/src/ls.c b/src/ls.c
-index 397e4ea..9494ae9 100644
---- a/src/ls.c
-+++ b/src/ls.c
-@@ -3213,7 +3213,14 @@ make_link_name (char const *name, char const *linkname)
- return xstrdup (linkname);
-
- char *p = xmalloc (prefix_len + 1 + strlen (linkname) + 1);
-- stpcpy (stpncpy (p, name, prefix_len + 1), linkname);
-+
-+ /* PREFIX_LEN usually specifies a string not ending in slash.
-+ In that case, extend it by one, since the next byte *is* a slash.
-+ Otherwise, the prefix is "/", so leave the length unchanged. */
-+ if ( ! ISSLASH (name[prefix_len - 1]))
-+ ++prefix_len;
-+
-+ stpcpy (stpncpy (p, name, prefix_len), linkname);
- return p;
- }
-
-diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
-index a4370a6..0bafc5f 100644
---- a/tests/Makefile.am
-+++ b/tests/Makefile.am
-@@ -449,6 +449,7 @@ TESTS = \
- ls/proc-selinux-segfault \
- ls/readdir-mountpoint-inode \
- ls/recursive \
-+ ls/root-rel-symlink-color \
- ls/rt-1 \
- ls/slink-acl \
- ls/stat-dtype \
-diff --git a/tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color b/tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color
-new file mode 100755
-index 0000000..d795432
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/tests/ls/root-rel-symlink-color
-@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
-+#!/bin/sh
-+# Exercise the 8.17 ls bug with coloring relative-named symlinks in "/".
-+
-+# Copyright (C) 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-+
-+# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
-+# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-+# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
-+# (at your option) any later version.
-+
-+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
-+# GNU General Public License for more details.
-+
-+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-+# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-+
-+. "${srcdir=.}/init.sh"; path_prepend_ ../src
-+print_ver_ ls
-+
-+symlink_to_rel=
-+for i in /*; do
-+ # Skip non-symlinks:
-+ env test -h "$i" || continue
-+
-+ # Skip dangling symlinks:
-+ env test -e "$i" || continue
-+
-+ # Skip any symlink-to-absolute-name:
-+ case $(readlink "$i") in /*) continue ;; esac
-+
-+ symlink_to_rel=$i
-+ break
-+done
-+
-+test -z "$symlink_to_rel" \
-+ && skip_ no relative symlink in /
-+
-+e='\33'
-+color_code='01;36'
-+c_pre="$e[0m$e[${color_code}m"
-+c_post="$e[0m"
-+printf "$c_pre$symlink_to_rel$c_post\n" > exp || framework_failure_
-+
-+env TERM=xterm LS_COLORS="ln=$color_code:or=1;31;42" \
-+ ls -d --color=always "$symlink_to_rel" > out || fail=1
-+
-+compare exp out || fail=1
-+
-+Exit $fail
---
-1.7.11.2
-
Modified: PKGBUILD
===================================================================
--- PKGBUILD 2012-08-17 00:20:08 UTC (rev 165377)
+++ PKGBUILD 2012-08-17 01:12:26 UTC (rev 165378)
@@ -3,41 +3,23 @@
# Contributor: judd <jvinet at zeroflux.org>
pkgname=coreutils
-pkgver=8.17
-pkgrel=3
+pkgver=8.18
+pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="The basic file, shell and text manipulation utilities of the GNU operating system"
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
license=('GPL3')
url="http://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils"
groups=('base')
depends=('glibc' 'pam' 'acl' 'gmp' 'libcap')
-replaces=('mktemp')
-backup=('etc/pam.d/su')
install=${pkgname}.install
-options=('!emptydirs')
-source=(ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.xz{,.sig}
- coreutils-pam.patch
- 0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch
- su.pam)
-md5sums=('bbda656ce8ca2c6903948f9faa204ba3'
- 'ebecd29b095aa21b0b2f833f1ec20d70'
- 'aad79a2aa6d566c375d7bdd1b0767278'
- 'd7c691898a695a6284a927e6a9426fe4'
- 'fa85e5cce5d723275b14365ba71a8aad')
+source=(ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.xz{,.sig})
+md5sums=('74712fbb0e0dfcb883c90eab91982780'
+ 'b23dd27937cf9ad04f4567fef57ec6a3')
build() {
cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}
- # added su wheel group pam patch (from fedora git)
- patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/coreutils-pam.patch
-
- # fix coloring for symlinks in /
- # upstream commit 6124a3842dfa8484b52e067a8ab8105c3875a4f7
- patch -Np1 -i $srcdir/0001-ls-color-each-symlink-to-relative-name-in-properly.patch
-
- autoreconf -v
./configure --prefix=/usr --libexecdir=/usr/lib \
- --enable-install-program=su \
--enable-no-install-program=groups,hostname,kill,uptime \
--enable-pam
make
@@ -53,14 +35,13 @@
make DESTDIR=${pkgdir} install
cd ${pkgdir}/usr/bin
- install -dm755 ${pkgdir}/{bin,usr/sbin}
+ install -dm755 ${pkgdir}/bin
# binaries required by FHS
_fhs=('cat' 'chgrp' 'chmod' 'chown' 'cp' 'date' 'dd' 'df' 'echo' 'false'
- 'ln' 'ls' 'mkdir' 'mknod' 'mv' 'pwd' 'rm' 'rmdir' 'stty' 'su' 'sync'
+ 'ln' 'ls' 'mkdir' 'mknod' 'mv' 'pwd' 'rm' 'rmdir' 'stty' 'sync'
'true' 'uname')
- mv ${_fhs[@]} ${pkgdir}/bin
-
- mv chroot ${pkgdir}/usr/sbin
- install -Dm644 ${srcdir}/su.pam ${pkgdir}/etc/pam.d/su
+ for i in ${_fhs[@]}; do
+ ln -s ../usr/bin/$i ${pkgdir}/bin/$i
+ done
}
Deleted: coreutils-pam.patch
===================================================================
--- coreutils-pam.patch 2012-08-17 00:20:08 UTC (rev 165377)
+++ coreutils-pam.patch 2012-08-17 01:12:26 UTC (rev 165378)
@@ -1,428 +0,0 @@
-diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/configure.ac coreutils-8.4/configure.ac
---- coreutils-8.4-orig/configure.ac 2010-01-11 18:20:42.000000000 +0100
-+++ coreutils-8.4/configure.ac 2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100
-@@ -126,6 +126,13 @@ if test "$gl_gcc_warnings" = yes; then
- AC_SUBST([GNULIB_WARN_CFLAGS])
- fi
-
-+dnl Give the chance to enable PAM
-+AC_ARG_ENABLE(pam, dnl
-+[ --enable-pam Enable use of the PAM libraries],
-+[AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define if you want to use PAM])
-+LIB_PAM="-ldl -lpam -lpam_misc"
-+AC_SUBST(LIB_PAM)])
-+
- AC_FUNC_FORK
-
- optional_bin_progs=
-diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/doc/coreutils.texi coreutils-8.4/doc/coreutils.texi
---- coreutils-8.4-orig/doc/coreutils.texi 2010-01-03 18:06:20.000000000 +0100
-+++ coreutils-8.4/doc/coreutils.texi 2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100
-@@ -15081,8 +15081,11 @@ to certain shells, etc.).
- @findex syslog
- @command{su} can optionally be compiled to use @code{syslog} to report
- failed, and optionally successful, @command{su} attempts. (If the system
--supports @code{syslog}.) However, GNU @command{su} does not check if the
--user is a member of the @code{wheel} group; see below.
-+supports @code{syslog}.)
-+
-+This version of @command{su} has support for using PAM for
-+authentication. You can edit @file{/etc/pam.d/su} to customize its
-+behaviour.
-
- The program accepts the following options. Also see @ref{Common options}.
-
-@@ -15124,6 +15127,8 @@ environment variables except @env{TERM},
- @env{PATH} to a compiled-in default value. Change to @var{user}'s home
- directory. Prepend @samp{-} to the shell's name, intended to make it
- read its login startup file(s).
-+Additionaly @env{DISPLAY} and @env{XAUTHORITY} environment variables
-+are preserved as well for PAM functionality.
-
- @item -m
- @itemx -p
-@@ -15163,33 +15168,6 @@ Exit status:
- the exit status of the subshell otherwise
- @end display
-
-- at cindex wheel group, not supported
-- at cindex group wheel, not supported
-- at cindex fascism
-- at subsection Why GNU @command{su} does not support the @samp{wheel} group
--
--(This section is by Richard Stallman.)
--
-- at cindex Twenex
-- at cindex MIT AI lab
--Sometimes a few of the users try to hold total power over all the
--rest. For example, in 1984, a few users at the MIT AI lab decided to
--seize power by changing the operator password on the Twenex system and
--keeping it secret from everyone else. (I was able to thwart this coup
--and give power back to the users by patching the kernel, but I
--wouldn't know how to do that in Unix.)
--
--However, occasionally the rulers do tell someone. Under the usual
-- at command{su} mechanism, once someone learns the root password who
--sympathizes with the ordinary users, he or she can tell the rest. The
--``wheel group'' feature would make this impossible, and thus cement the
--power of the rulers.
--
--I'm on the side of the masses, not that of the rulers. If you are
--used to supporting the bosses and sysadmins in whatever they do, you
--might find this idea strange at first.
--
--
- @node timeout invocation
- @section @command{timeout}: Run a command with a time limit
-
-diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/src/Makefile.am coreutils-8.4/src/Makefile.am
---- coreutils-8.4-orig/src/Makefile.am 2010-01-03 18:06:20.000000000 +0100
-+++ coreutils-8.4/src/Makefile.am 2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100
-@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ factor_LDADD += $(LIB_GMP)
- uptime_LDADD += $(GETLOADAVG_LIBS)
-
- # for crypt
--su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT)
-+su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT) @LIB_PAM@
-
- # for various ACL functions
- copy_LDADD += $(LIB_ACL)
-diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/src/su.c coreutils-8.4/src/su.c
---- coreutils-8.4-orig/src/su.c 2010-02-12 10:15:15.000000000 +0100
-+++ coreutils-8.4/src/su.c 2010-02-12 10:24:29.000000000 +0100
-@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@
- restricts who can su to UID 0 accounts. RMS considers that to
- be fascist.
-
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+
-+ Actually, with PAM, su has nothing to do with whether or not a
-+ wheel group is enforced by su. RMS tries to restrict your access
-+ to a su which implements the wheel group, but PAM considers that
-+ to be fascist, and gives the user/sysadmin the opportunity to
-+ enforce a wheel group by proper editing of /etc/pam.conf
-+
-+#endif
-+
- Compile-time options:
- -DSYSLOG_SUCCESS Log successful su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
- -DSYSLOG_FAILURE Log failed su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
-@@ -53,6 +63,15 @@
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <grp.h>
-
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+# include <signal.h>
-+# include <sys/wait.h>
-+# include <sys/fsuid.h>
-+# include <unistd.h>
-+# include <security/pam_appl.h>
-+# include <security/pam_misc.h>
-+#endif /* USE_PAM */
-+
- #include "system.h"
- #include "getpass.h"
-
-@@ -120,10 +139,17 @@
- /* The user to become if none is specified. */
- #define DEFAULT_USER "root"
-
-+#ifndef USE_PAM
- char *crypt (char const *key, char const *salt);
-+#endif
-
--static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t)
-+static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t,
-+ const struct passwd *)
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ ;
-+#else
- ATTRIBUTE_NORETURN;
-+#endif
-
- /* If true, pass the `-f' option to the subshell. */
- static bool fast_startup;
-@@ -209,7 +235,26 @@ log_su (struct passwd const *pw, bool su
- }
- #endif
-
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
-+static int retval;
-+static struct pam_conv conv = {
-+ misc_conv,
-+ NULL
-+};
-+
-+#define PAM_BAIL_P if (retval) { \
-+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \
-+ return 0; \
-+}
-+#define PAM_BAIL_P_VOID if (retval) { \
-+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \
-+return; \
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- /* Ask the user for a password.
-+ If PAM is in use, let PAM ask for the password if necessary.
- Return true if the user gives the correct password for entry PW,
- false if not. Return true without asking for a password if run by UID 0
- or if PW has an empty password. */
-@@ -217,6 +262,44 @@ log_su (struct passwd const *pw, bool su
- static bool
- correct_password (const struct passwd *pw)
- {
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ struct passwd *caller;
-+ char *tty_name, *ttyn;
-+ retval = pam_start(PROGRAM_NAME, pw->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
-+ PAM_BAIL_P;
-+
-+ if (getuid() != 0 && !isatty(0)) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "standard in must be a tty\n");
-+ exit(1);
-+ }
-+
-+ caller = getpwuid(getuid());
-+ if(caller != NULL && caller->pw_name != NULL) {
-+ retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, caller->pw_name);
-+ PAM_BAIL_P;
-+ }
-+
-+ ttyn = ttyname(0);
-+ if (ttyn) {
-+ if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
-+ tty_name = ttyn+5;
-+ else
-+ tty_name = ttyn;
-+ retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, tty_name);
-+ PAM_BAIL_P;
-+ }
-+ retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
-+ PAM_BAIL_P;
-+ retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
-+ if (retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
-+ /* password has expired. Offer option to change it. */
-+ retval = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
-+ PAM_BAIL_P;
-+ }
-+ PAM_BAIL_P;
-+ /* must be authenticated if this point was reached */
-+ return 1;
-+#else /* !USE_PAM */
- char *unencrypted, *encrypted, *correct;
- #if HAVE_GETSPNAM && HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD_SP_PWDP
- /* Shadow passwd stuff for SVR3 and maybe other systems. */
-@@ -241,6 +324,7 @@ correct_password (const struct passwd *p
- encrypted = crypt (unencrypted, correct);
- memset (unencrypted, 0, strlen (unencrypted));
- return STREQ (encrypted, correct);
-+#endif /* !USE_PAM */
- }
-
- /* Update `environ' for the new shell based on PW, with SHELL being
-@@ -254,12 +338,18 @@ modify_environment (const struct passwd
- /* Leave TERM unchanged. Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH.
- Unset all other environment variables. */
- char const *term = getenv ("TERM");
-+ char const *display = getenv ("DISPLAY");
-+ char const *xauthority = getenv ("XAUTHORITY");
- if (term)
- term = xstrdup (term);
- environ = xmalloc ((6 + !!term) * sizeof (char *));
- environ[0] = NULL;
- if (term)
- xsetenv ("TERM", term);
-+ if (display)
-+ xsetenv ("DISPLAY", display);
-+ if (xauthority)
-+ xsetenv ("XAUTHORITY", xauthority);
- xsetenv ("HOME", pw->pw_dir);
- xsetenv ("SHELL", shell);
- xsetenv ("USER", pw->pw_name);
-@@ -292,8 +382,13 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw
- {
- #ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
- errno = 0;
-- if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
-+ if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
-+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
-+#endif
- error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set groups"));
-+ }
- endgrent ();
- #endif
- if (setgid (pw->pw_gid))
-@@ -302,6 +397,31 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw
- error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set user id"));
- }
-
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+static int caught=0;
-+/* Signal handler for parent process later */
-+static void su_catch_sig(int sig)
-+{
-+ ++caught;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+pam_copyenv (pam_handle_t *pamh)
-+{
-+ char **env;
-+
-+ env = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
-+ if(env) {
-+ while(*env) {
-+ if (putenv (*env))
-+ xalloc_die ();
-+ env++;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ return(0);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- /* Run SHELL, or DEFAULT_SHELL if SHELL is empty.
- If COMMAND is nonzero, pass it to the shell with the -c option.
- Pass ADDITIONAL_ARGS to the shell as more arguments; there
-@@ -309,17 +429,49 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw
-
- static void
- run_shell (char const *shell, char const *command, char **additional_args,
-- size_t n_additional_args)
-+ size_t n_additional_args, const struct passwd *pw)
- {
- size_t n_args = 1 + fast_startup + 2 * !!command + n_additional_args + 1;
- char const **args = xnmalloc (n_args, sizeof *args);
- size_t argno = 1;
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ int child;
-+ sigset_t ourset;
-+ int status;
-+
-+ retval = pam_open_session(pamh,0);
-+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-+ fprintf (stderr, "could not open session\n");
-+ exit (1);
-+ }
-+
-+/* do this at the last possible moment, because environment variables may
-+ be passed even in the session phase
-+*/
-+ if(pam_copyenv(pamh) != PAM_SUCCESS)
-+ fprintf (stderr, "error copying PAM environment\n");
-+
-+ /* Credentials should be set in the parent */
-+ if (pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-+ pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
-+ fprintf(stderr, "could not set PAM credentials\n");
-+ exit(1);
-+ }
-+
-+ child = fork();
-+ if (child == 0) { /* child shell */
-+ change_identity (pw);
-+ pam_end(pamh, 0);
-+#endif
-
- if (simulate_login)
- {
- char *arg0;
- char *shell_basename;
-
-+ if(chdir(pw->pw_dir))
-+ error(0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
-+
- shell_basename = last_component (shell);
- arg0 = xmalloc (strlen (shell_basename) + 2);
- arg0[0] = '-';
-@@ -344,6 +496,67 @@ run_shell (char const *shell, char const
- error (0, errno, "%s", shell);
- exit (exit_status);
- }
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ } else if (child == -1) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "can not fork user shell: %s", strerror(errno));
-+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
-+ pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
-+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
-+ exit(1);
-+ }
-+ /* parent only */
-+ sigfillset(&ourset);
-+ if (sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: signal malfunction\n", PROGRAM_NAME);
-+ caught = 1;
-+ }
-+ if (!caught) {
-+ struct sigaction action;
-+ action.sa_handler = su_catch_sig;
-+ sigemptyset(&action.sa_mask);
-+ action.sa_flags = 0;
-+ sigemptyset(&ourset);
-+ if (sigaddset(&ourset, SIGTERM)
-+ || sigaddset(&ourset, SIGALRM)
-+ || sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL)
-+ || sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: signal masking malfunction\n", PROGRAM_NAME);
-+ caught = 1;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if (!caught) {
-+ do {
-+ int pid;
-+
-+ pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WUNTRACED);
-+
-+ if (((pid_t)-1 != pid) && (0 != WIFSTOPPED (status))) {
-+ kill(getpid(), WSTOPSIG(status));
-+ /* once we get here, we must have resumed */
-+ kill(pid, SIGCONT);
-+ }
-+ } while (0 != WIFSTOPPED(status));
-+ }
-+
-+ if (caught) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "\nSession terminated, killing shell...");
-+ kill (child, SIGTERM);
-+ }
-+ /* Not checking retval on this because we need to call close session */
-+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
-+ retval = pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
-+ PAM_BAIL_P_VOID;
-+ retval = pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
-+ PAM_BAIL_P_VOID;
-+ if (caught) {
-+ sleep(2);
-+ kill(child, SIGKILL);
-+ fprintf(stderr, " ...killed.\n");
-+ exit(-1);
-+ }
-+ exit ((0 != WIFEXITED (status)) ? WEXITSTATUS (status)
-+ : WTERMSIG (status) + 128);
-+#endif /* USE_PAM */
- }
-
- /* Return true if SHELL is a restricted shell (one not returned by
-@@ -511,9 +724,9 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
- shell = xstrdup (shell ? shell : pw->pw_shell);
- modify_environment (pw, shell);
-
-+#ifndef USE_PAM
- change_identity (pw);
-- if (simulate_login && chdir (pw->pw_dir) != 0)
-- error (0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
-+#endif
-
- /* error() flushes stderr, but does not check for write failure.
- Normally, we would catch this via our atexit() hook of
-@@ -523,5 +736,5 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
- if (ferror (stderr))
- exit (EXIT_CANCELED);
-
-- run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind));
-+ run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind), pw);
- }
Modified: coreutils.install
===================================================================
--- coreutils.install 2012-08-17 00:20:08 UTC (rev 165377)
+++ coreutils.install 2012-08-17 01:12:26 UTC (rev 165378)
@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
infodir=usr/share/info
-filelist=(coreutils.info)
+file=coreutils.info
post_install() {
- [ -x usr/bin/install-info ] || return 0
- for file in ${filelist[@]}; do
- usr/bin/install-info $infodir/$file.gz $infodir/dir 2> /dev/null
- done
+ [[ -x usr/bin/install-info ]] || return 0
+ install-info $infodir/$file.gz $infodir/dir 2> /dev/null
}
post_upgrade() {
@@ -13,9 +11,7 @@
}
pre_remove() {
- [ -x usr/bin/install-info ] || return 0
- for file in ${filelist[@]}; do
- usr/bin/install-info --delete $infodir/$file.gz $infodir/dir 2> /dev/null
- done
+ [[ -x usr/bin/install-info ]] || return 0
+ install-info --delete $infodir/$file.gz $infodir/dir 2> /dev/null
}
Deleted: su.pam
===================================================================
--- su.pam 2012-08-17 00:20:08 UTC (rev 165377)
+++ su.pam 2012-08-17 01:12:26 UTC (rev 165378)
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-#%PAM-1.0
-auth sufficient pam_rootok.so
-# Uncomment the following line to implicitly trust users in the "wheel" group.
-#auth sufficient pam_wheel.so trust use_uid
-# Uncomment the following line to require a user to be in the "wheel" group.
-#auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid
-auth required pam_unix.so
-account required pam_unix.so
-session required pam_unix.so
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