[aur-dev] [PATCH v2] Remove the OpenSSH patch
Lukas Fleischer
lfleischer at archlinux.org
Thu May 21 08:55:32 UTC 2015
Extended AuthorizedKeysCommand parameters are now officially supported
by OpenSSH.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Fleischer <lfleischer at archlinux.org>
---
Forgot to add git-auth.sh in the previous version.
INSTALL | 41 +-
.../0001-Patch-sshd-for-the-AUR.patch | 1094 --------------------
scripts/git-integration/git-auth.sh | 3 +
3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1120 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 scripts/git-integration/0001-Patch-sshd-for-the-AUR.patch
create mode 100755 scripts/git-integration/git-auth.sh
diff --git a/INSTALL b/INSTALL
index 34e1a00..2a67f9b 100644
--- a/INSTALL
+++ b/INSTALL
@@ -17,39 +17,28 @@ Setup on Arch Linux
4) Create a new MySQL database and a user and import the AUR SQL schema:
- $ mysql -uaur -p AUR </srv/http/aurweb/schema/aur-schema.sql
+ $ mysql -uaur -p AUR </srv/http/aurweb/schema/aur-schema.sql
5) Generate templates for new Git repositories:
- $ /srv/http/aurweb/scripts/git-integration/gen-templates.py
+ $ /srv/http/aurweb/scripts/git-integration/gen-templates.py
-6) Clone the OpenSSH project, apply the aurweb sshd patch and run `make`:
+6) Create a new user:
- $ cd /srv/http/aurweb/
- $ git clone git://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git
- $ cd openssh
- $ git checkout V_6_8_P1
- $ git am ../scripts/git-integration/0001-Patch-sshd-for-the-AUR.patch
- $ autoreconf
- $ ./configure
- $ make
+ # useradd -U -d /srv/http/aurweb -c 'AUR user' aur
-7) Create and edit the sshd configuration:
+7) Install the git-auth wrapper script:
- $ cd /srv/http/aurweb/
- $ umask 077
- $ mkdir .ssh/
- $ ssh-keygen -f .ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -N '' -t rsa
- $ cp scripts/git-integration/sshd_config .ssh/
+ # cd /srv/http/aurweb/scripts/git-integration/
+ # cp git-auth.sh /usr/local/bin/aur-git-auth
+ # chmod 755 /usr/local/bin/aur-git-auth
-8) Create a new user and change ownership of the .ssh directory:
+8) Configure sshd(8) for the AUR. Add the following lines at the end of your
+ sshd_config(5) and restart the sshd. Note that OpenSSH 6.9 or newer is
+ needed!
- # useradd -U -d /srv/http/aurweb -c 'AUR user' aur
- # chown aur:aur /srv/http/aurweb/.ssh/
+ Match User aur
+ PasswordAuthentication no
+ AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/local/bin/aur-git-auth "%t" "%k"
+ AuthorizedKeysCommandUser aur
-9) Add, enable and start systemd unit files for the new sshd:
-
- # cp /srv/http/aurweb/conf/aur-sshd.socket /etc/systemd/system/
- # cp /srv/http/aurweb/conf/aur-sshd at .service /etc/systemd/system/
- # systemctl enable aur-sshd.socket
- # systemctl start aur-sshd.socket
diff --git a/scripts/git-integration/0001-Patch-sshd-for-the-AUR.patch b/scripts/git-integration/0001-Patch-sshd-for-the-AUR.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 688b115..0000000
--- a/scripts/git-integration/0001-Patch-sshd-for-the-AUR.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1094 +0,0 @@
-From 6423ae83d38535687d52097b7854b3c81151fe34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Lukas Fleischer <lfleischer at archlinux.org>
-Date: Sat, 11 Apr 2015 12:57:46 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Patch sshd for the AUR
-
-* Apply the latest version of Damien Miller's patch to extend the
- parameters to the AuthorizedKeysCommand.
-
-* Remove the secure path check for the AuthorizedKeysCommand. We are
- running the sshd under a non-privileged user who has as little
- permissions as possible. In particular, he does not own the directory
- that contains the scripts for the Git backend.
-
-* Prevent from running the sshd as root.
-
-Signed-off-by: Lukas Fleischer <lfleischer at archlinux.org>
----
- auth2-pubkey.c | 530 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
- servconf.c | 35 ++++
- servconf.h | 8 +-
- ssh.c | 5 +
- sshd.c | 5 +
- sshd_config.5 | 54 +++++-
- sshkey.c | 172 +++++++++++--------
- sshkey.h | 1 +
- 8 files changed, 606 insertions(+), 204 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
-index d943efa..2ce0a4b 100644
---- a/auth2-pubkey.c
-+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
-@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@
- #include "monitor_wrap.h"
- #include "authfile.h"
- #include "match.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */
-+#include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */
-
- /* import */
- extern ServerOptions options;
-@@ -248,6 +251,227 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
- free(extra);
- }
-
-+/*
-+ * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
-+ * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
-+ * and its members.
-+ */
-+static int
-+split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp)
-+{
-+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+ int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
-+ char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
-+
-+ *argvp = NULL;
-+ *argcp = 0;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
-+ /* Skip leading whitespace */
-+ if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
-+ continue;
-+
-+ /* Start of a token */
-+ quote = 0;
-+ if (s[i] == '\\' &&
-+ (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\'))
-+ i++;
-+ else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"')
-+ quote = s[i++];
-+
-+ argv = xrealloc(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
-+ arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
-+ argv[argc] = NULL;
-+
-+ /* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
-+ for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
-+ if (s[i] == '\\') {
-+ if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
-+ s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
-+ s[i + 1] == '\\') {
-+ i++; /* Skip '\' */
-+ arg[j++] = s[i];
-+ } else {
-+ /* Unrecognised escape */
-+ arg[j++] = s[i];
-+ }
-+ } else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
-+ break; /* done */
-+ else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
-+ break; /* done */
-+ else
-+ arg[j++] = s[i];
-+ }
-+ if (s[i] == '\0') {
-+ if (quote != 0) {
-+ /* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
-+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ /* Success */
-+ *argcp = argc;
-+ *argvp = argv;
-+ argc = 0;
-+ argv = NULL;
-+ r = 0;
-+ out:
-+ if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
-+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
-+ free(argv[i]);
-+ free(argv);
-+ }
-+ return r;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the
-+ * subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure.
-+ * NB. "command" is only used for logging.
-+ */
-+static pid_t
-+subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
-+ int ac, char **av, FILE **child)
-+{
-+ FILE *f;
-+ struct stat st;
-+ int devnull, p[2], i;
-+ pid_t pid;
-+ char *cp, errmsg[512];
-+ u_int envsize;
-+ char **child_env;
-+
-+ *child = NULL;
-+
-+ debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__,
-+ tag, command, pw->pw_name);
-+
-+ /* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */
-+ if (*av[0] != '/') {
-+ error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+ if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) {
-+ error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
-+ av[0], strerror(errno));
-+ restore_uid();
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the
-+ * authorized_keys output.
-+ */
-+ if (pipe(p) != 0) {
-+ error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
-+ restore_uid();
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
-+ * run cleanup_exit() code.
-+ */
-+ restore_uid();
-+
-+ switch ((pid = fork())) {
-+ case -1: /* error */
-+ error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
-+ close(p[0]);
-+ close(p[1]);
-+ return 0;
-+ case 0: /* child */
-+ /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
-+ envsize = 5;
-+ child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
-+ child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
-+ child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
-+ child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
-+ child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
-+ if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
-+ child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
-+ signal(i, SIG_DFL);
-+
-+ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
-+ error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ _exit(1);
-+ }
-+ /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
-+ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
-+ dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
-+ error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
-+ _exit(1);
-+ }
-+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-+
-+ /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
-+ if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
-+ error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ _exit(1);
-+ }
-+ if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
-+ error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ _exit(1);
-+ }
-+ /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
-+ if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
-+ error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
-+ _exit(1);
-+ }
-+
-+ execve(av[0], av, child_env);
-+ error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
-+ _exit(127);
-+ default: /* parent */
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ close(p[1]);
-+ if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
-+ error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
-+ close(p[0]);
-+ /* Don't leave zombie child */
-+ kill(pid, SIGTERM);
-+ while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
-+ ;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ /* Success */
-+ debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid);
-+ *child = f;
-+ return pid;
-+}
-+
-+/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
-+static int
-+exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd)
-+{
-+ int status;
-+
-+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
-+ if (errno != EINTR) {
-+ error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
-+ error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
-+ return -1;
-+ } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
-+ error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
- static int
- match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
- {
-@@ -269,19 +493,13 @@ match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
- }
-
- static int
--match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
-+process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
-+ struct sshkey_cert *cert)
- {
-- FILE *f;
- char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
- u_long linenum = 0;
- u_int i;
-
-- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-- debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
-- if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
-- restore_uid();
-- return 0;
-- }
- while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
- /* Skip leading whitespace. */
- for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
-@@ -309,24 +527,119 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
- }
- for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
- if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
-- debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" "
-- "from file \"%s\" on line %lu",
-- cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
-+ debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
-+ file == NULL ? "(command)" : file,
-+ linenum, cert->principals[i]);
- if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
- file, linenum) != 1)
- continue;
-- fclose(f);
-- restore_uid();
- return 1;
- }
- }
- }
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
-+{
-+ FILE *f;
-+ int success;
-+
-+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+ debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
-+ if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
-+ restore_uid();
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ success = process_principals(f, file, pw, cert);
- fclose(f);
- restore_uid();
-- return 0;
-+ return success;
- }
-
- /*
-+ * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command.
-+ * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
-+ */
-+static int
-+match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key)
-+{
-+ FILE *f = NULL;
-+ int ok, found_principal = 0;
-+ struct passwd *pw;
-+ int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
-+ pid_t pid;
-+ char *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
-+ void (*osigchld)(int);
-+
-+ if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
-+ return 0;
-+ if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
-+ error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, "
-+ "skipping");
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
-+ * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
-+ */
-+ osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
-+
-+ /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
-+ username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
-+ "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-+ pw = getpwnam(username);
-+ if (pw == NULL) {
-+ error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
-+ username, strerror(errno));
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ command = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command,
-+ "u", user_pw->pw_name, "h", user_pw->pw_dir, (char *)NULL);
-+
-+ /* Turn the command into an argument vector */
-+ if (split_argv(command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
-+ error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
-+ "invalid quotes", command);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ if (ac == 0) {
-+ error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
-+ command);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command,
-+ ac, av, &f)) == 0)
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ uid_swapped = 1;
-+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+
-+ ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, key->cert);
-+
-+ if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command))
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ /* Read completed successfully */
-+ found_principal = ok;
-+ out:
-+ if (f != NULL)
-+ fclose(f);
-+ signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
-+ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
-+ free(av[i]);
-+ free(av);
-+ if (uid_swapped)
-+ restore_uid();
-+ free(command);
-+ free(username);
-+ return found_principal;
-+}
-+/*
- * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
- * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
- */
-@@ -448,7 +761,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
- {
- char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
- const char *reason;
-- int ret = 0;
-+ int ret = 0, found_principal = 0;
-
- if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
- return 0;
-@@ -470,14 +783,20 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
- * against the username.
- */
- if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
-- if (!match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) {
-- reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
-- "authorized principal";
-+ if (match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert))
-+ found_principal = 1;
-+ }
-+ /* Try querying command if specified */
-+ if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key))
-+ found_principal = 1;
-+ /* If principals file or command specify, then require a match here */
-+ if (!found_principal && (principals_file != NULL ||
-+ options.authorized_principals_command != NULL)) {
-+ reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
- fail_reason:
-- error("%s", reason);
-- auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
-- goto out;
-- }
-+ error("%s", reason);
-+ auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
-+ goto out;
- }
- if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
- principals_file == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0)
-@@ -526,144 +845,105 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
- static int
- user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
- {
-- FILE *f;
-- int ok, found_key = 0;
-+ FILE *f = NULL;
-+ int r, ok, found_key = 0;
- struct passwd *pw;
-- struct stat st;
-- int status, devnull, p[2], i;
-+ int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0;
- pid_t pid;
-- char *username, errmsg[512];
-+ char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
-+ char *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
-+ void (*osigchld)(int);
-
-- if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL ||
-- options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
-+ if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL)
- return 0;
--
- if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
- error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
- return 0;
- }
-
-+ /*
-+ * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
-+ * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
-+ */
-+ osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
-+
-+ /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
- username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
- "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
- pw = getpwnam(username);
- if (pw == NULL) {
- error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
- username, strerror(errno));
-- free(username);
-- return 0;
-+ goto out;
- }
-- free(username);
--
-- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
-- if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
-- error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
-- options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-+ /* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */
-+ if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
-+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
-+ error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
- goto out;
- }
-- if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0,
-- errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
-- error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
-+ if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
-+ error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- goto out;
- }
--
-- if (pipe(p) != 0) {
-- error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+ command = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command,
-+ "u", user_pw->pw_name, "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
-+ "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key), "f", key_fp, "k", keytext, (char *)NULL);
-+
-+ /* Turn the command into an argument vector */
-+ if (split_argv(command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
-+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
-+ command);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ if (ac == 0) {
-+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
-+ command);
- goto out;
- }
--
-- debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s %s\" as \"%s\"",
-- options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, pw->pw_name);
-
- /*
-- * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
-- * run cleanup_exit() code.
-+ * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
-+ * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the
-+ * target username as a single argument.
- */
-- restore_uid();
--
-- switch ((pid = fork())) {
-- case -1: /* error */
-- error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-- close(p[0]);
-- close(p[1]);
-- return 0;
-- case 0: /* child */
-- for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
-- signal(i, SIG_DFL);
--
-- if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
-- error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-- strerror(errno));
-- _exit(1);
-- }
-- /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
-- if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
-- dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
-- error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-- _exit(1);
-- }
-- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
--
-- /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
-- if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
-- error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
-- strerror(errno));
-- _exit(1);
-- }
-- if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
-- error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
-- strerror(errno));
-- _exit(1);
-- }
-- /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
-- if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
-- error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-- _exit(1);
-- }
--
-- execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
-- options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
--
-- error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
-- options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-- _exit(127);
-- default: /* parent */
-- break;
-+ if (ac == 1) {
-+ av = xrealloc(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av));
-+ av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name);
-+ av[2] = NULL;
-+ /* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */
-+ free(command);
-+ xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
- }
-
-+ if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command,
-+ ac, av, &f)) == 0)
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ uid_swapped = 1;
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
-- close(p[1]);
-- if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
-- error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-- close(p[0]);
-- /* Don't leave zombie child */
-- kill(pid, SIGTERM);
-- while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
-- ;
-- goto out;
-- }
- ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
-- fclose(f);
-
-- while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
-- if (errno != EINTR) {
-- error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-- goto out;
-- }
-- }
-- if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
-- error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
-- options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
-+ if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command))
- goto out;
-- } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
-- error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
-- options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
-- goto out;
-- }
-+
-+ /* Read completed successfully */
- found_key = ok;
- out:
-- restore_uid();
-+ if (f != NULL)
-+ fclose(f);
-+ signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
-+ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
-+ free(av[i]);
-+ free(av);
-+ if (uid_swapped)
-+ restore_uid();
-+ free(command);
-+ free(username);
-+ free(key_fp);
-+ free(keytext);
- return found_key;
- }
-
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 3185462..510cdde 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
- options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
- options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
-+ options->authorized_principals_command = NULL;
-+ options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL;
- options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
- options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
- options->version_addendum = NULL;
-@@ -396,6 +398,7 @@ typedef enum {
- sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- sHostCertificate,
- sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
-+ sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
- sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
- sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
- sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
-@@ -528,6 +531,8 @@ static struct {
- { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+ { "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+ { "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL },
-@@ -1697,6 +1702,34 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
- break;
-
-+ case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand:
-+ if (cp == NULL)
-+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
-+ linenum);
-+ len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
-+ if (*activep &&
-+ options->authorized_principals_command == NULL) {
-+ if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0)
-+ fatal("%.200s line %d: "
-+ "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand must be "
-+ "an absolute path", filename, linenum);
-+ options->authorized_principals_command =
-+ xstrdup(cp + len);
-+ }
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser:
-+ charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user;
-+
-+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
-+ fatal("%s line %d: missing "
-+ "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser argument.",
-+ filename, linenum);
-+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
-+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
-+ break;
-+
- case sAuthenticationMethods:
- if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
-@@ -2166,6 +2199,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum);
- dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);
- dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user);
-+ dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command);
-+ dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user);
- dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent);
- dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms,
- o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_SERVER_KEX);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 9922f0c..35d6673 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -176,9 +176,11 @@ typedef struct {
- char *chroot_directory;
- char *revoked_keys_file;
- char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
-- char *authorized_principals_file;
- char *authorized_keys_command;
- char *authorized_keys_command_user;
-+ char *authorized_principals_file;
-+ char *authorized_principals_command;
-+ char *authorized_principals_command_user;
-
- int64_t rekey_limit;
- int rekey_interval;
-@@ -214,9 +216,11 @@ struct connection_info {
- M_CP_STROPT(banner); \
- M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \
- M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \
-- M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \
- M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \
- M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \
-+ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \
-+ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command); \
-+ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command_user); \
- M_CP_STROPT(hostbased_key_types); \
- M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_key_types); \
- M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 0ad82f0..abf4e54 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -548,6 +548,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- original_real_uid = getuid();
- original_effective_uid = geteuid();
-
-+ if (original_effective_uid == 0) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "this is a patched version of the sshd that must not be run as root.\n");
-+ exit(1);
-+ }
-+
- /*
- * Use uid-swapping to give up root privileges for the duration of
- * option processing. We will re-instantiate the rights when we are
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 6aa17fa..672c486 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -1694,6 +1694,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0))
- fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without "
- "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser");
-+ if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL &&
-+ (options.authorized_principals_command != NULL &&
-+ strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0))
-+ fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without "
-+ "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser");
-
- /*
- * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 6dce0c7..a267af9 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -230,9 +230,21 @@ The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion
- of a single authentication method is sufficient.
- .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
- Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
--The program must be owned by root and not writable by group or others.
--It will be invoked with a single argument of the username
--being authenticated, and should produce on standard output zero or
-+The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and
-+specified by an absolute path.
-+.Pp
-+Arguments to
-+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
-+may be provided using the following tokens, which will be expanded
-+at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the
-+username being authenticated, %h is replaced by the home directory
-+of the user being authenticated, %t is replaced with the key type
-+offered for authentication, %f is replaced with the fingerprint of
-+the key, and %k is replaced with the key being offered for authentication.
-+If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user
-+will be supplied.
-+.Pp
-+The program should produce on standard output zero or
- more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in
- .Xr sshd 8 ) .
- If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate
-@@ -271,6 +283,42 @@ directory.
- Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace.
- The default is
- .Dq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 .
-+.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
-+Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed
-+certificate principals as per
-+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile .
-+The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and
-+specified by an absolute path.
-+.Pp
-+Arguments to
-+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
-+may be provided using the following tokens, which will be expanded
-+at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the
-+username being authenticated and %h is replaced by the home directory
-+of the user being authenticated.
-+.Pp
-+The program should produce on standard output zero or
-+more lines of
-+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
-+output.
-+If either
-+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
-+or
-+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
-+is specified, then certificates offered by the client for authentication
-+must contain a principal that is listed.
-+By default, no AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run.
-+.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
-+Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run.
-+It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host
-+than running authorized principals commands.
-+If
-+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
-+is specified but
-+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
-+is not, then
-+.Xr sshd 8
-+will refuse to start.
- .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
- Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for
- certificate authentication.
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index 3cc3f44..ecb61fd 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -761,6 +761,12 @@ to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain)
- if (key == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-
-+ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
-+ if (key->cert == NULL)
-+ return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT;
-+ if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0)
-+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB;
-+ }
- type = force_plain ? sshkey_type_plain(key->type) : key->type;
- typename = sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid);
-
-@@ -1409,98 +1415,116 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
- }
-
- int
--sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f)
-+sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *key, char **b64p)
- {
-- int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-- struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
-+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- char *uu = NULL;
-+
-+ if (b64p != NULL)
-+ *b64p = NULL;
-+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+ if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, b)) != 0)
-+ goto out;
-+ if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64(b)) == NULL) {
-+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ /* Success */
-+ if (b64p != NULL) {
-+ *b64p = uu;
-+ uu = NULL;
-+ }
-+ r = 0;
-+ out:
-+ sshbuf_free(b);
-+ free(uu);
-+ return r;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+sshkey_format_rsa1(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
-+{
-+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- #ifdef WITH_SSH1
- u_int bits = 0;
- char *dec_e = NULL, *dec_n = NULL;
--#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
-
-- if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
-- if (key->cert == NULL)
-- return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT;
-- if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0)
-- return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB;
-+ if (key->rsa == NULL || key->rsa->e == NULL ||
-+ key->rsa->n == NULL) {
-+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+ goto out;
- }
-- if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-- switch (key->type) {
--#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-- case KEY_RSA1:
-- if (key->rsa == NULL || key->rsa->e == NULL ||
-- key->rsa->n == NULL) {
-- ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-- goto out;
-- }
-- if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->e)) == NULL ||
-- (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->n)) == NULL) {
-- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-- goto out;
-- }
-- /* size of modulus 'n' */
-- if ((bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) <= 0) {
-- ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-- goto out;
-- }
-- if ((ret = sshbuf_putf(b, "%u %s %s", bits, dec_e, dec_n)) != 0)
-- goto out;
-+ if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->e)) == NULL ||
-+ (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->n)) == NULL) {
-+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ /* size of modulus 'n' */
-+ if ((bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) <= 0) {
-+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%u %s %s", bits, dec_e, dec_n)) != 0)
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ /* Success */
-+ r = 0;
-+ out:
-+ if (dec_e != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(dec_e);
-+ if (dec_n != NULL)
-+ OPENSSL_free(dec_n);
- #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
-- break;
--#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-- case KEY_DSA:
-- case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
-- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-- case KEY_ECDSA:
-- case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
-- case KEY_RSA:
-- case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
-- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
--#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-- case KEY_ED25519:
-- case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
-- if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-- goto out;
-- }
-- if ((ret = sshkey_putb(key, bb)) != 0)
-- goto out;
-- if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64(bb)) == NULL) {
-- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+
-+ return r;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
-+{
-+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+ char *uu = NULL;
-+
-+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
-+ if ((r = sshkey_format_rsa1(key, b)) != 0)
- goto out;
-- }
-- if ((ret = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s ", sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0)
-+ } else {
-+ /* Unsupported key types handled in sshkey_to_base64() */
-+ if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &uu)) != 0)
- goto out;
-- if ((ret = sshbuf_put(b, uu, strlen(uu))) != 0)
-+ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s %s",
-+ sshkey_ssh_name(key), uu)) != 0)
- goto out;
-- break;
-- default:
-- ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
-- goto out;
- }
-+ r = 0;
-+ out:
-+ free(uu);
-+ return r;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f)
-+{
-+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
-+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+
-+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+ if ((r = sshkey_format_text(key, b)) != 0)
-+ goto out;
- if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 1, f) != 1) {
- if (feof(f))
- errno = EPIPE;
-- ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- goto out;
- }
-- ret = 0;
-+ /* Success */
-+ r = 0;
- out:
-- if (b != NULL)
-- sshbuf_free(b);
-- if (bb != NULL)
-- sshbuf_free(bb);
-- if (uu != NULL)
-- free(uu);
--#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-- if (dec_e != NULL)
-- OPENSSL_free(dec_e);
-- if (dec_n != NULL)
-- OPENSSL_free(dec_n);
--#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
-- return ret;
-+ sshbuf_free(b);
-+ return r;
- }
-
- const char *
-diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index 62c1c3e..98f1ca9 100644
---- a/sshkey.h
-+++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
- int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
- int sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
- int sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
-+int sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *, char **);
- int sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
- int sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
- int sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
---
-2.3.5
-
diff --git a/scripts/git-integration/git-auth.sh b/scripts/git-integration/git-auth.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..c6a5401
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/git-integration/git-auth.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+/srv/http/aurweb/scripts/git-integration/git-auth.py "$1" "$2"
--
2.4.1
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