[arch-general] Packages Verified with MD5

Kyle Terrien kyleterrien at gmail.com
Sun Jan 12 17:15:27 EST 2014

On 01/12/2014 01:13 PM, Taylor Hornby wrote:
> Thank you, that makes so much more sense!
> So, really, the vulnerability only exists while the Arch dev (or
> package maintainer or whatever they're called) is building the
> package. Once they do, and sign it, all Arch users will verify their
> signature to make sure they get the same file the Arch dev created.

That's correct! See these pages for more info on how pacman's signature
checking works:


> That's not so bad, then, since you can't really do any better unless
> the upstream source (Mozilla) signs their files, and the package
> maintainer has their public key.

To be honest, I'm a little surprised that Mozilla doesn't sign their
Firefox source code.


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