[arch-general] Severity of Failed checksum for PKGBUILD

[Martti Kühne]

On Fri, Feb 20, 2015 at 4:09 PM, Daniel Micay <danielmicay at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 20/02/15 10:04 AM, Martti Kühne wrote:
>
> You should really just tell upstream to sign their releases, because it
> wipes out the attack vector instead of just making it possible to audit
> whether a MITM attack on the original. packager occurred like hashes.
>
> The hashes provide no security for the initial packaging work and no
> defense against an attack that's done by compromising the upstream
> sources, which is far more realistic than a targeted MITM attack on a
> specific Arch Linux packager.
>


Since security-by-reading-the-code isn't an option since a few
decades, we're stuck in this, yup.

cheers!
mar77i