[arch-general] Sébastien Luttringer and Tobias Powalowski

[NicoHood]

On 07/03/2017 12:21 AM, Morten Linderud wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 03, 2017 at 12:16:53AM +0200, NicoHood wrote:
>> On 07/03/2017 12:07 AM, Morten Linderud wrote:
>>> On Sun, Jul 02, 2017 at 11:55:35PM +0200, NicoHood wrote:
>>>> Yes the GPG signature of the tag commit is checked. However you can
>>>> attack the git metadata and set a tag to a different commit. If this
>>>> commit is signed, but at an older stage which is vulnearable, we have an
>>>> issue. Just one example. So we should always also secure the transport
>>>> layer.
>>>> https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/torres-arias
>>>>
>>>
>>> The sign includes the hash. You would essentially have to trick Lennart into replacing the tag to a different commit,
>>> and sign the tag. Creating a vulnerable but verified source for the PKGBUILD. At this point i think we have bigger
>>> problems then whatever the PKGBUILD is doing...
>>>
>>
>> Thats is exactly what I mean. If I understood right you can modify the
>> git metadata in a way that you can pull tag 1.2 but get 1.0. And tag 1.0
>> is gpg signed and all valid. This seems to work for me.
>>
> 
> But at this point you can't trust critical maintainers of important software. This isn't a threat model i think
> PKGBUILDs (or Arch for that matter) really cares about. Am i wrong? Or are you implying MITM attacks can trick the
> packager into packaging broken software?
> 
> 

Sure it is all about MITM, as we are talking about using https over
http. I am not sure if I am right. But why are we even discussing if
https is available? It will just make things better.

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