[arch-commits] Commit in ecryptfs-utils/trunk (CVE-2016-1572.patch PKGBUILD)

[Timothy Redaelli]

    Date: Monday, December 12, 2016 @ 16:43:24
  Author: tredaelli
Revision: 199038

upgpkg: ecryptfs-utils 111-1

Modified:
  ecryptfs-utils/trunk/PKGBUILD
Deleted:
  ecryptfs-utils/trunk/CVE-2016-1572.patch

---------------------+
 CVE-2016-1572.patch |  101 --------------------------------------------------
 PKGBUILD            |   17 ++------
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 113 deletions(-)

Deleted: CVE-2016-1572.patch
===================================================================
--- CVE-2016-1572.patch	2016-12-12 15:45:01 UTC (rev 199037)
+++ CVE-2016-1572.patch	2016-12-12 16:43:24 UTC (rev 199038)
@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-From 8fcdb9ef8406cd05c45acef6210a3bfa0831e857 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks at canonical.com>
-Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2016 19:39:14 -0600
-Subject: [PATCH] mount.ecryptfs_private: Validate mount destination fs type
-
-Refuse to mount over non-standard filesystems. Mounting over
-certain types filesystems is a red flag that the user is doing
-something devious, such as mounting over the /proc/self symlink
-target with malicious content in order to confuse programs that may
-attempt to parse those files. (LP: #1530566)
-
-https://launchpad.net/bugs/1530566
----
- debian/changelog                   |  8 +++++
- src/utils/mount.ecryptfs_private.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+)
-
---- a/src/utils/mount.ecryptfs_private.c
-+++ b/src/utils/mount.ecryptfs_private.c
-@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
- #include <sys/param.h>
- #include <sys/stat.h>
- #include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/vfs.h>
- #include <ctype.h>
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <keyutils.h>
-@@ -220,6 +221,62 @@ err:
- 	return NULL;
- }
- 
-+static int check_cwd_f_type()
-+{
-+	/**
-+	 * This is *not* a list of compatible lower filesystems list for
-+	 * eCryptfs. This is a list of filesystems that we reasonably expect to
-+	 * see mount.ecryptfs_private users mounting on top of. In other words,
-+	 * the filesystem type of the 'target' parameter of mount(2).
-+	 *
-+	 * This whitelist is to prevent malicious mount.ecryptfs_private users
-+	 * from mounting over filesystem types such as PROC_SUPER_MAGIC to
-+	 * deceive other programs with a crafted /proc/self/*. See
-+	 * https://launchpad.net/bugs/1530566 for more details.
-+	 */
-+	__SWORD_TYPE f_type_whitelist[] = {
-+		0x61756673 /* AUFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
-+		0x9123683E /* BTRFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
-+		0x00C36400 /* CEPH_SUPER_MAGIC */,
-+		0xFF534D42 /* CIFS_MAGIC_NUMBER */,
-+		0x0000F15F /* ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
-+		0x0000EF53 /* EXT[234]_SUPER_MAGIC */,
-+		0xF2F52010 /* F2FS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
-+		0x65735546 /* FUSE_SUPER_MAGIC */,
-+		0x01161970 /* GFS2_MAGIC */,
-+		0x3153464A /* JFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
-+		0x0000564C /* NCP_SUPER_MAGIC */,
-+		0x00006969 /* NFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
-+		0x00003434 /* NILFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
-+		0x5346544E /* NTFS_SB_MAGIC */,
-+		0x794C7630 /* OVERLAYFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
-+		0x52654973 /* REISERFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
-+		0x73717368 /* SQUASHFS_MAGIC */,
-+		0x01021994 /* TMPFS_MAGIC */,
-+		0x58465342 /* XFS_SB_MAGIC */,
-+		0x2FC12FC1 /* ZFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
-+	};
-+	struct statfs buf;
-+	size_t i, whitelist_len;
-+
-+	if (statfs(".", &buf) != 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to check filesystem type: %m\n");
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+
-+	whitelist_len = sizeof(f_type_whitelist) / sizeof(*f_type_whitelist);
-+	for (i = 0; i < whitelist_len; i++) {
-+		if (buf.f_type == f_type_whitelist[i]) {
-+			return 0;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	fprintf(stderr,
-+		"Refusing to mount over an unapproved filesystem type: %#lx\n",
-+		buf.f_type);
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
- int check_ownership_mnt(uid_t uid, char **mnt) {
- /* Check ownership of mount point, chdir into it, and
-  * canonicalize the path for use in mtab updating.
-@@ -629,6 +686,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
-  		goto fail;
-  	}
- 
-+	if (check_cwd_f_type() != 0) {
-+		goto fail;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (mounting == 1) {
- 		/* Increment mount counter, errors non-fatal */
- 		if (increment(fh_counter) < 0) {

Modified: PKGBUILD
===================================================================
--- PKGBUILD	2016-12-12 15:45:01 UTC (rev 199037)
+++ PKGBUILD	2016-12-12 16:43:24 UTC (rev 199038)
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
 # Contributor: Michal Krenek <mikos at sg1.cz>
 
 pkgname=ecryptfs-utils
-pkgver=108
-pkgrel=2
+pkgver=111
+pkgrel=1
 arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
 pkgdesc="Enterprise-class stacked cryptographic filesystem for Linux"
 url="https://launchpad.net/ecryptfs"
@@ -14,18 +14,11 @@
 depends=('nss' 'pam')
 optdepends=('python2: for python module')
 source=("https://launchpad.net/ecryptfs/trunk/${pkgver}/+download/${pkgname}_${pkgver}.orig.tar.gz"
-        "${pkgname}_${pkgver}.orig.tar.gz.sig::https://launchpad.net/ecryptfs/trunk/${pkgver}/+download/..-${pkgname}_${pkgver}.orig.tar.gz.asc"
-        CVE-2016-1572.patch)
-md5sums=('80f2a73e14030239fa01a2f1e5606a0e'
-         'SKIP'
-         '3932ca86f3f6e3c770d61d32b45ed3c0')
+        "${pkgname}_${pkgver}.orig.tar.gz.sig::https://launchpad.net/ecryptfs/trunk/${pkgver}/+download/..-${pkgname}_${pkgver}.orig.tar.gz.asc")
+md5sums=('83513228984f671930752c3518cac6fd'
+         'SKIP')
 validpgpkeys=('E2D9E1C5F9F5D59291F4607D95E64373F1529469')
 
-prepare() {
-  cd "${pkgname}-${pkgver}"
-  patch -p1 -i "$srcdir"/CVE-2016-1572.patch
-}
-
 build() {
   cd "${pkgname}-${pkgver}"
   ./configure --prefix=/usr --with-pamdir=/usr/lib/security PYTHON=python2