[arch-commits] Commit in x11vnc/trunk (3 files)
Jan de Groot
jgc at archlinux.org
Sat Mar 4 22:08:10 UTC 2017
Date: Saturday, March 4, 2017 @ 22:08:09
Author: jgc
Revision: 289996
upgpkg: x11vnc 1:0.9.13-10
OpenSSL 1.1 rebuild
Added:
x11vnc/trunk/0001-Fix-openssl-1.1.x-detection.patch
x11vnc/trunk/0002-Support-openssl-1.1.0.patch
Modified:
x11vnc/trunk/PKGBUILD
----------------------------------------+
0001-Fix-openssl-1.1.x-detection.patch | 34 ++
0002-Support-openssl-1.1.0.patch | 481 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
PKGBUILD | 9
3 files changed, 523 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Added: 0001-Fix-openssl-1.1.x-detection.patch
===================================================================
--- 0001-Fix-openssl-1.1.x-detection.patch (rev 0)
+++ 0001-Fix-openssl-1.1.x-detection.patch 2017-03-04 22:08:09 UTC (rev 289996)
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 5889645bd3e63cf02c3fcad942d7edef1b4df472 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
+Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 10:56:24 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix openssl 1.1.x detection
+
+The SSL_library_init function has been renamed to OPENSSL_init_ssl from
+openssl 1.1.0 on. While the old name still exists as a define for
+backwards compatibility, this breaks detection in the library itself.
+Update configure.ac to just detect the library instead of specific
+functions.
+
+Signed-off-by: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
+---
+ configure.ac | 7 +++----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -351,12 +351,11 @@ fi
+ AH_TEMPLATE(HAVE_X509_PRINT_EX_FP, [open ssl X509_print_ex_fp available])
+ if test "x$with_ssl" != "xno"; then
+ if test "x$HAVE_LIBCRYPTO" = "xtrue"; then
+- AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, SSL_library_init,
++ PKG_CHECK_MODULES(OPENSSL, [openssl >= 1.0.0],
+ SSL_LIBS="-lssl -lcrypto"
+- [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBSSL) HAVE_LIBSSL="true"], ,
+- -lcrypto)
++ [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBSSL) HAVE_LIBSSL="true"], ,)
+ else
+- AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, SSL_library_init,
++ PKG_CHECK_MODULES(OPENSSL, [openssl >= 1.0.0],
+ SSL_LIBS="-lssl"
+ [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBSSL) HAVE_LIBSSL="true"], ,)
+ fi
Added: 0002-Support-openssl-1.1.0.patch
===================================================================
--- 0002-Support-openssl-1.1.0.patch (rev 0)
+++ 0002-Support-openssl-1.1.0.patch 2017-03-04 22:08:09 UTC (rev 289996)
@@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
+From d37dac6963c2fb65cf577a6413657621cbcb406a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
+Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 14:43:57 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Support openssl 1.1.0
+
+Compatibility patch for openssl 1.1.0 and later. The 1.0.2 API should
+still work. Note that openssl 1.1.0 builds now have SSLv3 disabled per
+default, so clients will have to support TLS to connect securely.
+
+Signed-off-by: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
+---
+ README | 16 +++++++
+ x11vnc/enc.h | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ x11vnc/sslhelper.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 3 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/README
++++ b/README
+@@ -871,6 +871,14 @@ make
+ place. As of x11vnc 0.9.4 there is also the --with-ssl=DIR configure
+ option.
+
++ Note that from OpenSSL 1.1.0 on SSLv2 support has been dropped and
++ SSLv3 deactivated at build time per default. This means that unless
++ explicitly enabled, OpenSSL builds only support TLS (any version).
++ Since there is a reason for dropping SSLv3 (heard of POODLE?), most
++ distributions do not enable it for their OpenSSL binary. In summary
++ this means compiling x11vnc against OpenSSL 1.1.0 or newer is no
++ problem, but using encryption will require a viewer with TLS support.
++
+ On Solaris using static archives libssl.a and libcrypto.a instead of
+ .so shared libraries (e.g. from www.sunfreeware.com), we found we
+ needed to also set LDFLAGS as follows to get the configure to work:
+@@ -4228,6 +4236,14 @@ connect = 5900
+ protocol handshake. x11vnc 0.9.6 supports both simultaneously when
+ -ssl is active.
+
++ Note: With the advent of OpenSSL 1.1.0, SSLv2 is dropped and SSLv3
++ deactivated per default. A couple broken ciphers have also gone, most
++ importantly though is that clients trying to connect to x11vnc will
++ now have to support TLS if encryption is to be used. You can of
++ course always cook up your own build and run time OpenSSL 1.1.x if
++ SSLv3 is absolutely required, but it isn't wise from a security point
++ of view.
++
+
+ SSL VNC Viewers:. Viewer-side will need to use SSL as well. See the
+ next FAQ and here for SSL enabled VNC Viewers, including SSVNC, to
+--- a/x11vnc/enc.h
++++ b/x11vnc/enc.h
+@@ -454,8 +454,10 @@ extern void enc_do(char *ciph, char *key
+ p++;
+ if (strstr(p, "md5+") == p) {
+ Digest = EVP_md5(); p += strlen("md5+");
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L && !defined OPENSSL_NO_SHA0
+ } else if (strstr(p, "sha+") == p) {
+ Digest = EVP_sha(); p += strlen("sha+");
++#endif
+ } else if (strstr(p, "sha1+") == p) {
+ Digest = EVP_sha1(); p += strlen("sha1+");
+ } else if (strstr(p, "ripe+") == p) {
+@@ -696,7 +698,11 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
+ */
+ unsigned char E_keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char D_keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *E_ctx, *D_ctx;
++#else
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX E_ctx, D_ctx;
++#endif
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ unsigned char buf[BSIZE], out[BSIZE];
+@@ -739,11 +745,16 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
+ encsym = encrypt ? "+" : "-";
+
+ /* use the encryption/decryption context variables below */
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ E_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++ D_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++ ctx = encrypt ? E_ctx : D_ctx;
++#else
++ ctx = encrypt ? &E_ctx : &D_ctx;
++#endif
+ if (encrypt) {
+- ctx = &E_ctx;
+ keystr = E_keystr;
+ } else {
+- ctx = &D_ctx;
+ keystr = D_keystr;
+ }
+
+@@ -877,9 +888,9 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
+ in_salt = salt;
+ }
+
+- if (ivec_size < Cipher->iv_len && !securevnc) {
++ if (ivec_size < EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(Cipher) && !securevnc) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s - WARNING: short IV %d < %d\n",
+- prog, encstr, ivec_size, Cipher->iv_len);
++ prog, encstr, ivec_size, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(Cipher));
+ }
+
+ /* make the hashed value and place in keystr */
+@@ -1033,6 +1044,11 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s - close sock_fr\n", prog, encstr);
+ close(sock_fr);
+
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(E_ctx);
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(D_ctx);
++#endif
++
+ /* kill our partner after 2 secs. */
+ sleep(2);
+ if (child) {
+@@ -1101,14 +1117,24 @@ static int securevnc_server_rsa_save_dia
+ }
+
+ static char *rsa_md5_sum(unsigned char* rsabuf) {
+- EVP_MD_CTX md;
++ EVP_MD_CTX *md;
+ char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmp[16];
+ char md5str[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 8];
+ unsigned int i, size = 0;
+
+- EVP_DigestInit(&md, EVP_md5());
+- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, rsabuf, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
+- EVP_DigestFinal(&md, (unsigned char *)digest, &size);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
++#else
++ md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
++#endif
++ EVP_DigestInit(md, EVP_md5());
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, rsabuf, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
++ EVP_DigestFinal(md, (unsigned char *)digest, &size);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
++#else
++ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
++#endif
+
+ memset(md5str, 0, sizeof(md5str));
+ for (i=0; i < size; i++) {
+@@ -1225,7 +1251,7 @@ static void sslexit(char *msg) {
+
+ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, int conn2) {
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX init_ctx;
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *init_ctx;
+ unsigned char keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *rsabuf, *rsasav;
+ unsigned char *encrypted_keybuf;
+@@ -1364,8 +1390,15 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ /*
+ * Back to the work involving the tmp obscuring key:
+ */
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&init_ctx);
+- rc = EVP_CipherInit_ex(&init_ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, initkey, NULL, 1);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ init_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++#else
++
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX init_ctx_obj;
++ init_ctx = &init_ctx_obj;
++#endif
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(init_ctx);
++ rc = EVP_CipherInit_ex(init_ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, initkey, NULL, 1);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ sslexit("securevnc_setup: EVP_CipherInit_ex(init_ctx) failed");
+ }
+@@ -1374,6 +1407,9 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ n = read(server, (char *) buf, BSIZE);
+ fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: data read: %d\n", n);
+ if (n < 0) {
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx);
++#endif
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: initial data[%d]: ", n);
+@@ -1381,13 +1417,19 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ /* decode with the tmp key */
+ if (n > 0) {
+ memset(to_viewer, 0, sizeof(to_viewer));
+- if (EVP_CipherUpdate(&init_ctx, to_viewer, &len, buf, n) == 0) {
++ if (EVP_CipherUpdate(init_ctx, to_viewer, &len, buf, n) == 0) {
+ sslexit("securevnc_setup: EVP_CipherUpdate(init_ctx) failed");
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx);
++#endif
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ to_viewer_len = len;
+ }
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&init_ctx);
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(init_ctx);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx);
++#endif
+ free(initkey);
+
+ /* print what we would send to the viewer (sent below): */
+@@ -1448,7 +1490,7 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+
+ if (client_auth_req && client_auth) {
+ RSA *client_rsa = load_client_auth(client_auth);
+- EVP_MD_CTX dctx;
++ EVP_MD_CTX *dctx;
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *signature;
+ unsigned int ndig = 0, nsig = 0;
+
+@@ -1462,8 +1504,13 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+- EVP_DigestInit(&dctx, EVP_sha1());
+- EVP_DigestUpdate(&dctx, keystr, SECUREVNC_KEY_SIZE);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ dctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
++#else
++ dctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
++#endif
++ EVP_DigestInit(dctx, EVP_sha1());
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(dctx, keystr, SECUREVNC_KEY_SIZE);
+ /*
+ * Without something like the following MITM is still possible.
+ * This is because the MITM knows keystr and can use it with
+@@ -1474,7 +1521,7 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ * he doesn't have Viewer_ClientAuth.pkey.
+ */
+ if (0) {
+- EVP_DigestUpdate(&dctx, rsasav, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(dctx, rsasav, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
+ if (!keystore_verified) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: Warning: even *WITH* Client Authentication in SecureVNC,\n");
+@@ -1497,7 +1544,12 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup:\n");
+ }
+ }
+- EVP_DigestFinal(&dctx, (unsigned char *)digest, &ndig);
++ EVP_DigestFinal(dctx, (unsigned char *)digest, &ndig);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_MD_CTX_free(dctx);
++#else
++ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(dctx);
++#endif
+
+ signature = (unsigned char *) calloc(RSA_size(client_rsa), 1);
+ RSA_sign(NID_sha1, digest, ndig, signature, &nsig, client_rsa);
+--- a/x11vnc/sslhelper.c
++++ b/x11vnc/sslhelper.c
+@@ -799,8 +799,13 @@ static int pem_passwd_callback(char *buf
+
+ /* based on mod_ssl */
+ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *callback_ctx) {
+- X509_STORE_CTX store_ctx;
++ const ASN1_INTEGER *revoked_serial;
++ X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx;
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10100000L
++ X509_OBJECT *obj;
++#else
+ X509_OBJECT obj;
++#endif
+ X509_NAME *subject;
+ X509_NAME *issuer;
+ X509 *xs;
+@@ -820,11 +825,19 @@ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *
+
+ /* Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _subject_ of
+ * the current certificate in order to verify it's integrity. */
++ store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
++ X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10100000L
++ obj = X509_OBJECT_new();
++ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, subject, obj);
++ crl = X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(obj);
++#else
+ memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
+- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
+- rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj);
+- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx);
++ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj);
+ crl=obj.data.crl;
++#endif
++ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(store_ctx);
++ X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx);
+
+ if(rc>0 && crl) {
+ /* Log information about CRL
+@@ -850,7 +863,11 @@ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *
+ rfbLog("Invalid signature on CRL\n");
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx,
+ X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
++#else
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#endif
+ if(pubkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
+ return 0; /* Reject connection */
+@@ -864,45 +881,78 @@ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *
+ rfbLog("Found CRL has invalid nextUpdate field\n");
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx,
+ X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
++#else
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#endif
+ return 0; /* Reject connection */
+ }
+ if(X509_cmp_current_time(t)<0) {
+ rfbLog("Found CRL is expired - "
+ "revoking all certificates until you get updated CRL\n");
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
++#else
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#endif
+ return 0; /* Reject connection */
+ }
+- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
++#else
++ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#endif
+ }
+
+ /* Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _issuer_ of
+ * the current certificate in order to check for revocation. */
++ store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
++ X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10100000L
++ obj = X509_OBJECT_new();
++ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, obj);
++ crl = X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(obj);
++#else
+ memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
+- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
+- rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj);
+- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx);
++ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj);
+ crl=obj.data.crl;
++#endif
++ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(store_ctx);
++ X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx);
+
+ if(rc>0 && crl) {
+ /* Check if the current certificate is revoked by this CRL */
+ n=sk_X509_REVOKED_num(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl));
+ for(i=0; i<n; i++) {
+ revoked=sk_X509_REVOKED_value(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl), i);
+- if(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(revoked->serialNumber,
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ revoked_serial = X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(revoked);
++#else
++ revoked_serial = revoked->serialNumber;
++#endif
++ if(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(revoked_serial,
+ X509_get_serialNumber(xs)) == 0) {
+- serial=ASN1_INTEGER_get(revoked->serialNumber);
++ serial=ASN1_INTEGER_get(revoked_serial);
+ cp=X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, NULL, 0);
+ rfbLog("Certificate with serial %ld (0x%lX) "
+ "revoked per CRL from issuer %s\n", serial, serial, cp);
+ OPENSSL_free(cp);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
++#else
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#endif
+ return 0; /* Reject connection */
+ }
+ }
+- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
++#else
++ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#endif
+ }
+
+ return 1; /* Accept connection */
+@@ -951,6 +1001,8 @@ static int switch_to_anon_dh(void);
+
+ void openssl_init(int isclient) {
+ int db = 0, tmp_pem = 0, do_dh;
++ const SSL_METHOD *method;
++ char *method_name;
+ FILE *in;
+ double ds;
+ long mode;
+@@ -992,13 +1044,17 @@ void openssl_init(int isclient) {
+ ssl_client_mode = 0;
+ }
+
+- if (ssl_client_mode) {
+- if (db) fprintf(stderr, "SSLv23_client_method()\n");
+- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_client_method() );
+- } else {
+- if (db) fprintf(stderr, "SSLv23_server_method()\n");
+- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_server_method() );
+- }
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ method = ssl_client_mode ? TLS_client_method() : TLS_server_method();
++ if (db)
++ method_name = ssl_client_mode ? "TLS_client_method()" : "TLS_server_method()";
++#else
++ method = ssl_client_mode ? SSLv23_client_method() : SSLv23_server_method();
++ if (db)
++ method_name = ssl_client_mode ? "SSLv23_client_method()" : "SSLv23_server_method()";
++#endif
++ if (db) fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", method_name);
++ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ rfbLog("openssl_init: SSL_CTX_new failed.\n");
+@@ -1520,16 +1576,18 @@ static int add_anon_dh(void) {
+ }
+
+ static int switch_to_anon_dh(void) {
++ const SSL_METHOD *method;
+ long mode;
+
+ rfbLog("Using Anonymous Diffie-Hellman mode.\n");
+ rfbLog("WARNING: Anonymous Diffie-Hellman uses encryption but is\n");
+ rfbLog("WARNING: susceptible to a Man-In-The-Middle attack.\n");
+- if (ssl_client_mode) {
+- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_client_method() );
+- } else {
+- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_server_method() );
+- }
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ method = ssl_client_mode ? TLS_client_method() : TLS_server_method();
++#else
++ method = ssl_client_mode ? SSLv23_client_method() : SSLv23_server_method();
++#endif
++ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -1896,6 +1954,7 @@ static void pr_ssl_info(int verb) {
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ SSL_SESSION *s;
+ char *proto = "unknown";
++ int ssl_version;
+
+ if (verb) {}
+
+@@ -1905,13 +1964,21 @@ static void pr_ssl_info(int verb) {
+ c = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
+ s = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+
++ if (s) {
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ ssl_version = SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(s);
++#else
++ ssl_version = s->ssl_version;
++#endif
++ }
++
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ proto = "nosession";
+- } else if (s->ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
++ } else if (ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ proto = "SSLv2";
+- } else if (s->ssl_version == SSL3_VERSION) {
++ } else if (ssl_version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ proto = "SSLv3";
+- } else if (s->ssl_version == TLS1_VERSION) {
++ } else if (ssl_version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+ proto = "TLSv1";
+ }
+ if (c != NULL) {
Modified: PKGBUILD
===================================================================
--- PKGBUILD 2017-03-04 21:54:03 UTC (rev 289995)
+++ PKGBUILD 2017-03-04 22:08:09 UTC (rev 289996)
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
pkgname=x11vnc
epoch=1
pkgver=0.9.13
-pkgrel=9
+pkgrel=10
pkgdesc='VNC server for real X displays'
url='http://www.karlrunge.com/x11vnc/'
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
@@ -16,14 +16,21 @@
depends=('openssl' 'libjpeg' 'libxtst' 'libxinerama' 'libxdamage' 'libxrandr' 'avahi')
source=("http://downloads.sourceforge.net/project/libvncserver/${pkgname}/${pkgver}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz"
'fix-buffer-overflows.patch'
+ '0001-Fix-openssl-1.1.x-detection.patch'
+ '0002-Support-openssl-1.1.0.patch'
'service')
sha256sums=('f6829f2e629667a5284de62b080b13126a0736499fe47cdb447aedb07a59f13b'
'21fe10bee45d6fcf3a41aba546cd1134a858dc78ee3f95f5137d50c22d566912'
+ 'f356009176a11a793fef4514b26468c04908c961e6be226a83b631b6df5a2fdc'
+ 'eaf92da28276273c1892631b063b0477148b9e2f7dd14645e82b4afbfe02c0c2'
'cfb19d44e09e960e2fdb958c9258bccf23c2677715314985f7e819f1dcedb6e4')
prepare() {
cd "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}"
patch -p1 -i ../fix-buffer-overflows.patch
+ patch -p1 -i ../0001-Fix-openssl-1.1.x-detection.patch
+ patch -p1 -i ../0002-Support-openssl-1.1.0.patch
+ autoreconf -fi
}
build() {
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