[aur-dev] [PATCH] Fix account privilege escalation vulnerability

[canyonknight]

A check is only done to verify a Trusted User isn't promoting their
account. An attacker can send tampered account type POST data to
change their "User" level account to a "Developer" account.

Add check so that all users cannot increase their own account
permissions.

Signed-off-by: canyonknight <canyonknight at gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Fleischer <archlinux at cryptocrack.de>
---

Already applied to maint branch and aur.archlinux.org setup.
Anyone using a custom AUR setup should apply this patch.

 web/lib/acctfuncs.inc.php | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/web/lib/acctfuncs.inc.php b/web/lib/acctfuncs.inc.php
index 81e06b6..a41659e 100644
--- a/web/lib/acctfuncs.inc.php
+++ b/web/lib/acctfuncs.inc.php
@@ -145,8 +145,8 @@ function process_account_form($UTYPE,$TYPE,$A,$U="",$T="",$S="",$E="",
 		$error = __("The PGP key fingerprint is invalid.");
 	}
 
-	if ($UTYPE == "Trusted User" && $T == 3) {
-		$error = __("A Trusted User cannot assign Developer status.");
+	if (($UTYPE == "User" && $T > 1) || ($UTYPE == "Trusted User" && $T > 2)) {
+		$error = __("Cannot increase account permissions.");
 	}
 	if (!$error && !array_key_exists($L, $SUPPORTED_LANGS)) {
 		$error = __("Language is not currently supported.");
-- 
1.8.0.1