[ASA-201905-15] lib32-curl: arbitrary code execution

Remi Gacogne rgacogne at archlinux.org
Fri May 31 15:56:05 UTC 2019

Arch Linux Security Advisory ASA-201905-15

Severity: High
Date    : 2019-05-31
CVE-ID  : CVE-2019-5435 CVE-2019-5436
Package : lib32-curl
Type    : arbitrary code execution
Remote  : Yes
Link    : https://security.archlinux.org/AVG-963


The package lib32-curl before version 7.65.0-1 is vulnerable to
arbitrary code execution.


Upgrade to 7.65.0-1.

# pacman -Syu "lib32-curl>=7.65.0-1"

The problems have been fixed upstream in version 7.65.0.




- CVE-2019-5435 (arbitrary code execution)

libcurl before 7.65.0 contains two integer overflows in the
curl_url_set() function that if triggered, can lead to a too small
buffer allocation and a subsequent heap buffer overflow. The flaws only
exist on 32 bit architectures and require excessive string input

- CVE-2019-5436 (arbitrary code execution)

libcurl before 7.65.0 contains a heap buffer overflow in the function
(tftp_receive_packet()) that receives data from a TFTP server. It calls
recvfrom() with the default size for the buffer rather than with the
size that was used to allocate it. Thus, the content that might
overwrite the heap memory is entirely controlled by the server.

The flaw exists if the user selects to use a "blksize" of 504 or
smaller (default is 512). The smaller size that is used, the larger the
possible overflow becomes. Users choosing a smaller size than default
should be rare as the primary use case for changing the size is to make
it larger.


A malicious TFTP server can execute arbitrary code on the affected
host. A remote attacker can execute arbitrary code on the affected host
via a crafted URL part of excessive length.



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