[arch-commits] Commit in pam/trunk (5 files)
Levente Polyak
anthraxx at archlinux.org
Tue Nov 24 19:04:34 UTC 2020
Date: Tuesday, November 24, 2020 @ 19:04:33
Author: anthraxx
Revision: 401836
upgpkg: pam 1.5.0-2: backport security fix fox CVE-2020-27780
- adding soname provides
- adding a transitive dependency
Modified:
pam/trunk/PKGBUILD
Deleted:
pam/trunk/0e9b286afe1224b91ff00936058b084ad4b776e4.patch
pam/trunk/395915dae1571e10e2766c999974de864655ea3a.patch
pam/trunk/af0faf666c5008e54dfe43684f210e3581ff1bca.patch
pam/trunk/other
------------------------------------------------+
0e9b286afe1224b91ff00936058b084ad4b776e4.patch | 31 --------
395915dae1571e10e2766c999974de864655ea3a.patch | 47 ------------
PKGBUILD | 21 ++---
af0faf666c5008e54dfe43684f210e3581ff1bca.patch | 85 -----------------------
other | 5 -
5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 178 deletions(-)
Deleted: 0e9b286afe1224b91ff00936058b084ad4b776e4.patch
===================================================================
--- 0e9b286afe1224b91ff00936058b084ad4b776e4.patch 2020-11-24 18:02:37 UTC (rev 401835)
+++ 0e9b286afe1224b91ff00936058b084ad4b776e4.patch 2020-11-24 19:04:33 UTC (rev 401836)
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From 0e9b286afe1224b91ff00936058b084ad4b776e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: ikerexxe <ipedrosa at redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 14:44:04 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] pam_usertype: avoid determining if user exists
-
-Taking a look at the time for the password prompt to appear it was
-possible to determine if a user existed in a system. Solved it by
-matching the runtime until the password prompt was shown by always
-checking the password hash for an existing and a non-existing user.
-
-Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1629598
----
- modules/pam_usertype/pam_usertype.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/modules/pam_usertype/pam_usertype.c b/modules/pam_usertype/pam_usertype.c
-index 2807c306..d03b73b5 100644
---- a/modules/pam_usertype/pam_usertype.c
-+++ b/modules/pam_usertype/pam_usertype.c
-@@ -139,8 +139,11 @@ pam_usertype_get_uid(struct pam_usertype_opts *opts,
- "error retrieving information about user %s", username);
- }
-
-+ pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, "root");
-+
- return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
- }
-+ pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, "pam_usertype_non_existent:");
-
- *_uid = pwd->pw_uid;
-
Deleted: 395915dae1571e10e2766c999974de864655ea3a.patch
===================================================================
--- 395915dae1571e10e2766c999974de864655ea3a.patch 2020-11-24 18:02:37 UTC (rev 401835)
+++ 395915dae1571e10e2766c999974de864655ea3a.patch 2020-11-24 19:04:33 UTC (rev 401836)
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From 395915dae1571e10e2766c999974de864655ea3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: ikerexxe <ipedrosa at redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2020 09:52:11 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] pam_faillock: change /run/faillock/$USER permissions to 0660
-
-Nowadays, /run/faillock/$USER files have user:root ownership and 0600
-permissions. This forces the process that writes to these files to have
-CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE capabilites. Just by changing the permissions to 0660
-the capability can be removed, which leads to a more secure system.
-
-Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1661822
----
- modules/pam_faillock/faillock.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.c b/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.c
-index e492f5f9..4ea94cbe 100644
---- a/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.c
-+++ b/modules/pam_faillock/faillock.c
-@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ open_tally (const char *dir, const char *user, uid_t uid, int create)
- flags |= O_CREAT;
- }
-
-- fd = open(path, flags, 0600);
-+ fd = open(path, flags, 0660);
-
- free(path);
-
-@@ -88,6 +88,18 @@ open_tally (const char *dir, const char *user, uid_t uid, int create)
- if (st.st_uid != uid) {
- ignore_return(fchown(fd, uid, -1));
- }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If umask is set to 022, as will probably in most systems, then the
-+ * group will not be able to write to the file. So, change the file
-+ * permissions just in case.
-+ * Note: owners of this file are user:root, so if the permissions are
-+ * not changed the root process writing to this file will require
-+ * CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE.
-+ */
-+ if (!(st.st_mode & S_IWGRP)) {
-+ ignore_return(fchmod(fd, 0660));
-+ }
- }
- }
-
Modified: PKGBUILD
===================================================================
--- PKGBUILD 2020-11-24 18:02:37 UTC (rev 401835)
+++ PKGBUILD 2020-11-24 19:04:33 UTC (rev 401836)
@@ -3,19 +3,17 @@
pkgname=pam
pkgver=1.5.0
-pkgrel=1
+pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) library"
arch=('x86_64')
license=('GPL2')
url="http://linux-pam.org"
-depends=('glibc' 'libtirpc' 'pambase' 'audit')
+depends=('glibc' 'libtirpc' 'pambase' 'audit' 'libaudit.so' 'libxcrypt' 'libcrypt.so')
makedepends=('flex' 'w3m' 'docbook-xml>=4.4' 'docbook-xsl')
+provides=('libpam.so' 'libpamc.so' 'libpam_misc.so')
backup=(etc/security/{access.conf,faillock.conf,group.conf,limits.conf,namespace.conf,namespace.init,pam_env.conf,time.conf} etc/environment)
-source=(https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/releases/download/v$pkgver/Linux-PAM-$pkgver.tar.xz
- https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/releases/download/v$pkgver/Linux-PAM-$pkgver.tar.xz.asc
- 395915dae1571e10e2766c999974de864655ea3a.patch
- af0faf666c5008e54dfe43684f210e3581ff1bca.patch
- 0e9b286afe1224b91ff00936058b084ad4b776e4.patch
+source=(https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/releases/download/v$pkgver/Linux-PAM-$pkgver.tar.xz{,.asc}
+ CVE-2020-27780.patch::https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/30fdfb90d9864bcc254a62760aaa149d373fd4eb.patch
$pkgname.tmpfiles)
validpgpkeys=(
'8C6BFD92EE0F42EDF91A6A736D1A7F052E5924BB' # Thorsten Kukuk
@@ -24,13 +22,16 @@
sha256sums=('02d39854b508fae9dc713f7733bbcdadbe17b50de965aedddd65bcb6cc7852c8'
'SKIP'
- 'cd2440d7bec55fa91e499060c0bf248f4fd20e7a0ef613eb7a06ee083f7ce21b'
- 'ac3e1d307756f5975587a7846500414c02d2b60acb271017b9c7aa6f47c89875'
- '68f81b67dde5ee6003524b6b14e2d6f27edcfc0a2bde4c55a1cacbc6e299c207'
+ 'b785b637e4bf4c0a1601c296b562ee2eed09916cc589dc4021fa1abc6c5394c8'
'5631f224e90c4f0459361c2a5b250112e3a91ba849754bb6f67d69d683a2e5ac')
options=('!emptydirs')
+prepare() {
+ cd Linux-PAM-$pkgver
+ patch -Np1 < ../CVE-2020-27780.patch
+}
+
build() {
cd Linux-PAM-$pkgver
./configure --libdir=/usr/lib --sbindir=/usr/bin --disable-db
Deleted: af0faf666c5008e54dfe43684f210e3581ff1bca.patch
===================================================================
--- af0faf666c5008e54dfe43684f210e3581ff1bca.patch 2020-11-24 18:02:37 UTC (rev 401835)
+++ af0faf666c5008e54dfe43684f210e3581ff1bca.patch 2020-11-24 19:04:33 UTC (rev 401836)
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-From af0faf666c5008e54dfe43684f210e3581ff1bca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: ikerexxe <ipedrosa at redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 14:32:36 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] pam_unix: avoid determining if user exists
-
-Taking a look at the time for the password prompt to appear it was
-possible to determine if a user existed in a system. Solved it by
-matching the runtime until the password prompt was shown by always
-checking the password hash for an existing and a non-existing user.
-
-Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1629598
----
- modules/pam_unix/passverify.c | 6 ++++++
- modules/pam_unix/support.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
- 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
-index a571b4f7..7455eae6 100644
---- a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
-+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
-@@ -1096,6 +1096,12 @@ helper_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok)
- if (pwd == NULL || hash == NULL) {
- helper_log_err(LOG_NOTICE, "check pass; user unknown");
- retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
-+ } else if (p[0] == '\0' && nullok) {
-+ if (hash[0] == '\0') {
-+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
-+ } else {
-+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
-+ }
- } else {
- retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, hash, nullok);
- }
-diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
-index 41db1f04..dc67238c 100644
---- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c
-+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
-@@ -601,6 +601,8 @@ _unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned long long ctrl, const char *name
- char *salt = NULL;
- int daysleft;
- int retval;
-+ int execloop = 1;
-+ int nonexistent = 1;
-
- D(("called"));
-
-@@ -624,14 +626,31 @@ _unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned long long ctrl, const char *name
-
- /* UNIX passwords area */
-
-- retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
-+ /*
-+ * Execute this loop twice: one checking the password hash of an existing
-+ * user and another one for a non-existing user. This way the runtimes
-+ * are equal, making it more difficult to differentiate existing from
-+ * non-existing users.
-+ */
-+ while (execloop) {
-+ retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
-
-- if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) {
-- /* salt will not be set here so we can return immediately */
-- if (_unix_run_helper_binary(pamh, NULL, ctrl, name) == PAM_SUCCESS)
-- return 1;
-- else
-- return 0;
-+ if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) {
-+ execloop = 0;
-+ if(nonexistent) {
-+ get_pwd_hash(pamh, "pam_unix_non_existent:", &pwd, &salt);
-+ }
-+ /* salt will not be set here so we can return immediately */
-+ if (_unix_run_helper_binary(pamh, NULL, ctrl, name) == PAM_SUCCESS)
-+ return 1;
-+ else
-+ return 0;
-+ } else if (retval == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) {
-+ name = "root";
-+ nonexistent = 0;
-+ } else {
-+ execloop = 0;
-+ }
- }
-
- /* Does this user have a password? */
Deleted: other
===================================================================
--- other 2020-11-24 18:02:37 UTC (rev 401835)
+++ other 2020-11-24 19:04:33 UTC (rev 401836)
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-#%PAM-1.0
-auth required pam_unix.so
-account required pam_unix.so
-password required pam_unix.so
-session required pam_unix.so
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