[arch-commits] Commit in x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64 (12 files)
Gaëtan Bisson
bisson at archlinux.org
Thu Feb 15 01:14:13 UTC 2018
Date: Thursday, February 15, 2018 @ 01:14:13
Author: bisson
Revision: 317074
archrelease: copy trunk to extra-x86_64
Added:
x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/PKGBUILD
(from rev 317073, x11vnc/trunk/PKGBUILD)
x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/cursor.patch
(from rev 317073, x11vnc/trunk/cursor.patch)
x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/fix-buffer-overflows.patch
(from rev 317073, x11vnc/trunk/fix-buffer-overflows.patch)
x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/openssl-detect.patch
(from rev 317073, x11vnc/trunk/openssl-detect.patch)
x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/openssl-support.patch
(from rev 317073, x11vnc/trunk/openssl-support.patch)
x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/service
(from rev 317073, x11vnc/trunk/service)
Deleted:
x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/PKGBUILD
x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/cursor.patch
x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/fix-buffer-overflows.patch
x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/openssl-detect.patch
x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/openssl-support.patch
x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/service
----------------------------+
PKGBUILD | 86 +--
cursor.patch | 562 ++++++++++++-------------
fix-buffer-overflows.patch | 52 +-
openssl-detect.patch | 68 +--
openssl-support.patch | 962 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
service | 14
6 files changed, 864 insertions(+), 880 deletions(-)
Deleted: PKGBUILD
===================================================================
--- PKGBUILD 2018-02-15 01:13:13 UTC (rev 317073)
+++ PKGBUILD 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-# $Id$
-# Maintainer: Gaetan Bisson <bisson at archlinux.org>
-# Contributor: damir <damir at archlinux.org>
-
-pkgname=x11vnc
-epoch=1
-pkgver=0.9.14
-pkgrel=4
-pkgdesc='VNC server for real X displays'
-url='https://github.com/LibVNC/x11vnc'
-arch=('x86_64')
-license=('GPL2')
-optdepends=('tk: GUI support'
- 'net-tools: -auth guess'
- 'xf86-video-dummy: Xdummy script')
-depends=('libvncserver' 'openssl' 'libjpeg' 'libxtst' 'libxinerama'
- 'libxdamage' 'libxrandr' 'avahi' 'xorg-xdpyinfo')
-source=("https://github.com/LibVNC/x11vnc/archive/${pkgver}.tar.gz"
- 'fix-buffer-overflows.patch'
- 'openssl-detect.patch'
- 'openssl-support.patch'
- 'cursor.patch'
- 'service')
-sha256sums=('45f87c5e4382988c73e8c7891ac2bfb45d8f9ce1196ae06651c84636684ea143'
- '1d19edf54c6216b830150e5b05175a81ee8be3288d8584d3de0276df9a38384e'
- 'f356009176a11a793fef4514b26468c04908c961e6be226a83b631b6df5a2fdc'
- 'f9cafe56cb878b067bc95c6bd84aa8d480af6400bea836d87a08e24e0c4eca0b'
- '0559a163f62c308a993a911f5ced5d00cd20afd3e267e9057fe37a2436768f62'
- 'cfb19d44e09e960e2fdb958c9258bccf23c2677715314985f7e819f1dcedb6e4')
-
-prepare() {
- cd "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}"
- patch -p1 -i ../fix-buffer-overflows.patch
- patch -p1 -i ../openssl-detect.patch
- patch -p1 -i ../openssl-support.patch
- patch -p1 -i ../cursor.patch
- autoreconf -fi
-}
-
-build() {
- cd "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}"
- ./configure --prefix=/usr --mandir=/usr/share/man
- make
-}
-
-package() {
- cd "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}"
- make DESTDIR="${pkgdir}" install
- install misc/{rx11vnc,Xdummy} "${pkgdir}"/usr/bin
- install -Dm644 ../service "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/systemd/system/x11vnc.service"
-}
Copied: x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/PKGBUILD (from rev 317073, x11vnc/trunk/PKGBUILD)
===================================================================
--- PKGBUILD (rev 0)
+++ PKGBUILD 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# $Id$
+# Maintainer: Gaetan Bisson <bisson at archlinux.org>
+# Contributor: damir <damir at archlinux.org>
+
+pkgname=x11vnc
+epoch=1
+pkgver=0.9.15
+pkgrel=1
+pkgdesc='VNC server for real X displays'
+url='https://github.com/LibVNC/x11vnc'
+arch=('x86_64')
+license=('GPL2')
+optdepends=('tk: GUI support'
+ 'net-tools: -auth guess'
+ 'xf86-video-dummy: Xdummy script')
+depends=('libvncserver' 'openssl' 'libjpeg' 'libxtst' 'libxinerama'
+ 'libxdamage' 'libxrandr' 'avahi' 'xorg-xdpyinfo')
+source=("https://github.com/LibVNC/x11vnc/archive/${pkgver}.tar.gz"
+ 'service')
+sha256sums=('3e43bd875edc3c7f52a0d3676c4ec7de910fcd210240ee20b4522deb2bf84cff'
+ 'cfb19d44e09e960e2fdb958c9258bccf23c2677715314985f7e819f1dcedb6e4')
+
+build() {
+ cd "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}"
+ autoreconf -fi
+ ./configure --prefix=/usr --mandir=/usr/share/man
+ make
+}
+
+package() {
+ cd "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}"
+ make DESTDIR="${pkgdir}" install
+ install misc/{rx11vnc,Xdummy} "${pkgdir}"/usr/bin
+ install -Dm644 ../service "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/systemd/system/x11vnc.service"
+}
Deleted: cursor.patch
===================================================================
--- cursor.patch 2018-02-15 01:13:13 UTC (rev 317073)
+++ cursor.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
@@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
-From 37c946191a0f36490531624a2d03ec1ce7c714ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stephan Fuhrmann <stfu_os at freenet.de>
-Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 11:28:25 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Broken cursor bugfix for 64 bit systems (#49)
-
-* Proper 32 bit types assigned
-
-* The size dependent conversions are not necessary if input type is 32 bit in every case
-
-* Unused variable
-
-* Another type problem 32/64 fixed
-
-* Prototype fixed
-
-* Pointer cast missing
-
-* * Multiple conversions from (unsigned long*) to proper (uint32_t*).
-* Bugfix for XFixesCursorImage type problem. Structure contains (unsigned long*), but protocol says the pixels are just 32 bit.
- This is a problem for 64 bit systems where (unsigned long) is 64 bits wide.
----
- src/cursor.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------------
- src/cursor.h | 3 +--
- src/screen.c | 28 ++++++++++-----------
- 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/cursor.c b/src/cursor.c
-index 8c14b6c..6e135be 100644
---- a/src/cursor.c
-+++ b/src/cursor.c
-@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void set_no_cursor(void);
- void set_warrow_cursor(void);
- int set_cursor(int x, int y, int which);
- int check_x11_pointer(void);
--int store_cursor(int serial, unsigned long *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot);
-+int store_cursor(int serial, uint32_t *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot);
- unsigned long get_cursor_serial(int mode);
- rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h, int xhot, int yhot, int Bpp);
- void save_under_cursor_buffer(rfbClientPtr cl);
-@@ -1008,14 +1008,13 @@ void initialize_xfixes(void) {
- rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h,
- int xhot, int yhot, int Bpp) {
- rfbCursorPtr c;
-- static unsigned long black = 0, white = 1;
-+ static uint32_t black = 0, white = 1;
- static int first = 1;
- char *bitmap, *rich, *alpha;
- char *pixels_new = NULL;
- int n_opaque, n_trans, n_alpha, len, histo[256];
- int send_alpha = 0, alpha_shift = 0, thresh;
- int i, x, y;
--
- if (first && dpy) { /* raw_fb hack */
- X_LOCK;
- black = BlackPixel(dpy, scr);
-@@ -1033,7 +1032,6 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h,
- if (scaling_cursor && (scale_cursor_fac_x != 1.0 || scale_cursor_fac_y != 1.0)) {
- int W, H;
- char *pixels_use = (char *) pixels;
-- unsigned int *pixels32 = NULL;
-
- W = w;
- H = h;
-@@ -1043,48 +1041,10 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h,
-
- pixels_new = (char *) malloc(4*w*h);
-
-- if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) {
-- int i, j, k = 0;
-- /*
-- * to avoid 64bpp code in scale_rect() we knock
-- * down to unsigned int on 64bit machines:
-- */
-- pixels32 = (unsigned int*) malloc(4*W*H);
-- for (j=0; j<H; j++) {
-- for (i=0; i<W; i++) {
-- *(pixels32+k) = 0xffffffff & (*(pixels+k));
-- k++;
-- }
-- }
-- pixels_use = (char *) pixels32;
-- }
--
- scale_rect(scale_cursor_fac_x, scale_cursor_fac_y, scaling_cursor_blend,
- scaling_cursor_interpolate,
- 4, pixels_use, 4*W, pixels_new, 4*w,
- W, H, w, h, 0, 0, W, H, 0);
--
-- if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) {
-- int i, j, k = 0;
-- unsigned long *pixels64;
-- unsigned int* source = (unsigned int*) pixels_new;
-- /*
-- * now knock it back up to unsigned long:
-- */
-- pixels64 = (unsigned long*) malloc(8*w*h);
-- for (j=0; j<h; j++) {
-- for (i=0; i<w; i++) {
-- *(pixels64+k) = (unsigned long) (*(source+k));
-- k++;
-- }
-- }
-- free(pixels_new);
-- pixels_new = (char *) pixels64;
-- if (pixels32) {
-- free(pixels32);
-- pixels32 = NULL;
-- }
-- }
-
- pixels = (uint32_t *) pixels_new;
-
-@@ -1111,7 +1071,7 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h,
- i = 0;
- for (y = 0; y < h; y++) {
- for (x = 0; x < w; x++) {
-- unsigned long a;
-+ uint32_t a;
-
- a = 0xff000000 & (*(pixels+i));
- a = a >> 24; /* alpha channel */
-@@ -1154,8 +1114,8 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h,
- i = 0;
- for (y = 0; y < h; y++) {
- for (x = 0; x < w; x++) {
-- unsigned long r, g, b, a;
-- unsigned int ui;
-+ uint32_t r, g, b, a;
-+ uint32_t ui;
- char *p;
-
- a = 0xff000000 & (*(pixels+i));
-@@ -1322,6 +1282,7 @@ static int get_exact_cursor(int init) {
- }
- if (xfixes_present && dpy) {
- #if HAVE_LIBXFIXES
-+ uint32_t *pixel32 = NULL;
- int last_idx = (int) get_cursor_serial(1);
- XFixesCursorImage *xfc;
-
-@@ -1350,15 +1311,37 @@ static int get_exact_cursor(int init) {
-
- /* retrieve the cursor info + pixels from server: */
- xfc = XFixesGetCursorImage(dpy);
-+ {
-+ /* 2017-07-09, Stephan Fuhrmann: This fixes an implementation flaw for 64 bit systems.
-+ * The XFixesCursorImage structure says xfc->pixels is (unsigned long*) in the structure, but
-+ * the protocol spec says it's 32 bit per pixel
-+ * (https://www.x.org/releases/X11R7.6/doc/fixesproto/fixesproto.txt).
-+ * I'm converting the data anyway to 32 bit to be sure. Only necessary for 64 bit systems,
-+ * but doing it anyway for 32 bit.
-+ * */
-+ int x,y;
-+ pixel32 = malloc(xfc->width * xfc->height * sizeof(uint32_t));
-+ for (y = 0; y < xfc->height; y++) {
-+ for (x = 0; x < xfc->width; x++) {
-+ uint32_t ofs = x + y*xfc->width;
-+ *(pixel32 + ofs) = *(xfc->pixels + ofs);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ }
-+
- X_UNLOCK;
- if (! xfc) {
- /* failure. */
- return which;
- }
-
-- which = store_cursor(xfc->cursor_serial, xfc->pixels,
-+ which = store_cursor(xfc->cursor_serial, pixel32,
- xfc->width, xfc->height, 32, xfc->xhot, xfc->yhot);
-
-+ if (pixel32 != NULL) {
-+ free(pixel32);
-+ }
-+
- X_LOCK;
- XFree_wr(xfc);
- X_UNLOCK;
-@@ -1367,7 +1350,7 @@ static int get_exact_cursor(int init) {
- return(which);
- }
-
--int store_cursor(int serial, unsigned long *data, int w, int h, int cbpp,
-+int store_cursor(int serial, uint32_t *data, int w, int h, int cbpp,
- int xhot, int yhot) {
- int which = CURS_ARROW;
- int use, oldest, i;
-@@ -1453,7 +1436,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "sc: %d %d/%d %d - %d %d\n", serial, w, h, cbpp, xhot, yhot);
- }
-
- /* place cursor into our collection */
-- cursors[use]->rfb = pixels2curs((uint32_t*)data, w, h, xhot, yhot, bpp/8);
-+ cursors[use]->rfb = pixels2curs(data, w, h, xhot, yhot, bpp/8);
-
- /* update time and serial index: */
- curs_times[use] = now;
-diff --git a/src/cursor.h b/src/cursor.h
-index 0cd42d1..e8ed248 100644
---- a/src/cursor.h
-+++ b/src/cursor.h
-@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ extern int alpha_blend;
- extern int alt_arrow;
- extern int alt_arrow_max;
-
--
- extern void first_cursor(void);
- extern void setup_cursors_and_push(void);
- extern void initialize_xfixes(void);
-@@ -64,7 +63,7 @@ extern void set_no_cursor(void);
- extern void set_warrow_cursor(void);
- extern int set_cursor(int x, int y, int which);
- extern int check_x11_pointer(void);
--extern int store_cursor(int serial, unsigned long *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot);
-+extern int store_cursor(int serial, uint32_t *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot);
- extern unsigned long get_cursor_serial(int mode);
- extern rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h, int xhot, int yhot, int Bpp);
- void save_under_cursor_buffer(rfbClientPtr cl);
-diff --git a/src/screen.c b/src/screen.c
-index bda4690..395b503 100644
---- a/src/screen.c
-+++ b/src/screen.c
-@@ -1206,10 +1206,10 @@ void vnc_reflect_got_update(rfbClient *cl, int x, int y, int w, int h) {
- void vnc_reflect_got_cursorshape(rfbClient *cl, int xhot, int yhot, int width, int height, int bytesPerPixel) {
- static int serial = 1;
- int i, j;
-- char *pixels = NULL;
-- unsigned long r, g, b;
-- unsigned int ui = 0;
-- unsigned long red_mask, green_mask, blue_mask;
-+ uint32_t *pixels = NULL;
-+ uint32_t r, g, b;
-+ uint32_t ui = 0;
-+ uint32_t red_mask, green_mask, blue_mask;
-
- if (cl) {}
- if (unixpw_in_progress) {
-@@ -1230,21 +1230,20 @@ void vnc_reflect_got_cursorshape(rfbClient *cl, int xhot, int yhot, int width, i
- green_mask = (client->format.greenMax << client->format.greenShift);
- blue_mask = (client->format.blueMax << client->format.blueShift);
-
-- pixels = (char *)malloc(4*width*height);
-+ pixels = (uint32_t *)malloc(4*width*height);
- for (j=0; j<height; j++) {
- for (i=0; i<width; i++) {
-- unsigned int* uip;
- unsigned char* uic;
- int m;
- if (bytesPerPixel == 1) {
-- unsigned char* p = (unsigned char *) client->rcSource;
-- ui = (unsigned long) *(p + j * width + i);
-+ uint8_t* p = (uint8_t *) client->rcSource;
-+ ui = (uint32_t) *(p + j * width + i);
- } else if (bytesPerPixel == 2) {
-- unsigned short* p = (unsigned short *) client->rcSource;
-- ui = (unsigned long) *(p + j * width + i);
-+ uint16_t* p = (uint16_t *) client->rcSource;
-+ ui = (uint32_t) *(p + j * width + i);
- } else if (bytesPerPixel == 4) {
-- unsigned int* p = (unsigned int *) client->rcSource;
-- ui = (unsigned long) *(p + j * width + i);
-+ uint32_t* p = (uint32_t *) client->rcSource;
-+ ui = (uint32_t) *(p + j * width + i);
- }
- r = (red_mask & ui) >> client->format.redShift;
- g = (green_mask & ui) >> client->format.greenShift;
-@@ -1261,12 +1260,11 @@ void vnc_reflect_got_cursorshape(rfbClient *cl, int xhot, int yhot, int width, i
- if (m) {
- ui |= 0xff000000;
- }
-- uip = (unsigned int *)pixels;
-- *(uip + j * width + i) = ui;
-+ *(pixels + j * width + i) = ui;
- }
- }
-
-- store_cursor(serial++, (unsigned long*) pixels, width, height, 32, xhot, yhot);
-+ store_cursor(serial++, pixels, width, height, 32, xhot, yhot);
- free(pixels);
- set_cursor(cursor_x, cursor_y, get_which_cursor());
- }
Copied: x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/cursor.patch (from rev 317073, x11vnc/trunk/cursor.patch)
===================================================================
--- cursor.patch (rev 0)
+++ cursor.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+From 37c946191a0f36490531624a2d03ec1ce7c714ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stephan Fuhrmann <stfu_os at freenet.de>
+Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 11:28:25 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Broken cursor bugfix for 64 bit systems (#49)
+
+* Proper 32 bit types assigned
+
+* The size dependent conversions are not necessary if input type is 32 bit in every case
+
+* Unused variable
+
+* Another type problem 32/64 fixed
+
+* Prototype fixed
+
+* Pointer cast missing
+
+* * Multiple conversions from (unsigned long*) to proper (uint32_t*).
+* Bugfix for XFixesCursorImage type problem. Structure contains (unsigned long*), but protocol says the pixels are just 32 bit.
+ This is a problem for 64 bit systems where (unsigned long) is 64 bits wide.
+---
+ src/cursor.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------------
+ src/cursor.h | 3 +--
+ src/screen.c | 28 ++++++++++-----------
+ 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/cursor.c b/src/cursor.c
+index 8c14b6c..6e135be 100644
+--- a/src/cursor.c
++++ b/src/cursor.c
+@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void set_no_cursor(void);
+ void set_warrow_cursor(void);
+ int set_cursor(int x, int y, int which);
+ int check_x11_pointer(void);
+-int store_cursor(int serial, unsigned long *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot);
++int store_cursor(int serial, uint32_t *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot);
+ unsigned long get_cursor_serial(int mode);
+ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h, int xhot, int yhot, int Bpp);
+ void save_under_cursor_buffer(rfbClientPtr cl);
+@@ -1008,14 +1008,13 @@ void initialize_xfixes(void) {
+ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h,
+ int xhot, int yhot, int Bpp) {
+ rfbCursorPtr c;
+- static unsigned long black = 0, white = 1;
++ static uint32_t black = 0, white = 1;
+ static int first = 1;
+ char *bitmap, *rich, *alpha;
+ char *pixels_new = NULL;
+ int n_opaque, n_trans, n_alpha, len, histo[256];
+ int send_alpha = 0, alpha_shift = 0, thresh;
+ int i, x, y;
+-
+ if (first && dpy) { /* raw_fb hack */
+ X_LOCK;
+ black = BlackPixel(dpy, scr);
+@@ -1033,7 +1032,6 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h,
+ if (scaling_cursor && (scale_cursor_fac_x != 1.0 || scale_cursor_fac_y != 1.0)) {
+ int W, H;
+ char *pixels_use = (char *) pixels;
+- unsigned int *pixels32 = NULL;
+
+ W = w;
+ H = h;
+@@ -1043,48 +1041,10 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h,
+
+ pixels_new = (char *) malloc(4*w*h);
+
+- if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) {
+- int i, j, k = 0;
+- /*
+- * to avoid 64bpp code in scale_rect() we knock
+- * down to unsigned int on 64bit machines:
+- */
+- pixels32 = (unsigned int*) malloc(4*W*H);
+- for (j=0; j<H; j++) {
+- for (i=0; i<W; i++) {
+- *(pixels32+k) = 0xffffffff & (*(pixels+k));
+- k++;
+- }
+- }
+- pixels_use = (char *) pixels32;
+- }
+-
+ scale_rect(scale_cursor_fac_x, scale_cursor_fac_y, scaling_cursor_blend,
+ scaling_cursor_interpolate,
+ 4, pixels_use, 4*W, pixels_new, 4*w,
+ W, H, w, h, 0, 0, W, H, 0);
+-
+- if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) {
+- int i, j, k = 0;
+- unsigned long *pixels64;
+- unsigned int* source = (unsigned int*) pixels_new;
+- /*
+- * now knock it back up to unsigned long:
+- */
+- pixels64 = (unsigned long*) malloc(8*w*h);
+- for (j=0; j<h; j++) {
+- for (i=0; i<w; i++) {
+- *(pixels64+k) = (unsigned long) (*(source+k));
+- k++;
+- }
+- }
+- free(pixels_new);
+- pixels_new = (char *) pixels64;
+- if (pixels32) {
+- free(pixels32);
+- pixels32 = NULL;
+- }
+- }
+
+ pixels = (uint32_t *) pixels_new;
+
+@@ -1111,7 +1071,7 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h,
+ i = 0;
+ for (y = 0; y < h; y++) {
+ for (x = 0; x < w; x++) {
+- unsigned long a;
++ uint32_t a;
+
+ a = 0xff000000 & (*(pixels+i));
+ a = a >> 24; /* alpha channel */
+@@ -1154,8 +1114,8 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h,
+ i = 0;
+ for (y = 0; y < h; y++) {
+ for (x = 0; x < w; x++) {
+- unsigned long r, g, b, a;
+- unsigned int ui;
++ uint32_t r, g, b, a;
++ uint32_t ui;
+ char *p;
+
+ a = 0xff000000 & (*(pixels+i));
+@@ -1322,6 +1282,7 @@ static int get_exact_cursor(int init) {
+ }
+ if (xfixes_present && dpy) {
+ #if HAVE_LIBXFIXES
++ uint32_t *pixel32 = NULL;
+ int last_idx = (int) get_cursor_serial(1);
+ XFixesCursorImage *xfc;
+
+@@ -1350,15 +1311,37 @@ static int get_exact_cursor(int init) {
+
+ /* retrieve the cursor info + pixels from server: */
+ xfc = XFixesGetCursorImage(dpy);
++ {
++ /* 2017-07-09, Stephan Fuhrmann: This fixes an implementation flaw for 64 bit systems.
++ * The XFixesCursorImage structure says xfc->pixels is (unsigned long*) in the structure, but
++ * the protocol spec says it's 32 bit per pixel
++ * (https://www.x.org/releases/X11R7.6/doc/fixesproto/fixesproto.txt).
++ * I'm converting the data anyway to 32 bit to be sure. Only necessary for 64 bit systems,
++ * but doing it anyway for 32 bit.
++ * */
++ int x,y;
++ pixel32 = malloc(xfc->width * xfc->height * sizeof(uint32_t));
++ for (y = 0; y < xfc->height; y++) {
++ for (x = 0; x < xfc->width; x++) {
++ uint32_t ofs = x + y*xfc->width;
++ *(pixel32 + ofs) = *(xfc->pixels + ofs);
++ }
++ }
++ }
++
+ X_UNLOCK;
+ if (! xfc) {
+ /* failure. */
+ return which;
+ }
+
+- which = store_cursor(xfc->cursor_serial, xfc->pixels,
++ which = store_cursor(xfc->cursor_serial, pixel32,
+ xfc->width, xfc->height, 32, xfc->xhot, xfc->yhot);
+
++ if (pixel32 != NULL) {
++ free(pixel32);
++ }
++
+ X_LOCK;
+ XFree_wr(xfc);
+ X_UNLOCK;
+@@ -1367,7 +1350,7 @@ static int get_exact_cursor(int init) {
+ return(which);
+ }
+
+-int store_cursor(int serial, unsigned long *data, int w, int h, int cbpp,
++int store_cursor(int serial, uint32_t *data, int w, int h, int cbpp,
+ int xhot, int yhot) {
+ int which = CURS_ARROW;
+ int use, oldest, i;
+@@ -1453,7 +1436,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "sc: %d %d/%d %d - %d %d\n", serial, w, h, cbpp, xhot, yhot);
+ }
+
+ /* place cursor into our collection */
+- cursors[use]->rfb = pixels2curs((uint32_t*)data, w, h, xhot, yhot, bpp/8);
++ cursors[use]->rfb = pixels2curs(data, w, h, xhot, yhot, bpp/8);
+
+ /* update time and serial index: */
+ curs_times[use] = now;
+diff --git a/src/cursor.h b/src/cursor.h
+index 0cd42d1..e8ed248 100644
+--- a/src/cursor.h
++++ b/src/cursor.h
+@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ extern int alpha_blend;
+ extern int alt_arrow;
+ extern int alt_arrow_max;
+
+-
+ extern void first_cursor(void);
+ extern void setup_cursors_and_push(void);
+ extern void initialize_xfixes(void);
+@@ -64,7 +63,7 @@ extern void set_no_cursor(void);
+ extern void set_warrow_cursor(void);
+ extern int set_cursor(int x, int y, int which);
+ extern int check_x11_pointer(void);
+-extern int store_cursor(int serial, unsigned long *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot);
++extern int store_cursor(int serial, uint32_t *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot);
+ extern unsigned long get_cursor_serial(int mode);
+ extern rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h, int xhot, int yhot, int Bpp);
+ void save_under_cursor_buffer(rfbClientPtr cl);
+diff --git a/src/screen.c b/src/screen.c
+index bda4690..395b503 100644
+--- a/src/screen.c
++++ b/src/screen.c
+@@ -1206,10 +1206,10 @@ void vnc_reflect_got_update(rfbClient *cl, int x, int y, int w, int h) {
+ void vnc_reflect_got_cursorshape(rfbClient *cl, int xhot, int yhot, int width, int height, int bytesPerPixel) {
+ static int serial = 1;
+ int i, j;
+- char *pixels = NULL;
+- unsigned long r, g, b;
+- unsigned int ui = 0;
+- unsigned long red_mask, green_mask, blue_mask;
++ uint32_t *pixels = NULL;
++ uint32_t r, g, b;
++ uint32_t ui = 0;
++ uint32_t red_mask, green_mask, blue_mask;
+
+ if (cl) {}
+ if (unixpw_in_progress) {
+@@ -1230,21 +1230,20 @@ void vnc_reflect_got_cursorshape(rfbClient *cl, int xhot, int yhot, int width, i
+ green_mask = (client->format.greenMax << client->format.greenShift);
+ blue_mask = (client->format.blueMax << client->format.blueShift);
+
+- pixels = (char *)malloc(4*width*height);
++ pixels = (uint32_t *)malloc(4*width*height);
+ for (j=0; j<height; j++) {
+ for (i=0; i<width; i++) {
+- unsigned int* uip;
+ unsigned char* uic;
+ int m;
+ if (bytesPerPixel == 1) {
+- unsigned char* p = (unsigned char *) client->rcSource;
+- ui = (unsigned long) *(p + j * width + i);
++ uint8_t* p = (uint8_t *) client->rcSource;
++ ui = (uint32_t) *(p + j * width + i);
+ } else if (bytesPerPixel == 2) {
+- unsigned short* p = (unsigned short *) client->rcSource;
+- ui = (unsigned long) *(p + j * width + i);
++ uint16_t* p = (uint16_t *) client->rcSource;
++ ui = (uint32_t) *(p + j * width + i);
+ } else if (bytesPerPixel == 4) {
+- unsigned int* p = (unsigned int *) client->rcSource;
+- ui = (unsigned long) *(p + j * width + i);
++ uint32_t* p = (uint32_t *) client->rcSource;
++ ui = (uint32_t) *(p + j * width + i);
+ }
+ r = (red_mask & ui) >> client->format.redShift;
+ g = (green_mask & ui) >> client->format.greenShift;
+@@ -1261,12 +1260,11 @@ void vnc_reflect_got_cursorshape(rfbClient *cl, int xhot, int yhot, int width, i
+ if (m) {
+ ui |= 0xff000000;
+ }
+- uip = (unsigned int *)pixels;
+- *(uip + j * width + i) = ui;
++ *(pixels + j * width + i) = ui;
+ }
+ }
+
+- store_cursor(serial++, (unsigned long*) pixels, width, height, 32, xhot, yhot);
++ store_cursor(serial++, pixels, width, height, 32, xhot, yhot);
+ free(pixels);
+ set_cursor(cursor_x, cursor_y, get_which_cursor());
+ }
Deleted: fix-buffer-overflows.patch
===================================================================
--- fix-buffer-overflows.patch 2018-02-15 01:13:13 UTC (rev 317073)
+++ fix-buffer-overflows.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-diff -Naur x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/win_utils.c x11vnc-0.9.13/src/win_utils.c
---- x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/win_utils.c 2016-10-07 23:26:03.248600761 +0200
-+++ x11vnc-0.9.13/src/win_utils.c 2016-10-07 23:26:51.919256706 +0200
-@@ -262,8 +262,8 @@
- }
-
- last_snap = now;
-- if (num > stack_list_len + blackouts) {
-- int n = 2*num;
-+ if (num + blackouts > stack_list_len) {
-+ int n = 2 * (num + blackouts);
- free(stack_list);
- stack_list = (winattr_t *) malloc(n*sizeof(winattr_t));
- stack_list_len = n;
-diff -Naur x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/xrecord.c x11vnc-0.9.13/src/xrecord.c
---- x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/xrecord.c 2016-10-07 23:26:03.248600761 +0200
-+++ x11vnc-0.9.13/src/xrecord.c 2016-10-07 23:27:49.566700470 +0200
-@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@
- data = (char *)req;
- data += sz_xConfigureWindowReq;
-
-- for (i=0; i<req->length; i++) {
-+ for (i = 0; i < req->length - sz_xConfigureWindowReq / 4 && i < 4; i++) {
- unsigned int v;
- /*
- * We use unsigned int for the values. There were
Copied: x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/fix-buffer-overflows.patch (from rev 317073, x11vnc/trunk/fix-buffer-overflows.patch)
===================================================================
--- fix-buffer-overflows.patch (rev 0)
+++ fix-buffer-overflows.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+diff -Naur x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/win_utils.c x11vnc-0.9.13/src/win_utils.c
+--- x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/win_utils.c 2016-10-07 23:26:03.248600761 +0200
++++ x11vnc-0.9.13/src/win_utils.c 2016-10-07 23:26:51.919256706 +0200
+@@ -262,8 +262,8 @@
+ }
+
+ last_snap = now;
+- if (num > stack_list_len + blackouts) {
+- int n = 2*num;
++ if (num + blackouts > stack_list_len) {
++ int n = 2 * (num + blackouts);
+ free(stack_list);
+ stack_list = (winattr_t *) malloc(n*sizeof(winattr_t));
+ stack_list_len = n;
+diff -Naur x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/xrecord.c x11vnc-0.9.13/src/xrecord.c
+--- x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/xrecord.c 2016-10-07 23:26:03.248600761 +0200
++++ x11vnc-0.9.13/src/xrecord.c 2016-10-07 23:27:49.566700470 +0200
+@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@
+ data = (char *)req;
+ data += sz_xConfigureWindowReq;
+
+- for (i=0; i<req->length; i++) {
++ for (i = 0; i < req->length - sz_xConfigureWindowReq / 4 && i < 4; i++) {
+ unsigned int v;
+ /*
+ * We use unsigned int for the values. There were
Deleted: openssl-detect.patch
===================================================================
--- openssl-detect.patch 2018-02-15 01:13:13 UTC (rev 317073)
+++ openssl-detect.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From 5889645bd3e63cf02c3fcad942d7edef1b4df472 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
-Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 10:56:24 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix openssl 1.1.x detection
-
-The SSL_library_init function has been renamed to OPENSSL_init_ssl from
-openssl 1.1.0 on. While the old name still exists as a define for
-backwards compatibility, this breaks detection in the library itself.
-Update configure.ac to just detect the library instead of specific
-functions.
-
-Signed-off-by: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
----
- configure.ac | 7 +++----
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -351,12 +351,11 @@ fi
- AH_TEMPLATE(HAVE_X509_PRINT_EX_FP, [open ssl X509_print_ex_fp available])
- if test "x$with_ssl" != "xno"; then
- if test "x$HAVE_LIBCRYPTO" = "xtrue"; then
-- AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, SSL_library_init,
-+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES(OPENSSL, [openssl >= 1.0.0],
- SSL_LIBS="-lssl -lcrypto"
-- [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBSSL) HAVE_LIBSSL="true"], ,
-- -lcrypto)
-+ [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBSSL) HAVE_LIBSSL="true"], ,)
- else
-- AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, SSL_library_init,
-+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES(OPENSSL, [openssl >= 1.0.0],
- SSL_LIBS="-lssl"
- [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBSSL) HAVE_LIBSSL="true"], ,)
- fi
Copied: x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/openssl-detect.patch (from rev 317073, x11vnc/trunk/openssl-detect.patch)
===================================================================
--- openssl-detect.patch (rev 0)
+++ openssl-detect.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 5889645bd3e63cf02c3fcad942d7edef1b4df472 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
+Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 10:56:24 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix openssl 1.1.x detection
+
+The SSL_library_init function has been renamed to OPENSSL_init_ssl from
+openssl 1.1.0 on. While the old name still exists as a define for
+backwards compatibility, this breaks detection in the library itself.
+Update configure.ac to just detect the library instead of specific
+functions.
+
+Signed-off-by: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
+---
+ configure.ac | 7 +++----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -351,12 +351,11 @@ fi
+ AH_TEMPLATE(HAVE_X509_PRINT_EX_FP, [open ssl X509_print_ex_fp available])
+ if test "x$with_ssl" != "xno"; then
+ if test "x$HAVE_LIBCRYPTO" = "xtrue"; then
+- AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, SSL_library_init,
++ PKG_CHECK_MODULES(OPENSSL, [openssl >= 1.0.0],
+ SSL_LIBS="-lssl -lcrypto"
+- [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBSSL) HAVE_LIBSSL="true"], ,
+- -lcrypto)
++ [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBSSL) HAVE_LIBSSL="true"], ,)
+ else
+- AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, SSL_library_init,
++ PKG_CHECK_MODULES(OPENSSL, [openssl >= 1.0.0],
+ SSL_LIBS="-lssl"
+ [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBSSL) HAVE_LIBSSL="true"], ,)
+ fi
Deleted: openssl-support.patch
===================================================================
--- openssl-support.patch 2018-02-15 01:13:13 UTC (rev 317073)
+++ openssl-support.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
@@ -1,481 +0,0 @@
-From d37dac6963c2fb65cf577a6413657621cbcb406a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
-Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 14:43:57 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Support openssl 1.1.0
-
-Compatibility patch for openssl 1.1.0 and later. The 1.0.2 API should
-still work. Note that openssl 1.1.0 builds now have SSLv3 disabled per
-default, so clients will have to support TLS to connect securely.
-
-Signed-off-by: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
----
- README | 16 +++++++
- src/enc.h | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- src/sslhelper.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- 3 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
-
---- a/README
-+++ b/README
-@@ -871,6 +871,14 @@ make
- place. As of x11vnc 0.9.4 there is also the --with-ssl=DIR configure
- option.
-
-+ Note that from OpenSSL 1.1.0 on SSLv2 support has been dropped and
-+ SSLv3 deactivated at build time per default. This means that unless
-+ explicitly enabled, OpenSSL builds only support TLS (any version).
-+ Since there is a reason for dropping SSLv3 (heard of POODLE?), most
-+ distributions do not enable it for their OpenSSL binary. In summary
-+ this means compiling x11vnc against OpenSSL 1.1.0 or newer is no
-+ problem, but using encryption will require a viewer with TLS support.
-+
- On Solaris using static archives libssl.a and libcrypto.a instead of
- .so shared libraries (e.g. from www.sunfreeware.com), we found we
- needed to also set LDFLAGS as follows to get the configure to work:
-@@ -4228,6 +4236,14 @@ connect = 5900
- protocol handshake. x11vnc 0.9.6 supports both simultaneously when
- -ssl is active.
-
-+ Note: With the advent of OpenSSL 1.1.0, SSLv2 is dropped and SSLv3
-+ deactivated per default. A couple broken ciphers have also gone, most
-+ importantly though is that clients trying to connect to x11vnc will
-+ now have to support TLS if encryption is to be used. You can of
-+ course always cook up your own build and run time OpenSSL 1.1.x if
-+ SSLv3 is absolutely required, but it isn't wise from a security point
-+ of view.
-+
-
- SSL VNC Viewers:. Viewer-side will need to use SSL as well. See the
- next FAQ and here for SSL enabled VNC Viewers, including SSVNC, to
---- a/src/enc.h
-+++ b/src/enc.h
-@@ -454,8 +454,10 @@ extern void enc_do(char *ciph, char *key
- p++;
- if (strstr(p, "md5+") == p) {
- Digest = EVP_md5(); p += strlen("md5+");
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L && !defined OPENSSL_NO_SHA0
- } else if (strstr(p, "sha+") == p) {
- Digest = EVP_sha(); p += strlen("sha+");
-+#endif
- } else if (strstr(p, "sha1+") == p) {
- Digest = EVP_sha1(); p += strlen("sha1+");
- } else if (strstr(p, "ripe+") == p) {
-@@ -696,7 +698,11 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
- */
- unsigned char E_keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char D_keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *E_ctx, *D_ctx;
-+#else
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX E_ctx, D_ctx;
-+#endif
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-
- unsigned char buf[BSIZE], out[BSIZE];
-@@ -739,11 +745,16 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
- encsym = encrypt ? "+" : "-";
-
- /* use the encryption/decryption context variables below */
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ E_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-+ D_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-+ ctx = encrypt ? E_ctx : D_ctx;
-+#else
-+ ctx = encrypt ? &E_ctx : &D_ctx;
-+#endif
- if (encrypt) {
-- ctx = &E_ctx;
- keystr = E_keystr;
- } else {
-- ctx = &D_ctx;
- keystr = D_keystr;
- }
-
-@@ -877,9 +888,9 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
- in_salt = salt;
- }
-
-- if (ivec_size < Cipher->iv_len && !securevnc) {
-+ if (ivec_size < EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(Cipher) && !securevnc) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s - WARNING: short IV %d < %d\n",
-- prog, encstr, ivec_size, Cipher->iv_len);
-+ prog, encstr, ivec_size, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(Cipher));
- }
-
- /* make the hashed value and place in keystr */
-@@ -1033,6 +1044,11 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s - close sock_fr\n", prog, encstr);
- close(sock_fr);
-
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(E_ctx);
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(D_ctx);
-+#endif
-+
- /* kill our partner after 2 secs. */
- sleep(2);
- if (child) {
-@@ -1101,14 +1117,24 @@ static int securevnc_server_rsa_save_dia
- }
-
- static char *rsa_md5_sum(unsigned char* rsabuf) {
-- EVP_MD_CTX md;
-+ EVP_MD_CTX *md;
- char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmp[16];
- char md5str[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 8];
- unsigned int i, size = 0;
-
-- EVP_DigestInit(&md, EVP_md5());
-- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, rsabuf, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
-- EVP_DigestFinal(&md, (unsigned char *)digest, &size);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-+#else
-+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-+#endif
-+ EVP_DigestInit(md, EVP_md5());
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, rsabuf, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
-+ EVP_DigestFinal(md, (unsigned char *)digest, &size);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
-+#else
-+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
-+#endif
-
- memset(md5str, 0, sizeof(md5str));
- for (i=0; i < size; i++) {
-@@ -1225,7 +1251,7 @@ static void sslexit(char *msg) {
-
- static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, int conn2) {
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX init_ctx;
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *init_ctx;
- unsigned char keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char *rsabuf, *rsasav;
- unsigned char *encrypted_keybuf;
-@@ -1364,8 +1390,15 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
- /*
- * Back to the work involving the tmp obscuring key:
- */
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&init_ctx);
-- rc = EVP_CipherInit_ex(&init_ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, initkey, NULL, 1);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ init_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-+#else
-+
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX init_ctx_obj;
-+ init_ctx = &init_ctx_obj;
-+#endif
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(init_ctx);
-+ rc = EVP_CipherInit_ex(init_ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, initkey, NULL, 1);
- if (rc == 0) {
- sslexit("securevnc_setup: EVP_CipherInit_ex(init_ctx) failed");
- }
-@@ -1374,6 +1407,9 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
- n = read(server, (char *) buf, BSIZE);
- fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: data read: %d\n", n);
- if (n < 0) {
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx);
-+#endif
- exit(1);
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: initial data[%d]: ", n);
-@@ -1381,13 +1417,19 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
- /* decode with the tmp key */
- if (n > 0) {
- memset(to_viewer, 0, sizeof(to_viewer));
-- if (EVP_CipherUpdate(&init_ctx, to_viewer, &len, buf, n) == 0) {
-+ if (EVP_CipherUpdate(init_ctx, to_viewer, &len, buf, n) == 0) {
- sslexit("securevnc_setup: EVP_CipherUpdate(init_ctx) failed");
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx);
-+#endif
- exit(1);
- }
- to_viewer_len = len;
- }
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&init_ctx);
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(init_ctx);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx);
-+#endif
- free(initkey);
-
- /* print what we would send to the viewer (sent below): */
-@@ -1448,7 +1490,7 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
-
- if (client_auth_req && client_auth) {
- RSA *client_rsa = load_client_auth(client_auth);
-- EVP_MD_CTX dctx;
-+ EVP_MD_CTX *dctx;
- unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *signature;
- unsigned int ndig = 0, nsig = 0;
-
-@@ -1462,8 +1504,13 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
- exit(1);
- }
-
-- EVP_DigestInit(&dctx, EVP_sha1());
-- EVP_DigestUpdate(&dctx, keystr, SECUREVNC_KEY_SIZE);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ dctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-+#else
-+ dctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-+#endif
-+ EVP_DigestInit(dctx, EVP_sha1());
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(dctx, keystr, SECUREVNC_KEY_SIZE);
- /*
- * Without something like the following MITM is still possible.
- * This is because the MITM knows keystr and can use it with
-@@ -1474,7 +1521,7 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
- * he doesn't have Viewer_ClientAuth.pkey.
- */
- if (0) {
-- EVP_DigestUpdate(&dctx, rsasav, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(dctx, rsasav, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
- if (!keystore_verified) {
- fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup:\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: Warning: even *WITH* Client Authentication in SecureVNC,\n");
-@@ -1497,7 +1544,12 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
- fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup:\n");
- }
- }
-- EVP_DigestFinal(&dctx, (unsigned char *)digest, &ndig);
-+ EVP_DigestFinal(dctx, (unsigned char *)digest, &ndig);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(dctx);
-+#else
-+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(dctx);
-+#endif
-
- signature = (unsigned char *) calloc(RSA_size(client_rsa), 1);
- RSA_sign(NID_sha1, digest, ndig, signature, &nsig, client_rsa);
---- a/src/sslhelper.c
-+++ b/src/sslhelper.c
-@@ -799,8 +799,13 @@ static int pem_passwd_callback(char *buf
-
- /* based on mod_ssl */
- static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *callback_ctx) {
-- X509_STORE_CTX store_ctx;
-+ const ASN1_INTEGER *revoked_serial;
-+ X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx;
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10100000L
-+ X509_OBJECT *obj;
-+#else
- X509_OBJECT obj;
-+#endif
- X509_NAME *subject;
- X509_NAME *issuer;
- X509 *xs;
-@@ -820,11 +825,19 @@ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *
-
- /* Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _subject_ of
- * the current certificate in order to verify it's integrity. */
-+ store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
-+ X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10100000L
-+ obj = X509_OBJECT_new();
-+ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, subject, obj);
-+ crl = X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(obj);
-+#else
- memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
-- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
-- rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj);
-- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx);
-+ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj);
- crl=obj.data.crl;
-+#endif
-+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(store_ctx);
-+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx);
-
- if(rc>0 && crl) {
- /* Log information about CRL
-@@ -850,7 +863,11 @@ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *
- rfbLog("Invalid signature on CRL\n");
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx,
- X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
-+#else
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#endif
- if(pubkey)
- EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
- return 0; /* Reject connection */
-@@ -864,45 +881,78 @@ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *
- rfbLog("Found CRL has invalid nextUpdate field\n");
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx,
- X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
-+#else
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#endif
- return 0; /* Reject connection */
- }
- if(X509_cmp_current_time(t)<0) {
- rfbLog("Found CRL is expired - "
- "revoking all certificates until you get updated CRL\n");
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
-+#else
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#endif
- return 0; /* Reject connection */
- }
-- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
-+#else
-+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#endif
- }
-
- /* Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _issuer_ of
- * the current certificate in order to check for revocation. */
-+ store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
-+ X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10100000L
-+ obj = X509_OBJECT_new();
-+ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, obj);
-+ crl = X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(obj);
-+#else
- memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
-- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
-- rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj);
-- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx);
-+ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj);
- crl=obj.data.crl;
-+#endif
-+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(store_ctx);
-+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx);
-
- if(rc>0 && crl) {
- /* Check if the current certificate is revoked by this CRL */
- n=sk_X509_REVOKED_num(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl));
- for(i=0; i<n; i++) {
- revoked=sk_X509_REVOKED_value(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl), i);
-- if(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(revoked->serialNumber,
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ revoked_serial = X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(revoked);
-+#else
-+ revoked_serial = revoked->serialNumber;
-+#endif
-+ if(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(revoked_serial,
- X509_get_serialNumber(xs)) == 0) {
-- serial=ASN1_INTEGER_get(revoked->serialNumber);
-+ serial=ASN1_INTEGER_get(revoked_serial);
- cp=X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, NULL, 0);
- rfbLog("Certificate with serial %ld (0x%lX) "
- "revoked per CRL from issuer %s\n", serial, serial, cp);
- OPENSSL_free(cp);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
-+#else
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#endif
- return 0; /* Reject connection */
- }
- }
-- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
-+#else
-+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#endif
- }
-
- return 1; /* Accept connection */
-@@ -951,6 +1001,8 @@ static int switch_to_anon_dh(void);
-
- void openssl_init(int isclient) {
- int db = 0, tmp_pem = 0, do_dh;
-+ const SSL_METHOD *method;
-+ char *method_name;
- FILE *in;
- double ds;
- long mode;
-@@ -992,13 +1044,17 @@ void openssl_init(int isclient) {
- ssl_client_mode = 0;
- }
-
-- if (ssl_client_mode) {
-- if (db) fprintf(stderr, "SSLv23_client_method()\n");
-- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_client_method() );
-- } else {
-- if (db) fprintf(stderr, "SSLv23_server_method()\n");
-- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_server_method() );
-- }
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ method = ssl_client_mode ? TLS_client_method() : TLS_server_method();
-+ if (db)
-+ method_name = ssl_client_mode ? "TLS_client_method()" : "TLS_server_method()";
-+#else
-+ method = ssl_client_mode ? SSLv23_client_method() : SSLv23_server_method();
-+ if (db)
-+ method_name = ssl_client_mode ? "SSLv23_client_method()" : "SSLv23_server_method()";
-+#endif
-+ if (db) fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", method_name);
-+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
-
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- rfbLog("openssl_init: SSL_CTX_new failed.\n");
-@@ -1520,16 +1576,18 @@ static int add_anon_dh(void) {
- }
-
- static int switch_to_anon_dh(void) {
-+ const SSL_METHOD *method;
- long mode;
-
- rfbLog("Using Anonymous Diffie-Hellman mode.\n");
- rfbLog("WARNING: Anonymous Diffie-Hellman uses encryption but is\n");
- rfbLog("WARNING: susceptible to a Man-In-The-Middle attack.\n");
-- if (ssl_client_mode) {
-- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_client_method() );
-- } else {
-- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_server_method() );
-- }
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ method = ssl_client_mode ? TLS_client_method() : TLS_server_method();
-+#else
-+ method = ssl_client_mode ? SSLv23_client_method() : SSLv23_server_method();
-+#endif
-+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- return 0;
- }
-@@ -1896,6 +1954,7 @@ static void pr_ssl_info(int verb) {
- SSL_CIPHER *c;
- SSL_SESSION *s;
- char *proto = "unknown";
-+ int ssl_version;
-
- if (verb) {}
-
-@@ -1905,13 +1964,21 @@ static void pr_ssl_info(int verb) {
- c = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
- s = SSL_get_session(ssl);
-
-+ if (s) {
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ ssl_version = SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(s);
-+#else
-+ ssl_version = s->ssl_version;
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
- if (s == NULL) {
- proto = "nosession";
-- } else if (s->ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
-+ } else if (ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
- proto = "SSLv2";
-- } else if (s->ssl_version == SSL3_VERSION) {
-+ } else if (ssl_version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- proto = "SSLv3";
-- } else if (s->ssl_version == TLS1_VERSION) {
-+ } else if (ssl_version == TLS1_VERSION) {
- proto = "TLSv1";
- }
- if (c != NULL) {
Copied: x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/openssl-support.patch (from rev 317073, x11vnc/trunk/openssl-support.patch)
===================================================================
--- openssl-support.patch (rev 0)
+++ openssl-support.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
@@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
+From d37dac6963c2fb65cf577a6413657621cbcb406a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
+Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 14:43:57 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Support openssl 1.1.0
+
+Compatibility patch for openssl 1.1.0 and later. The 1.0.2 API should
+still work. Note that openssl 1.1.0 builds now have SSLv3 disabled per
+default, so clients will have to support TLS to connect securely.
+
+Signed-off-by: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
+---
+ README | 16 +++++++
+ src/enc.h | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ src/sslhelper.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 3 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/README
++++ b/README
+@@ -871,6 +871,14 @@ make
+ place. As of x11vnc 0.9.4 there is also the --with-ssl=DIR configure
+ option.
+
++ Note that from OpenSSL 1.1.0 on SSLv2 support has been dropped and
++ SSLv3 deactivated at build time per default. This means that unless
++ explicitly enabled, OpenSSL builds only support TLS (any version).
++ Since there is a reason for dropping SSLv3 (heard of POODLE?), most
++ distributions do not enable it for their OpenSSL binary. In summary
++ this means compiling x11vnc against OpenSSL 1.1.0 or newer is no
++ problem, but using encryption will require a viewer with TLS support.
++
+ On Solaris using static archives libssl.a and libcrypto.a instead of
+ .so shared libraries (e.g. from www.sunfreeware.com), we found we
+ needed to also set LDFLAGS as follows to get the configure to work:
+@@ -4228,6 +4236,14 @@ connect = 5900
+ protocol handshake. x11vnc 0.9.6 supports both simultaneously when
+ -ssl is active.
+
++ Note: With the advent of OpenSSL 1.1.0, SSLv2 is dropped and SSLv3
++ deactivated per default. A couple broken ciphers have also gone, most
++ importantly though is that clients trying to connect to x11vnc will
++ now have to support TLS if encryption is to be used. You can of
++ course always cook up your own build and run time OpenSSL 1.1.x if
++ SSLv3 is absolutely required, but it isn't wise from a security point
++ of view.
++
+
+ SSL VNC Viewers:. Viewer-side will need to use SSL as well. See the
+ next FAQ and here for SSL enabled VNC Viewers, including SSVNC, to
+--- a/src/enc.h
++++ b/src/enc.h
+@@ -454,8 +454,10 @@ extern void enc_do(char *ciph, char *key
+ p++;
+ if (strstr(p, "md5+") == p) {
+ Digest = EVP_md5(); p += strlen("md5+");
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L && !defined OPENSSL_NO_SHA0
+ } else if (strstr(p, "sha+") == p) {
+ Digest = EVP_sha(); p += strlen("sha+");
++#endif
+ } else if (strstr(p, "sha1+") == p) {
+ Digest = EVP_sha1(); p += strlen("sha1+");
+ } else if (strstr(p, "ripe+") == p) {
+@@ -696,7 +698,11 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
+ */
+ unsigned char E_keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char D_keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *E_ctx, *D_ctx;
++#else
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX E_ctx, D_ctx;
++#endif
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ unsigned char buf[BSIZE], out[BSIZE];
+@@ -739,11 +745,16 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
+ encsym = encrypt ? "+" : "-";
+
+ /* use the encryption/decryption context variables below */
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ E_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++ D_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++ ctx = encrypt ? E_ctx : D_ctx;
++#else
++ ctx = encrypt ? &E_ctx : &D_ctx;
++#endif
+ if (encrypt) {
+- ctx = &E_ctx;
+ keystr = E_keystr;
+ } else {
+- ctx = &D_ctx;
+ keystr = D_keystr;
+ }
+
+@@ -877,9 +888,9 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
+ in_salt = salt;
+ }
+
+- if (ivec_size < Cipher->iv_len && !securevnc) {
++ if (ivec_size < EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(Cipher) && !securevnc) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s - WARNING: short IV %d < %d\n",
+- prog, encstr, ivec_size, Cipher->iv_len);
++ prog, encstr, ivec_size, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(Cipher));
+ }
+
+ /* make the hashed value and place in keystr */
+@@ -1033,6 +1044,11 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s - close sock_fr\n", prog, encstr);
+ close(sock_fr);
+
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(E_ctx);
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(D_ctx);
++#endif
++
+ /* kill our partner after 2 secs. */
+ sleep(2);
+ if (child) {
+@@ -1101,14 +1117,24 @@ static int securevnc_server_rsa_save_dia
+ }
+
+ static char *rsa_md5_sum(unsigned char* rsabuf) {
+- EVP_MD_CTX md;
++ EVP_MD_CTX *md;
+ char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmp[16];
+ char md5str[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 8];
+ unsigned int i, size = 0;
+
+- EVP_DigestInit(&md, EVP_md5());
+- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, rsabuf, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
+- EVP_DigestFinal(&md, (unsigned char *)digest, &size);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
++#else
++ md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
++#endif
++ EVP_DigestInit(md, EVP_md5());
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, rsabuf, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
++ EVP_DigestFinal(md, (unsigned char *)digest, &size);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
++#else
++ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
++#endif
+
+ memset(md5str, 0, sizeof(md5str));
+ for (i=0; i < size; i++) {
+@@ -1225,7 +1251,7 @@ static void sslexit(char *msg) {
+
+ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, int conn2) {
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX init_ctx;
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *init_ctx;
+ unsigned char keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *rsabuf, *rsasav;
+ unsigned char *encrypted_keybuf;
+@@ -1364,8 +1390,15 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ /*
+ * Back to the work involving the tmp obscuring key:
+ */
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&init_ctx);
+- rc = EVP_CipherInit_ex(&init_ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, initkey, NULL, 1);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ init_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++#else
++
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX init_ctx_obj;
++ init_ctx = &init_ctx_obj;
++#endif
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(init_ctx);
++ rc = EVP_CipherInit_ex(init_ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, initkey, NULL, 1);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ sslexit("securevnc_setup: EVP_CipherInit_ex(init_ctx) failed");
+ }
+@@ -1374,6 +1407,9 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ n = read(server, (char *) buf, BSIZE);
+ fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: data read: %d\n", n);
+ if (n < 0) {
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx);
++#endif
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: initial data[%d]: ", n);
+@@ -1381,13 +1417,19 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ /* decode with the tmp key */
+ if (n > 0) {
+ memset(to_viewer, 0, sizeof(to_viewer));
+- if (EVP_CipherUpdate(&init_ctx, to_viewer, &len, buf, n) == 0) {
++ if (EVP_CipherUpdate(init_ctx, to_viewer, &len, buf, n) == 0) {
+ sslexit("securevnc_setup: EVP_CipherUpdate(init_ctx) failed");
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx);
++#endif
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ to_viewer_len = len;
+ }
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&init_ctx);
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(init_ctx);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx);
++#endif
+ free(initkey);
+
+ /* print what we would send to the viewer (sent below): */
+@@ -1448,7 +1490,7 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+
+ if (client_auth_req && client_auth) {
+ RSA *client_rsa = load_client_auth(client_auth);
+- EVP_MD_CTX dctx;
++ EVP_MD_CTX *dctx;
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *signature;
+ unsigned int ndig = 0, nsig = 0;
+
+@@ -1462,8 +1504,13 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+- EVP_DigestInit(&dctx, EVP_sha1());
+- EVP_DigestUpdate(&dctx, keystr, SECUREVNC_KEY_SIZE);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ dctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
++#else
++ dctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
++#endif
++ EVP_DigestInit(dctx, EVP_sha1());
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(dctx, keystr, SECUREVNC_KEY_SIZE);
+ /*
+ * Without something like the following MITM is still possible.
+ * This is because the MITM knows keystr and can use it with
+@@ -1474,7 +1521,7 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ * he doesn't have Viewer_ClientAuth.pkey.
+ */
+ if (0) {
+- EVP_DigestUpdate(&dctx, rsasav, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(dctx, rsasav, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
+ if (!keystore_verified) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: Warning: even *WITH* Client Authentication in SecureVNC,\n");
+@@ -1497,7 +1544,12 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
+ fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup:\n");
+ }
+ }
+- EVP_DigestFinal(&dctx, (unsigned char *)digest, &ndig);
++ EVP_DigestFinal(dctx, (unsigned char *)digest, &ndig);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_MD_CTX_free(dctx);
++#else
++ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(dctx);
++#endif
+
+ signature = (unsigned char *) calloc(RSA_size(client_rsa), 1);
+ RSA_sign(NID_sha1, digest, ndig, signature, &nsig, client_rsa);
+--- a/src/sslhelper.c
++++ b/src/sslhelper.c
+@@ -799,8 +799,13 @@ static int pem_passwd_callback(char *buf
+
+ /* based on mod_ssl */
+ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *callback_ctx) {
+- X509_STORE_CTX store_ctx;
++ const ASN1_INTEGER *revoked_serial;
++ X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx;
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10100000L
++ X509_OBJECT *obj;
++#else
+ X509_OBJECT obj;
++#endif
+ X509_NAME *subject;
+ X509_NAME *issuer;
+ X509 *xs;
+@@ -820,11 +825,19 @@ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *
+
+ /* Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _subject_ of
+ * the current certificate in order to verify it's integrity. */
++ store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
++ X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10100000L
++ obj = X509_OBJECT_new();
++ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, subject, obj);
++ crl = X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(obj);
++#else
+ memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
+- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
+- rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj);
+- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx);
++ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj);
+ crl=obj.data.crl;
++#endif
++ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(store_ctx);
++ X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx);
+
+ if(rc>0 && crl) {
+ /* Log information about CRL
+@@ -850,7 +863,11 @@ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *
+ rfbLog("Invalid signature on CRL\n");
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx,
+ X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
++#else
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#endif
+ if(pubkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
+ return 0; /* Reject connection */
+@@ -864,45 +881,78 @@ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *
+ rfbLog("Found CRL has invalid nextUpdate field\n");
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx,
+ X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
++#else
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#endif
+ return 0; /* Reject connection */
+ }
+ if(X509_cmp_current_time(t)<0) {
+ rfbLog("Found CRL is expired - "
+ "revoking all certificates until you get updated CRL\n");
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
++#else
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#endif
+ return 0; /* Reject connection */
+ }
+- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
++#else
++ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#endif
+ }
+
+ /* Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _issuer_ of
+ * the current certificate in order to check for revocation. */
++ store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
++ X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10100000L
++ obj = X509_OBJECT_new();
++ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, obj);
++ crl = X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(obj);
++#else
+ memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
+- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
+- rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj);
+- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx);
++ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj);
+ crl=obj.data.crl;
++#endif
++ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(store_ctx);
++ X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx);
+
+ if(rc>0 && crl) {
+ /* Check if the current certificate is revoked by this CRL */
+ n=sk_X509_REVOKED_num(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl));
+ for(i=0; i<n; i++) {
+ revoked=sk_X509_REVOKED_value(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl), i);
+- if(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(revoked->serialNumber,
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ revoked_serial = X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(revoked);
++#else
++ revoked_serial = revoked->serialNumber;
++#endif
++ if(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(revoked_serial,
+ X509_get_serialNumber(xs)) == 0) {
+- serial=ASN1_INTEGER_get(revoked->serialNumber);
++ serial=ASN1_INTEGER_get(revoked_serial);
+ cp=X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, NULL, 0);
+ rfbLog("Certificate with serial %ld (0x%lX) "
+ "revoked per CRL from issuer %s\n", serial, serial, cp);
+ OPENSSL_free(cp);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
++#else
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#endif
+ return 0; /* Reject connection */
+ }
+ }
+- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
++#else
++ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++#endif
+ }
+
+ return 1; /* Accept connection */
+@@ -951,6 +1001,8 @@ static int switch_to_anon_dh(void);
+
+ void openssl_init(int isclient) {
+ int db = 0, tmp_pem = 0, do_dh;
++ const SSL_METHOD *method;
++ char *method_name;
+ FILE *in;
+ double ds;
+ long mode;
+@@ -992,13 +1044,17 @@ void openssl_init(int isclient) {
+ ssl_client_mode = 0;
+ }
+
+- if (ssl_client_mode) {
+- if (db) fprintf(stderr, "SSLv23_client_method()\n");
+- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_client_method() );
+- } else {
+- if (db) fprintf(stderr, "SSLv23_server_method()\n");
+- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_server_method() );
+- }
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ method = ssl_client_mode ? TLS_client_method() : TLS_server_method();
++ if (db)
++ method_name = ssl_client_mode ? "TLS_client_method()" : "TLS_server_method()";
++#else
++ method = ssl_client_mode ? SSLv23_client_method() : SSLv23_server_method();
++ if (db)
++ method_name = ssl_client_mode ? "SSLv23_client_method()" : "SSLv23_server_method()";
++#endif
++ if (db) fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", method_name);
++ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ rfbLog("openssl_init: SSL_CTX_new failed.\n");
+@@ -1520,16 +1576,18 @@ static int add_anon_dh(void) {
+ }
+
+ static int switch_to_anon_dh(void) {
++ const SSL_METHOD *method;
+ long mode;
+
+ rfbLog("Using Anonymous Diffie-Hellman mode.\n");
+ rfbLog("WARNING: Anonymous Diffie-Hellman uses encryption but is\n");
+ rfbLog("WARNING: susceptible to a Man-In-The-Middle attack.\n");
+- if (ssl_client_mode) {
+- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_client_method() );
+- } else {
+- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_server_method() );
+- }
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ method = ssl_client_mode ? TLS_client_method() : TLS_server_method();
++#else
++ method = ssl_client_mode ? SSLv23_client_method() : SSLv23_server_method();
++#endif
++ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -1896,6 +1954,7 @@ static void pr_ssl_info(int verb) {
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ SSL_SESSION *s;
+ char *proto = "unknown";
++ int ssl_version;
+
+ if (verb) {}
+
+@@ -1905,13 +1964,21 @@ static void pr_ssl_info(int verb) {
+ c = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
+ s = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+
++ if (s) {
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ ssl_version = SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(s);
++#else
++ ssl_version = s->ssl_version;
++#endif
++ }
++
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ proto = "nosession";
+- } else if (s->ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
++ } else if (ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ proto = "SSLv2";
+- } else if (s->ssl_version == SSL3_VERSION) {
++ } else if (ssl_version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ proto = "SSLv3";
+- } else if (s->ssl_version == TLS1_VERSION) {
++ } else if (ssl_version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+ proto = "TLSv1";
+ }
+ if (c != NULL) {
Deleted: service
===================================================================
--- service 2018-02-15 01:13:13 UTC (rev 317073)
+++ service 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=VNC Server for X11
-Requires=graphical.target
-After=graphical.target
-
-[Service]
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/x11vnc
Copied: x11vnc/repos/extra-x86_64/service (from rev 317073, x11vnc/trunk/service)
===================================================================
--- service (rev 0)
+++ service 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=VNC Server for X11
+Requires=graphical.target
+After=graphical.target
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/x11vnc
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