[pacman-dev] GPG remote signing

Rémy Oudompheng remyoudompheng at gmail.com
Sun Jun 12 05:19:24 EDT 2011

On 2011/6/12 Kerrick Staley <mail at kerrickstaley.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 10, 2011 at 5:45 PM, Dan McGee <dpmcgee at gmail.com> wrote:
>> I've done a fair amount of research on what we might be able to do
>> with this during the afternoon here. Some observations below. This is
>> mainly addressing point four in Thomas' prior email
>> (http://mailman.archlinux.org/mailman/private/arch-dev/2011-May/014193.html).
> Could you please explain what the situation is? I do not have access
> to the arch-dev archives. In particular, what do you mean by "location
> A" and "location B"?
> You want developers to be able to sign databases without copying them
> to their local machines, correct? I vote for (4), then. (1) provides
> complete security against an attacker with access to the main server,
> but it may be hassling. (2), (3), and (4) ultimately don't provide any
> security against an attacker with access to the main server (at least
> until the attack is discovered), but with (2) and (3) keys will need
> to be revoked after an attack (the developer's and the server's,
> respectively), whereas with (4) nothing will have to be done (except
> secure the server). Also, an attack against (4) would probably be
> harder to mount for the attacker and easier to notice for the
> developers.

I personally vote for signing the hash, but not for having two sorts
of signatures. Isn't there any way to split GnuPG's code into the
hashing part and the encryption part?


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