[aur-general] AUR no more extracting source tarballs ( was: Upgraded AUR to 1.8.0)
archlinux at cryptocrack.de
Mon Feb 21 10:54:24 EST 2011
On Mon, Feb 21, 2011 at 04:42:49PM +0100, Dieter Plaetinck wrote:
> On Mon, 21 Feb 2011 16:35:33 +0100
> Lukas Fleischer <archlinux at cryptocrack.de> wrote:
> > On Mon, Feb 21, 2011 at 03:46:47PM +0100, Dieter Plaetinck wrote:
> > > On Mon, 21 Feb 2011 14:50:39 +0100
> > > Lukas Fleischer <archlinux at cryptocrack.de> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > > The only issue that might affect the end users as well is "ZIP
> > > > bombs". Most users will probably notice such a thing before it is
> > > > entirely extracted, just interrupt tar(1)/gzip(1) and send a
> > > > removal request to aur-general, however.
> > >
> > > hmmm. some good points.
> > > I guess I could try the suggested approach and see how I like it.
> > > However, now that you bring up the "zip bombs", do you think it's
> > > feasible to scan for them serverside without compromising security
> > > and/or making things needlessly complicated? it would be useful for
> > > clients if that one aspect could be filtered out in advance.
> > I don't think this is possible without decompressing the tarball which
> > is again vulnerable to (D)DoS.
> hmm maybe we mean different things.
> you are talking about exhausting ram/cpu/time, right?
Yes, like having two 1GB large files `tar -czf`'ed and uploading the
resulting tarball to the AUR. I don't think that can be detected without
being vulnerable to DoS attacks.
> In that case, sure, just leave it to the client. the problem is trivial
> I was talking about bad filenames
> (like ../../foo, /foo, /root/foobar, /tmpl/blah, and whatever else is
> that might be prevented with `tar -t`
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