[arch-commits] Commit in linux/trunk (14 files)

Jan Steffens heftig at archlinux.org
Wed Jan 3 07:21:26 UTC 2018


    Date: Wednesday, January 3, 2018 @ 07:21:25
  Author: heftig
Revision: 313949

4.14.11-1

Added:
  linux/trunk/0002-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch
    (from rev 313772, linux/trunk/0001-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch)
  linux/trunk/0003-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch
    (from rev 313772, linux/trunk/0002-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch)
  linux/trunk/0004-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch
    (from rev 313772, linux/trunk/0001-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch)
  linux/trunk/0005-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch
    (from rev 313772, linux/trunk/0002-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch)
  linux/trunk/0006-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch
    (from rev 313772, linux/trunk/0003-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch)
  linux/trunk/0007-x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch
Modified:
  linux/trunk/0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch
  linux/trunk/PKGBUILD
  linux/trunk/config
Deleted:
  linux/trunk/0001-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch
  linux/trunk/0001-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch
  linux/trunk/0002-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch
  linux/trunk/0002-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch
  linux/trunk/0003-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch

-----------------------------------------------------------------+
 0001-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch |   72 ------
 0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch |   15 -
 0001-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch |   73 ------
 0002-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch       |   57 -----
 0002-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch |   75 ++++++
 0002-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch |   49 ----
 0003-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch |  114 ----------
 0003-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch       |   57 +++++
 0004-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch |   74 ++++++
 0005-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch |   49 ++++
 0006-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch |  114 ++++++++++
 0007-x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch  |   42 +++
 PKGBUILD                                                        |   43 ++-
 config                                                          |    3 
 14 files changed, 445 insertions(+), 392 deletions(-)

Deleted: 0001-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch
===================================================================
--- 0001-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch	2018-01-03 07:16:24 UTC (rev 313948)
+++ 0001-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch	2018-01-03 07:21:25 UTC (rev 313949)
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-From b0bfa7c33cead5dd87267cfd4c29fda47dc1adc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-Message-Id: <b0bfa7c33cead5dd87267cfd4c29fda47dc1adc4.1514245012.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
-From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert at secunet.com>
-Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2017 06:40:57 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Revert "xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in
- xfrm_state_find."
-
-This reverts commit c9f3f813d462c72dbe412cee6a5cbacf13c4ad5e.
-
-This commit breaks transport mode when the policy template
-has widlcard addresses configured, so revert it.
-
-Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert at secunet.com>
----
- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
-index 6eb228a70131069b..a2e531bf4f976308 100644
---- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
-+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
-@@ -1361,29 +1361,36 @@ xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one(struct xfrm_policy *policy, const struct flowi *fl,
- 	struct net *net = xp_net(policy);
- 	int nx;
- 	int i, error;
-+	xfrm_address_t *daddr = xfrm_flowi_daddr(fl, family);
-+	xfrm_address_t *saddr = xfrm_flowi_saddr(fl, family);
- 	xfrm_address_t tmp;
- 
- 	for (nx = 0, i = 0; i < policy->xfrm_nr; i++) {
- 		struct xfrm_state *x;
--		xfrm_address_t *local;
--		xfrm_address_t *remote;
-+		xfrm_address_t *remote = daddr;
-+		xfrm_address_t *local  = saddr;
- 		struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl = &policy->xfrm_vec[i];
- 
--		remote = &tmpl->id.daddr;
--		local = &tmpl->saddr;
--		if (xfrm_addr_any(local, tmpl->encap_family)) {
--			error = xfrm_get_saddr(net, fl->flowi_oif,
--					       &tmp, remote,
--					       tmpl->encap_family, 0);
--			if (error)
--				goto fail;
--			local = &tmp;
-+		if (tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL ||
-+		    tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_BEET) {
-+			remote = &tmpl->id.daddr;
-+			local = &tmpl->saddr;
-+			if (xfrm_addr_any(local, tmpl->encap_family)) {
-+				error = xfrm_get_saddr(net, fl->flowi_oif,
-+						       &tmp, remote,
-+						       tmpl->encap_family, 0);
-+				if (error)
-+					goto fail;
-+				local = &tmp;
-+			}
- 		}
- 
- 		x = xfrm_state_find(remote, local, fl, tmpl, policy, &error, family);
- 
- 		if (x && x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_VALID) {
- 			xfrm[nx++] = x;
-+			daddr = remote;
-+			saddr = local;
- 			continue;
- 		}
- 		if (x) {
--- 
-2.15.1
-

Modified: 0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch
===================================================================
--- 0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch	2018-01-03 07:16:24 UTC (rev 313948)
+++ 0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch	2018-01-03 07:21:25 UTC (rev 313949)
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
-From 5ec2dd3a095442ec1a21d86042a4994f2ba24e63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-Message-Id: <5ec2dd3a095442ec1a21d86042a4994f2ba24e63.1512651251.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+From fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
 From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn at canonical.com>
 Date: Fri, 31 May 2013 19:12:12 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] add sysctl to disallow unprivileged CLONE_NEWUSER by default
+Subject: [PATCH 1/7] add sysctl to disallow unprivileged CLONE_NEWUSER by
+ default
 
 Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn at ubuntu.com>
 [bwh: Remove unneeded binary sysctl bits]
@@ -14,7 +15,7 @@
  3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
-index 07cc743698d3668e..4011d68a8ff9305c 100644
+index 500ce64517d93e68..35f5860958b40e9b 100644
 --- a/kernel/fork.c
 +++ b/kernel/fork.c
 @@ -102,6 +102,11 @@
@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@
  
  /*
   * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel
-@@ -1555,6 +1560,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
+@@ -1554,6 +1559,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
  	if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS))
  		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
  
@@ -40,7 +41,7 @@
  	/*
  	 * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
  	 * can only be started up within the thread group.
-@@ -2348,6 +2357,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unshare, unsigned long, unshare_flags)
+@@ -2347,6 +2356,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unshare, unsigned long, unshare_flags)
  	if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
  		unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS;
  
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@
  	if (err)
  		goto bad_unshare_out;
 diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
-index b86520ed3fb60fbf..f7dab3760839f1a1 100644
+index 56aca862c4f584f5..e8402ba393c1915d 100644
 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
 +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
 @@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ extern int core_uses_pid;

Deleted: 0001-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch
===================================================================
--- 0001-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch	2018-01-03 07:16:24 UTC (rev 313948)
+++ 0001-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch	2018-01-03 07:21:25 UTC (rev 313949)
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From c3c1af44db713ac6624e729ea4832d0ce70685e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-Message-Id: <c3c1af44db713ac6624e729ea4832d0ce70685e0.1513282811.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
-From: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier at suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 16:26:40 +0900
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] e1000e: Fix e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan return
- value.
-
-e1000e_check_for_copper_link() and e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan()
-are the two functions that may be assigned to mac.ops.check_for_link when
-phy.media_type == e1000_media_type_copper. Commit 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e:
-Separate signaling for link check/link up") changed the meaning of the
-return value of check_for_link for copper media but only adjusted the first
-function. This patch adjusts the second function likewise.
-
-Reported-by: Christian Hesse <list at eworm.de>
-Reported-by: Gabriel C <nix.or.die at gmail.com>
-Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198047
-Fixes: 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e: Separate signaling for link check/link up")
-Tested-by: Christian Hesse <list at eworm.de>
-Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier at suse.com>
----
- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c | 11 ++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
-index d6d4ed7acf031172..31277d3bb7dc1241 100644
---- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
-+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
-@@ -1367,22 +1367,25 @@ static s32 e1000_disable_ulp_lpt_lp(struct e1000_hw *hw, bool force)
-  *  Checks to see of the link status of the hardware has changed.  If a
-  *  change in link status has been detected, then we read the PHY registers
-  *  to get the current speed/duplex if link exists.
-+ *
-+ *  Returns a negative error code (-E1000_ERR_*) or 0 (link down) or 1 (link
-+ *  up).
-  **/
- static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan(struct e1000_hw *hw)
- {
- 	struct e1000_mac_info *mac = &hw->mac;
- 	s32 ret_val, tipg_reg = 0;
- 	u16 emi_addr, emi_val = 0;
- 	bool link;
- 	u16 phy_reg;
- 
- 	/* We only want to go out to the PHY registers to see if Auto-Neg
- 	 * has completed and/or if our link status has changed.  The
- 	 * get_link_status flag is set upon receiving a Link Status
- 	 * Change or Rx Sequence Error interrupt.
- 	 */
- 	if (!mac->get_link_status)
--		return 0;
-+		return 1;
- 
- 	/* First we want to see if the MII Status Register reports
- 	 * link.  If so, then we want to get the current speed/duplex
-@@ -1613,10 +1616,12 @@ static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan(struct e1000_hw *hw)
- 	 * different link partner.
- 	 */
- 	ret_val = e1000e_config_fc_after_link_up(hw);
--	if (ret_val)
-+	if (ret_val) {
- 		e_dbg("Error configuring flow control\n");
-+		return ret_val;
-+	}
- 
--	return ret_val;
-+	return 1;
- }
- 
- static s32 e1000_get_variants_ich8lan(struct e1000_adapter *adapter)
--- 
-2.15.1
-

Deleted: 0002-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch
===================================================================
--- 0002-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch	2018-01-03 07:16:24 UTC (rev 313948)
+++ 0002-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch	2018-01-03 07:21:25 UTC (rev 313949)
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-From 80d3e994e0631d9135cadf20a0b5ad483d7e9bbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-Message-Id: <80d3e994e0631d9135cadf20a0b5ad483d7e9bbb.1513282811.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
-In-Reply-To: <c3c1af44db713ac6624e729ea4832d0ce70685e0.1513282811.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
-References: <c3c1af44db713ac6624e729ea4832d0ce70685e0.1513282811.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
-From: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam at gmail.com>
-Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2017 20:58:35 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] dccp: CVE-2017-8824: use-after-free in DCCP code
-
-Whenever the sock object is in DCCP_CLOSED state,
-dccp_disconnect() must free dccps_hc_tx_ccid and
-dccps_hc_rx_ccid and set to NULL.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam at gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet at google.com>
-Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
----
- net/dccp/proto.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/net/dccp/proto.c b/net/dccp/proto.c
-index b68168fcc06aa198..9d43c1f4027408f3 100644
---- a/net/dccp/proto.c
-+++ b/net/dccp/proto.c
-@@ -259,25 +259,30 @@ int dccp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags)
- {
- 	struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
- 	struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
-+	struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);
- 	int err = 0;
- 	const int old_state = sk->sk_state;
- 
- 	if (old_state != DCCP_CLOSED)
- 		dccp_set_state(sk, DCCP_CLOSED);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * This corresponds to the ABORT function of RFC793, sec. 3.8
- 	 * TCP uses a RST segment, DCCP a Reset packet with Code 2, "Aborted".
- 	 */
- 	if (old_state == DCCP_LISTEN) {
- 		inet_csk_listen_stop(sk);
- 	} else if (dccp_need_reset(old_state)) {
- 		dccp_send_reset(sk, DCCP_RESET_CODE_ABORTED);
- 		sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
- 	} else if (old_state == DCCP_REQUESTING)
- 		sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
- 
- 	dccp_clear_xmit_timers(sk);
-+	ccid_hc_rx_delete(dp->dccps_hc_rx_ccid, sk);
-+	ccid_hc_tx_delete(dp->dccps_hc_tx_ccid, sk);
-+	dp->dccps_hc_rx_ccid = NULL;
-+	dp->dccps_hc_tx_ccid = NULL;
- 
- 	__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
- 	__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
--- 
-2.15.1
-

Copied: linux/trunk/0002-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch (from rev 313772, linux/trunk/0001-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch)
===================================================================
--- 0002-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ 0002-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch	2018-01-03 07:21:25 UTC (rev 313949)
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From 8c6956686606b9c3661e74a410c8cb2fc276c5ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id: <8c6956686606b9c3661e74a410c8cb2fc276c5ee.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+In-Reply-To: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+References: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+From: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier at suse.com>
+Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2017 16:26:40 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH 2/7] e1000e: Fix e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan return
+ value.
+
+e1000e_check_for_copper_link() and e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan()
+are the two functions that may be assigned to mac.ops.check_for_link when
+phy.media_type == e1000_media_type_copper. Commit 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e:
+Separate signaling for link check/link up") changed the meaning of the
+return value of check_for_link for copper media but only adjusted the first
+function. This patch adjusts the second function likewise.
+
+Reported-by: Christian Hesse <list at eworm.de>
+Reported-by: Gabriel C <nix.or.die at gmail.com>
+Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198047
+Fixes: 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e: Separate signaling for link check/link up")
+Tested-by: Christian Hesse <list at eworm.de>
+Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier at suse.com>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c | 11 ++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
+index d6d4ed7acf031172..31277d3bb7dc1241 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
+@@ -1367,22 +1367,25 @@ static s32 e1000_disable_ulp_lpt_lp(struct e1000_hw *hw, bool force)
+  *  Checks to see of the link status of the hardware has changed.  If a
+  *  change in link status has been detected, then we read the PHY registers
+  *  to get the current speed/duplex if link exists.
++ *
++ *  Returns a negative error code (-E1000_ERR_*) or 0 (link down) or 1 (link
++ *  up).
+  **/
+ static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan(struct e1000_hw *hw)
+ {
+ 	struct e1000_mac_info *mac = &hw->mac;
+ 	s32 ret_val, tipg_reg = 0;
+ 	u16 emi_addr, emi_val = 0;
+ 	bool link;
+ 	u16 phy_reg;
+ 
+ 	/* We only want to go out to the PHY registers to see if Auto-Neg
+ 	 * has completed and/or if our link status has changed.  The
+ 	 * get_link_status flag is set upon receiving a Link Status
+ 	 * Change or Rx Sequence Error interrupt.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (!mac->get_link_status)
+-		return 0;
++		return 1;
+ 
+ 	/* First we want to see if the MII Status Register reports
+ 	 * link.  If so, then we want to get the current speed/duplex
+@@ -1613,10 +1616,12 @@ static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan(struct e1000_hw *hw)
+ 	 * different link partner.
+ 	 */
+ 	ret_val = e1000e_config_fc_after_link_up(hw);
+-	if (ret_val)
++	if (ret_val) {
+ 		e_dbg("Error configuring flow control\n");
++		return ret_val;
++	}
+ 
+-	return ret_val;
++	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static s32 e1000_get_variants_ich8lan(struct e1000_adapter *adapter)
+-- 
+2.15.1
+

Deleted: 0002-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch
===================================================================
--- 0002-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch	2018-01-03 07:16:24 UTC (rev 313948)
+++ 0002-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch	2018-01-03 07:21:25 UTC (rev 313949)
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-From 1c3a5e72b70bcfaf342075a3fa5fcbdf99302a3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-Message-Id: <1c3a5e72b70bcfaf342075a3fa5fcbdf99302a3f.1514245012.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
-In-Reply-To: <b0bfa7c33cead5dd87267cfd4c29fda47dc1adc4.1514245012.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
-References: <b0bfa7c33cead5dd87267cfd4c29fda47dc1adc4.1514245012.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
-From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert at secunet.com>
-Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2017 10:44:57 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read on socket policy
- lookup.
-
-When we do tunnel or beet mode, we pass saddr and daddr from the
-template to xfrm_state_find(), this is ok. On transport mode,
-we pass the addresses from the flowi, assuming that the IP
-addresses (and address family) don't change during transformation.
-This assumption is wrong in the IPv4 mapped IPv6 case, packet
-is IPv4 and template is IPv6.
-
-Fix this by catching address family missmatches of the policy
-and the flow already before we do the lookup.
-
-Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller at googlegroups.com>
-Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert at secunet.com>
----
- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 8 +++++++-
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
-index a2e531bf4f976308..c79ed3bed5d4dc2f 100644
---- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
-+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
-@@ -1169,9 +1169,15 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(const struct sock *sk, int dir,
-  again:
- 	pol = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_policy[dir]);
- 	if (pol != NULL) {
--		bool match = xfrm_selector_match(&pol->selector, fl, family);
-+		bool match;
- 		int err = 0;
- 
-+		if (pol->family != family) {
-+			pol = NULL;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+
-+		match = xfrm_selector_match(&pol->selector, fl, family);
- 		if (match) {
- 			if ((sk->sk_mark & pol->mark.m) != pol->mark.v) {
- 				pol = NULL;
--- 
-2.15.1
-

Deleted: 0003-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch
===================================================================
--- 0003-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch	2018-01-03 07:16:24 UTC (rev 313948)
+++ 0003-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch	2018-01-03 07:21:25 UTC (rev 313949)
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-From a3c64fe9d978f3ee8f21fac5b410c63fe7cce725 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-Message-Id: <a3c64fe9d978f3ee8f21fac5b410c63fe7cce725.1514245012.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
-In-Reply-To: <b0bfa7c33cead5dd87267cfd4c29fda47dc1adc4.1514245012.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
-References: <b0bfa7c33cead5dd87267cfd4c29fda47dc1adc4.1514245012.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
-From: Tejun Heo <tj at kernel.org>
-Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 07:09:19 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] cgroup: fix css_task_iter crash on CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC
-
-While teaching css_task_iter to handle skipping over tasks which
-aren't group leaders, bc2fb7ed089f ("cgroup: add @flags to
-css_task_iter_start() and implement CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS") introduced a
-silly bug.
-
-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS is implemented by repeating
-css_task_iter_advance() while the advanced cursor is pointing to a
-non-leader thread.  However, the cursor variable, @l, wasn't updated
-when the iteration has to advance to the next css_set and the
-following repetition would operate on the terminal @l from the
-previous iteration which isn't pointing to a valid task leading to
-oopses like the following or infinite looping.
-
-  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000254
-  IP: __task_pid_nr_ns+0xc7/0xf0
-  PGD 0 P4D 0
-  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
-  ...
-  CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.14.4-200.fc26.x86_64 #1
-  Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/PRIME B350M-A, BIOS 3203 11/09/2017
-  task: ffff88c4baee8000 task.stack: ffff96d5c3158000
-  RIP: 0010:__task_pid_nr_ns+0xc7/0xf0
-  RSP: 0018:ffff96d5c315bd50 EFLAGS: 00010206
-  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88c4b68c6000 RCX: 0000000000000250
-  RDX: ffffffffa5e47960 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88c490f6ab00
-  RBP: ffff96d5c315bd50 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: 0000000000000005
-  R10: ffff88c4be006b80 R11: ffff88c42f1b8004 R12: ffff96d5c315bf18
-  R13: ffff88c42d7dd200 R14: ffff88c490f6a510 R15: ffff88c4b68c6000
-  FS:  00007f9446f8ea00(0000) GS:ffff88c4be680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
-  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
-  CR2: 0000000000000254 CR3: 00000007f956f000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
-  Call Trace:
-   cgroup_procs_show+0x19/0x30
-   cgroup_seqfile_show+0x4c/0xb0
-   kernfs_seq_show+0x21/0x30
-   seq_read+0x2ec/0x3f0
-   kernfs_fop_read+0x134/0x180
-   __vfs_read+0x37/0x160
-   ? security_file_permission+0x9b/0xc0
-   vfs_read+0x8e/0x130
-   SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
-   entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
-  RIP: 0033:0x7f94455f942d
-  RSP: 002b:00007ffe81ba2d00 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
-  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005574e2233f00 RCX: 00007f94455f942d
-  RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00005574e2321a90 RDI: 000000000000002b
-  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00005574e2321a90 R09: 00005574e231de60
-  R10: 00007f94458c8b38 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f94458c8ae0
-  R13: 00007ffe81ba3800 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005574e2116560
-  Code: 04 74 0e 89 f6 48 8d 04 76 48 8d 04 c5 f0 05 00 00 48 8b bf b8 05 00 00 48 01 c7 31 c0 48 8b 0f 48 85 c9 74 18 8b b2 30 08 00 00 <3b> 71 04 77 0d 48 c1 e6 05 48 01 f1 48 3b 51 38 74 09 5d c3 8b
-  RIP: __task_pid_nr_ns+0xc7/0xf0 RSP: ffff96d5c315bd50
-
-Fix it by moving the initialization of the cursor below the repeat
-label.  While at it, rename it to @next for readability.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj at kernel.org>
-Fixes: bc2fb7ed089f ("cgroup: add @flags to css_task_iter_start() and implement CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS")
-Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org # v4.14+
-Reported-by: Laura Abbott <labbott at redhat.com>
-Reported-by: Bronek Kozicki <brok at incorrekt.com>
-Reported-by: George Amanakis <gamanakis at gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj at kernel.org>
----
- kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 14 ++++++--------
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
-index 44857278eb8aa6a2..030e4286f14c715e 100644
---- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
-+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
-@@ -4059,26 +4059,24 @@ static void css_task_iter_advance_css_set(struct css_task_iter *it)
- 
- static void css_task_iter_advance(struct css_task_iter *it)
- {
--	struct list_head *l = it->task_pos;
-+	struct list_head *next;
- 
- 	lockdep_assert_held(&css_set_lock);
--	WARN_ON_ONCE(!l);
--
- repeat:
- 	/*
- 	 * Advance iterator to find next entry.  cset->tasks is consumed
- 	 * first and then ->mg_tasks.  After ->mg_tasks, we move onto the
- 	 * next cset.
- 	 */
--	l = l->next;
-+	next = it->task_pos->next;
- 
--	if (l == it->tasks_head)
--		l = it->mg_tasks_head->next;
-+	if (next == it->tasks_head)
-+		next = it->mg_tasks_head->next;
- 
--	if (l == it->mg_tasks_head)
-+	if (next == it->mg_tasks_head)
- 		css_task_iter_advance_css_set(it);
- 	else
--		it->task_pos = l;
-+		it->task_pos = next;
- 
- 	/* if PROCS, skip over tasks which aren't group leaders */
- 	if ((it->flags & CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS) && it->task_pos &&
--- 
-2.15.1
-

Copied: linux/trunk/0003-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch (from rev 313772, linux/trunk/0002-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch)
===================================================================
--- 0003-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ 0003-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch	2018-01-03 07:21:25 UTC (rev 313949)
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From b81e273fb227373a2951c7256ab11a87d5333a9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id: <b81e273fb227373a2951c7256ab11a87d5333a9d.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+In-Reply-To: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+References: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+From: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam at gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2017 20:58:35 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 3/7] dccp: CVE-2017-8824: use-after-free in DCCP code
+
+Whenever the sock object is in DCCP_CLOSED state,
+dccp_disconnect() must free dccps_hc_tx_ccid and
+dccps_hc_rx_ccid and set to NULL.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam at gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet at google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
+---
+ net/dccp/proto.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/dccp/proto.c b/net/dccp/proto.c
+index b68168fcc06aa198..9d43c1f4027408f3 100644
+--- a/net/dccp/proto.c
++++ b/net/dccp/proto.c
+@@ -259,25 +259,30 @@ int dccp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags)
+ {
+ 	struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
+ 	struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
++	struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);
+ 	int err = 0;
+ 	const int old_state = sk->sk_state;
+ 
+ 	if (old_state != DCCP_CLOSED)
+ 		dccp_set_state(sk, DCCP_CLOSED);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * This corresponds to the ABORT function of RFC793, sec. 3.8
+ 	 * TCP uses a RST segment, DCCP a Reset packet with Code 2, "Aborted".
+ 	 */
+ 	if (old_state == DCCP_LISTEN) {
+ 		inet_csk_listen_stop(sk);
+ 	} else if (dccp_need_reset(old_state)) {
+ 		dccp_send_reset(sk, DCCP_RESET_CODE_ABORTED);
+ 		sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
+ 	} else if (old_state == DCCP_REQUESTING)
+ 		sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
+ 
+ 	dccp_clear_xmit_timers(sk);
++	ccid_hc_rx_delete(dp->dccps_hc_rx_ccid, sk);
++	ccid_hc_tx_delete(dp->dccps_hc_tx_ccid, sk);
++	dp->dccps_hc_rx_ccid = NULL;
++	dp->dccps_hc_tx_ccid = NULL;
+ 
+ 	__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
+ 	__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
+-- 
+2.15.1
+

Copied: linux/trunk/0004-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch (from rev 313772, linux/trunk/0001-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch)
===================================================================
--- 0004-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ 0004-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch	2018-01-03 07:21:25 UTC (rev 313949)
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From d03c0ef520f40c6de691c37e0f168c87b3423015 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id: <d03c0ef520f40c6de691c37e0f168c87b3423015.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+In-Reply-To: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+References: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert at secunet.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2017 06:40:57 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 4/7] Revert "xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in
+ xfrm_state_find."
+
+This reverts commit c9f3f813d462c72dbe412cee6a5cbacf13c4ad5e.
+
+This commit breaks transport mode when the policy template
+has widlcard addresses configured, so revert it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert at secunet.com>
+---
+ net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+index 2a6093840e7e856e..6bc16bb61b5533ef 100644
+--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
++++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+@@ -1362,29 +1362,36 @@ xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one(struct xfrm_policy *policy, const struct flowi *fl,
+ 	struct net *net = xp_net(policy);
+ 	int nx;
+ 	int i, error;
++	xfrm_address_t *daddr = xfrm_flowi_daddr(fl, family);
++	xfrm_address_t *saddr = xfrm_flowi_saddr(fl, family);
+ 	xfrm_address_t tmp;
+ 
+ 	for (nx = 0, i = 0; i < policy->xfrm_nr; i++) {
+ 		struct xfrm_state *x;
+-		xfrm_address_t *local;
+-		xfrm_address_t *remote;
++		xfrm_address_t *remote = daddr;
++		xfrm_address_t *local  = saddr;
+ 		struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl = &policy->xfrm_vec[i];
+ 
+-		remote = &tmpl->id.daddr;
+-		local = &tmpl->saddr;
+-		if (xfrm_addr_any(local, tmpl->encap_family)) {
+-			error = xfrm_get_saddr(net, fl->flowi_oif,
+-					       &tmp, remote,
+-					       tmpl->encap_family, 0);
+-			if (error)
+-				goto fail;
+-			local = &tmp;
++		if (tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL ||
++		    tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_BEET) {
++			remote = &tmpl->id.daddr;
++			local = &tmpl->saddr;
++			if (xfrm_addr_any(local, tmpl->encap_family)) {
++				error = xfrm_get_saddr(net, fl->flowi_oif,
++						       &tmp, remote,
++						       tmpl->encap_family, 0);
++				if (error)
++					goto fail;
++				local = &tmp;
++			}
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		x = xfrm_state_find(remote, local, fl, tmpl, policy, &error, family);
+ 
+ 		if (x && x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_VALID) {
+ 			xfrm[nx++] = x;
++			daddr = remote;
++			saddr = local;
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+ 		if (x) {
+-- 
+2.15.1
+

Copied: linux/trunk/0005-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch (from rev 313772, linux/trunk/0002-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch)
===================================================================
--- 0005-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ 0005-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch	2018-01-03 07:21:25 UTC (rev 313949)
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 3721d64246982f91a5bf863fc17ac60ff722e0c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id: <3721d64246982f91a5bf863fc17ac60ff722e0c4.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+In-Reply-To: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+References: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert at secunet.com>
+Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2017 10:44:57 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 5/7] xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read on socket policy
+ lookup.
+
+When we do tunnel or beet mode, we pass saddr and daddr from the
+template to xfrm_state_find(), this is ok. On transport mode,
+we pass the addresses from the flowi, assuming that the IP
+addresses (and address family) don't change during transformation.
+This assumption is wrong in the IPv4 mapped IPv6 case, packet
+is IPv4 and template is IPv6.
+
+Fix this by catching address family missmatches of the policy
+and the flow already before we do the lookup.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller at googlegroups.com>
+Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert at secunet.com>
+---
+ net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+index 6bc16bb61b5533ef..50c5f46b5cca942e 100644
+--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
++++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+@@ -1169,9 +1169,15 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(const struct sock *sk, int dir,
+  again:
+ 	pol = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_policy[dir]);
+ 	if (pol != NULL) {
+-		bool match = xfrm_selector_match(&pol->selector, fl, family);
++		bool match;
+ 		int err = 0;
+ 
++		if (pol->family != family) {
++			pol = NULL;
++			goto out;
++		}
++
++		match = xfrm_selector_match(&pol->selector, fl, family);
+ 		if (match) {
+ 			if ((sk->sk_mark & pol->mark.m) != pol->mark.v) {
+ 				pol = NULL;
+-- 
+2.15.1
+

Copied: linux/trunk/0006-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch (from rev 313772, linux/trunk/0003-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch)
===================================================================
--- 0006-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ 0006-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch	2018-01-03 07:21:25 UTC (rev 313949)
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+From a79cb4d4e540c72a601ca0494e914565c16e2893 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id: <a79cb4d4e540c72a601ca0494e914565c16e2893.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+In-Reply-To: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+References: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+From: Tejun Heo <tj at kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 07:09:19 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 6/7] cgroup: fix css_task_iter crash on CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC
+
+While teaching css_task_iter to handle skipping over tasks which
+aren't group leaders, bc2fb7ed089f ("cgroup: add @flags to
+css_task_iter_start() and implement CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS") introduced a
+silly bug.
+
+CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS is implemented by repeating
+css_task_iter_advance() while the advanced cursor is pointing to a
+non-leader thread.  However, the cursor variable, @l, wasn't updated
+when the iteration has to advance to the next css_set and the
+following repetition would operate on the terminal @l from the
+previous iteration which isn't pointing to a valid task leading to
+oopses like the following or infinite looping.
+
+  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000254
+  IP: __task_pid_nr_ns+0xc7/0xf0
+  PGD 0 P4D 0
+  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
+  ...
+  CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.14.4-200.fc26.x86_64 #1
+  Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/PRIME B350M-A, BIOS 3203 11/09/2017
+  task: ffff88c4baee8000 task.stack: ffff96d5c3158000
+  RIP: 0010:__task_pid_nr_ns+0xc7/0xf0
+  RSP: 0018:ffff96d5c315bd50 EFLAGS: 00010206
+  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88c4b68c6000 RCX: 0000000000000250
+  RDX: ffffffffa5e47960 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88c490f6ab00
+  RBP: ffff96d5c315bd50 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: 0000000000000005
+  R10: ffff88c4be006b80 R11: ffff88c42f1b8004 R12: ffff96d5c315bf18
+  R13: ffff88c42d7dd200 R14: ffff88c490f6a510 R15: ffff88c4b68c6000
+  FS:  00007f9446f8ea00(0000) GS:ffff88c4be680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+  CR2: 0000000000000254 CR3: 00000007f956f000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
+  Call Trace:
+   cgroup_procs_show+0x19/0x30
+   cgroup_seqfile_show+0x4c/0xb0
+   kernfs_seq_show+0x21/0x30
+   seq_read+0x2ec/0x3f0
+   kernfs_fop_read+0x134/0x180
+   __vfs_read+0x37/0x160
+   ? security_file_permission+0x9b/0xc0
+   vfs_read+0x8e/0x130
+   SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
+   entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
+  RIP: 0033:0x7f94455f942d
+  RSP: 002b:00007ffe81ba2d00 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
+  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005574e2233f00 RCX: 00007f94455f942d
+  RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00005574e2321a90 RDI: 000000000000002b
+  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00005574e2321a90 R09: 00005574e231de60
+  R10: 00007f94458c8b38 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f94458c8ae0
+  R13: 00007ffe81ba3800 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005574e2116560
+  Code: 04 74 0e 89 f6 48 8d 04 76 48 8d 04 c5 f0 05 00 00 48 8b bf b8 05 00 00 48 01 c7 31 c0 48 8b 0f 48 85 c9 74 18 8b b2 30 08 00 00 <3b> 71 04 77 0d 48 c1 e6 05 48 01 f1 48 3b 51 38 74 09 5d c3 8b
+  RIP: __task_pid_nr_ns+0xc7/0xf0 RSP: ffff96d5c315bd50
+
+Fix it by moving the initialization of the cursor below the repeat
+label.  While at it, rename it to @next for readability.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj at kernel.org>
+Fixes: bc2fb7ed089f ("cgroup: add @flags to css_task_iter_start() and implement CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS")
+Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org # v4.14+
+Reported-by: Laura Abbott <labbott at redhat.com>
+Reported-by: Bronek Kozicki <brok at incorrekt.com>
+Reported-by: George Amanakis <gamanakis at gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj at kernel.org>
+---
+ kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 14 ++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
+index 44857278eb8aa6a2..030e4286f14c715e 100644
+--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
++++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
+@@ -4059,26 +4059,24 @@ static void css_task_iter_advance_css_set(struct css_task_iter *it)
+ 
+ static void css_task_iter_advance(struct css_task_iter *it)
+ {
+-	struct list_head *l = it->task_pos;
++	struct list_head *next;
+ 
+ 	lockdep_assert_held(&css_set_lock);
+-	WARN_ON_ONCE(!l);
+-
+ repeat:
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Advance iterator to find next entry.  cset->tasks is consumed
+ 	 * first and then ->mg_tasks.  After ->mg_tasks, we move onto the
+ 	 * next cset.
+ 	 */
+-	l = l->next;
++	next = it->task_pos->next;
+ 
+-	if (l == it->tasks_head)
+-		l = it->mg_tasks_head->next;
++	if (next == it->tasks_head)
++		next = it->mg_tasks_head->next;
+ 
+-	if (l == it->mg_tasks_head)
++	if (next == it->mg_tasks_head)
+ 		css_task_iter_advance_css_set(it);
+ 	else
+-		it->task_pos = l;
++		it->task_pos = next;
+ 
+ 	/* if PROCS, skip over tasks which aren't group leaders */
+ 	if ((it->flags & CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS) && it->task_pos &&
+-- 
+2.15.1
+

Added: 0007-x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch
===================================================================
--- 0007-x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch	                        (rev 0)
+++ 0007-x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch	2018-01-03 07:21:25 UTC (rev 313949)
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 51786b65797aed683ca72293a3cb86a2cab987c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+Message-Id: <51786b65797aed683ca72293a3cb86a2cab987c0.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+In-Reply-To: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+References: <fb89d912d5f7289d3a922c77b671e36e1c740f5e.1514959852.git.jan.steffens at gmail.com>
+From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
+Date: Tue, 26 Dec 2017 23:43:54 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH 7/7] x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors
+
+AMD processors are not subject to the types of attacks that the kernel
+page table isolation feature protects against.  The AMD microarchitecture
+does not allow memory references, including speculative references, that
+access higher privileged data when running in a lesser privileged mode
+when that access would result in a page fault.
+
+Disable page table isolation by default on AMD processors by not setting
+the X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE feature, which controls whether X86_FEATURE_PTI
+is set.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
+Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp at suse.de>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+index f2a94dfb434e9a7c..b1be494ab4e8badf 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+@@ -899,8 +899,8 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+ 
+ 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
+ 
+-	/* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
+-	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
++	if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
++		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
+ 
+ 	fpu__init_system(c);
+ 
+-- 
+2.15.1
+

Modified: PKGBUILD
===================================================================
--- PKGBUILD	2018-01-03 07:16:24 UTC (rev 313948)
+++ PKGBUILD	2018-01-03 07:21:25 UTC (rev 313949)
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 pkgbase=linux               # Build stock -ARCH kernel
 #pkgbase=linux-custom       # Build kernel with a different name
 _srcname=linux-4.14
-pkgver=4.14.10
+pkgver=4.14.11
 pkgrel=1
 arch=('x86_64')
 url="https://www.kernel.org/"
@@ -22,11 +22,12 @@
   '90-linux.hook'  # pacman hook for initramfs regeneration
   'linux.preset'   # standard config files for mkinitcpio ramdisk
   0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch
-  0001-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch
-  0002-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch
-  0001-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch
-  0002-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch
-  0003-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch
+  0002-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch
+  0003-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch
+  0004-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch
+  0005-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch
+  0006-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch
+  0007-x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch
 )
 validpgpkeys=(
   'ABAF11C65A2970B130ABE3C479BE3E4300411886'  # Linus Torvalds
@@ -34,18 +35,19 @@
 )
 sha256sums=('f81d59477e90a130857ce18dc02f4fbe5725854911db1e7ba770c7cd350f96a7'
             'SKIP'
-            '16f560aa713b46c707f04a226f67dc31fdd280aae57dd19e0413d61df5336c74'
+            'f588b62d7ee1d2ebdc24afa0e256ff2f8812d5cab3bf572bf02e7c4525922bf9'
             'SKIP'
-            '4d12ed868b05720c3d263c8454622c67bdee6969400049d7adac7b00907ad195'
+            '24b8cf6829dafcb2b5c76cffaae6438ad2d432f13d6551fa1c8f25e66b751ed4'
             'ae2e95db94ef7176207c690224169594d49445e04249d2499e9d2fbc117a0b21'
             '75f99f5239e03238f88d1a834c50043ec32b1dc568f2cc291b07d04718483919'
             'ad6344badc91ad0630caacde83f7f9b97276f80d26a20619a87952be65492c65'
-            '37b86ca3de148a34258e3176dbf41488d9dbd19e93adbd22a062b3c41332ce85'
-            'c6e7db7dfd6a07e1fd0e20c3a5f0f315f9c2a366fe42214918b756f9a1c9bfa3'
-            '1d69940c6bf1731fa1d1da29b32ec4f594fa360118fe7b128c9810285ebf13e2'
-            'ed3266ab03f836f57de0faf8a10ffd7566c909515c2649de99adaab2fac4aa32'
-            '64a014f7e1b4588728b3ea9538beee67ec63fb792d890c7be9cc13ddc2121b00'
-            '3d4c41086c077fbd515d04f5e59c0c258f700433c5da3365d960b696c2e56efb')
+            '06bc1d8b1cd153c3146a4376d833f5769b980e5ef5eae99ddaaeb48bf514dae2'
+            'b90bef87574f30ec66c0f10d089bea56a9e974b6d052fee3071b1ff21360724b'
+            'f38531dee9fd8a59202ce96ac5b40446f1f035b89788ea9ecb2fb3909f703a25'
+            '705d5fbfce00ccc20490bdfb5853d67d86ac00c845de6ecb13e414214b48daeb'
+            '0a249248534a17f14fab7e14994811ae81fe324668a82ff41f3bcabeeae1460f'
+            '8e1b303957ddd829c0c9ad7c012cd32f2354ff3c8c1b85da3d7f8a54524f3711'
+            '914a0a019545ad7d14ed8d5c58d417eb0a8ec12a756beec79a545aabda343b31')
 
 _kernelname=${pkgbase#linux}
 
@@ -65,18 +67,21 @@
   patch -Np1 -i ../0001-add-sysctl-to-disallow-unprivileged-CLONE_NEWUSER-by.patch
 
   # https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/56575
-  patch -Np1 -i ../0001-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch
+  patch -Np1 -i ../0002-e1000e-Fix-e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan-retur.patch
 
   # https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8824
-  patch -Np1 -i ../0002-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch
+  patch -Np1 -i ../0003-dccp-CVE-2017-8824-use-after-free-in-DCCP-code.patch
 
   # https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/56605
-  patch -Np1 -i ../0001-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch
-  patch -Np1 -i ../0002-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch
+  patch -Np1 -i ../0004-Revert-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-xfrm_sta.patch
+  patch -Np1 -i ../0005-xfrm-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-on-socket-policy-l.patch
 
   # https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/56846
-  patch -Np1 -i ../0003-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch
+  patch -Np1 -i ../0006-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch
 
+  # For AMD processors, keep PTI off by default
+  patch -Np1 -i ../0007-x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch
+
   cp -Tf ../config .config
 
   if [ "${_kernelname}" != "" ]; then

Modified: config
===================================================================
--- config	2018-01-03 07:16:24 UTC (rev 313948)
+++ config	2018-01-03 07:21:25 UTC (rev 313949)
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #
 # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT.
-# Linux/x86 4.14.9-1 Kernel Configuration
+# Linux/x86 4.14.11-1 Kernel Configuration
 #
 CONFIG_64BIT=y
 CONFIG_X86_64=y
@@ -8130,6 +8130,7 @@
 # CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS is not set
 CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y
 # CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK is not set
+CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y
 # CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND is not set
 # CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set
 # CONFIG_INTEL_TXT is not set



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