[ASA-202012-16] hostapd: proxy injection

[Morten Linderud]

Arch Linux Security Advisory ASA-202012-16
==========================================

Severity: Medium
Date    : 2020-12-09
CVE-ID  : CVE-2020-12695
Package : hostapd
Type    : proxy injection
Remote  : Yes
Link    : https://security.archlinux.org/AVG-1322

Summary
=======

The package hostapd before version 2.9-4 is vulnerable to proxy
injection.

Resolution
==========

Upgrade to 2.9-4.

# pacman -Syu "hostapd>=2.9-4"

The problem has been fixed upstream but no release is available yet.

Workaround
==========

None.

Description
===========

The Open Connectivity Foundation UPnP specification before 2020-04-17
does not forbid the acceptance of a subscription request with a
delivery URL on a different network segment than the fully qualified
event-subscription URL, aka the CallStranger issue. This issue could
allow a device connected to the local network (i.e., a device that has
been authorized to transmit packets in the network in which the AP is
located) to trigger the AP to initiate a HTTP (TCP/IP) connection to an
arbitrary URL, including connections to servers in external networks.

Impact
======

An attacker on the local network  might be able to force the AP to
initiate a HTTP (TCP/IP) connection to an arbitrary URL, including
connections to servers in external networks.

References
==========

https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/68861
https://w1.fi/security/2020-1/upnp-subscribe-misbehavior-wps-ap.txt
http://www.callstranger.com/
https://w1.fi/security/2020-1/0001-WPS-UPnP-Do-not-allow-event-subscriptions-with-URLs-.patch
https://w1.fi/security/2020-1/0002-WPS-UPnP-Fix-event-message-generation-using-a-long-U.patch
https://w1.fi/security/2020-1/0003-WPS-UPnP-Handle-HTTP-initiation-failures-for-events-.patch
https://security.archlinux.org/CVE-2020-12695
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