[arch-commits] Commit in x11vnc/trunk (4 files)
Gaëtan Bisson
bisson at archlinux.org
Thu Feb 15 01:15:31 UTC 2018
Date: Thursday, February 15, 2018 @ 01:15:30
Author: bisson
Revision: 317075
remove patches merged upstream
Deleted:
x11vnc/trunk/cursor.patch
x11vnc/trunk/fix-buffer-overflows.patch
x11vnc/trunk/openssl-detect.patch
x11vnc/trunk/openssl-support.patch
----------------------------+
cursor.patch | 281 -------------------------
fix-buffer-overflows.patch | 26 --
openssl-detect.patch | 34 ---
openssl-support.patch | 481 -------------------------------------------
4 files changed, 822 deletions(-)
Deleted: cursor.patch
===================================================================
--- cursor.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
+++ cursor.patch 2018-02-15 01:15:30 UTC (rev 317075)
@@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
-From 37c946191a0f36490531624a2d03ec1ce7c714ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stephan Fuhrmann <stfu_os at freenet.de>
-Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 11:28:25 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Broken cursor bugfix for 64 bit systems (#49)
-
-* Proper 32 bit types assigned
-
-* The size dependent conversions are not necessary if input type is 32 bit in every case
-
-* Unused variable
-
-* Another type problem 32/64 fixed
-
-* Prototype fixed
-
-* Pointer cast missing
-
-* * Multiple conversions from (unsigned long*) to proper (uint32_t*).
-* Bugfix for XFixesCursorImage type problem. Structure contains (unsigned long*), but protocol says the pixels are just 32 bit.
- This is a problem for 64 bit systems where (unsigned long) is 64 bits wide.
----
- src/cursor.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------------
- src/cursor.h | 3 +--
- src/screen.c | 28 ++++++++++-----------
- 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/cursor.c b/src/cursor.c
-index 8c14b6c..6e135be 100644
---- a/src/cursor.c
-+++ b/src/cursor.c
-@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void set_no_cursor(void);
- void set_warrow_cursor(void);
- int set_cursor(int x, int y, int which);
- int check_x11_pointer(void);
--int store_cursor(int serial, unsigned long *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot);
-+int store_cursor(int serial, uint32_t *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot);
- unsigned long get_cursor_serial(int mode);
- rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h, int xhot, int yhot, int Bpp);
- void save_under_cursor_buffer(rfbClientPtr cl);
-@@ -1008,14 +1008,13 @@ void initialize_xfixes(void) {
- rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h,
- int xhot, int yhot, int Bpp) {
- rfbCursorPtr c;
-- static unsigned long black = 0, white = 1;
-+ static uint32_t black = 0, white = 1;
- static int first = 1;
- char *bitmap, *rich, *alpha;
- char *pixels_new = NULL;
- int n_opaque, n_trans, n_alpha, len, histo[256];
- int send_alpha = 0, alpha_shift = 0, thresh;
- int i, x, y;
--
- if (first && dpy) { /* raw_fb hack */
- X_LOCK;
- black = BlackPixel(dpy, scr);
-@@ -1033,7 +1032,6 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h,
- if (scaling_cursor && (scale_cursor_fac_x != 1.0 || scale_cursor_fac_y != 1.0)) {
- int W, H;
- char *pixels_use = (char *) pixels;
-- unsigned int *pixels32 = NULL;
-
- W = w;
- H = h;
-@@ -1043,48 +1041,10 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h,
-
- pixels_new = (char *) malloc(4*w*h);
-
-- if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) {
-- int i, j, k = 0;
-- /*
-- * to avoid 64bpp code in scale_rect() we knock
-- * down to unsigned int on 64bit machines:
-- */
-- pixels32 = (unsigned int*) malloc(4*W*H);
-- for (j=0; j<H; j++) {
-- for (i=0; i<W; i++) {
-- *(pixels32+k) = 0xffffffff & (*(pixels+k));
-- k++;
-- }
-- }
-- pixels_use = (char *) pixels32;
-- }
--
- scale_rect(scale_cursor_fac_x, scale_cursor_fac_y, scaling_cursor_blend,
- scaling_cursor_interpolate,
- 4, pixels_use, 4*W, pixels_new, 4*w,
- W, H, w, h, 0, 0, W, H, 0);
--
-- if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) {
-- int i, j, k = 0;
-- unsigned long *pixels64;
-- unsigned int* source = (unsigned int*) pixels_new;
-- /*
-- * now knock it back up to unsigned long:
-- */
-- pixels64 = (unsigned long*) malloc(8*w*h);
-- for (j=0; j<h; j++) {
-- for (i=0; i<w; i++) {
-- *(pixels64+k) = (unsigned long) (*(source+k));
-- k++;
-- }
-- }
-- free(pixels_new);
-- pixels_new = (char *) pixels64;
-- if (pixels32) {
-- free(pixels32);
-- pixels32 = NULL;
-- }
-- }
-
- pixels = (uint32_t *) pixels_new;
-
-@@ -1111,7 +1071,7 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h,
- i = 0;
- for (y = 0; y < h; y++) {
- for (x = 0; x < w; x++) {
-- unsigned long a;
-+ uint32_t a;
-
- a = 0xff000000 & (*(pixels+i));
- a = a >> 24; /* alpha channel */
-@@ -1154,8 +1114,8 @@ rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h,
- i = 0;
- for (y = 0; y < h; y++) {
- for (x = 0; x < w; x++) {
-- unsigned long r, g, b, a;
-- unsigned int ui;
-+ uint32_t r, g, b, a;
-+ uint32_t ui;
- char *p;
-
- a = 0xff000000 & (*(pixels+i));
-@@ -1322,6 +1282,7 @@ static int get_exact_cursor(int init) {
- }
- if (xfixes_present && dpy) {
- #if HAVE_LIBXFIXES
-+ uint32_t *pixel32 = NULL;
- int last_idx = (int) get_cursor_serial(1);
- XFixesCursorImage *xfc;
-
-@@ -1350,15 +1311,37 @@ static int get_exact_cursor(int init) {
-
- /* retrieve the cursor info + pixels from server: */
- xfc = XFixesGetCursorImage(dpy);
-+ {
-+ /* 2017-07-09, Stephan Fuhrmann: This fixes an implementation flaw for 64 bit systems.
-+ * The XFixesCursorImage structure says xfc->pixels is (unsigned long*) in the structure, but
-+ * the protocol spec says it's 32 bit per pixel
-+ * (https://www.x.org/releases/X11R7.6/doc/fixesproto/fixesproto.txt).
-+ * I'm converting the data anyway to 32 bit to be sure. Only necessary for 64 bit systems,
-+ * but doing it anyway for 32 bit.
-+ * */
-+ int x,y;
-+ pixel32 = malloc(xfc->width * xfc->height * sizeof(uint32_t));
-+ for (y = 0; y < xfc->height; y++) {
-+ for (x = 0; x < xfc->width; x++) {
-+ uint32_t ofs = x + y*xfc->width;
-+ *(pixel32 + ofs) = *(xfc->pixels + ofs);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ }
-+
- X_UNLOCK;
- if (! xfc) {
- /* failure. */
- return which;
- }
-
-- which = store_cursor(xfc->cursor_serial, xfc->pixels,
-+ which = store_cursor(xfc->cursor_serial, pixel32,
- xfc->width, xfc->height, 32, xfc->xhot, xfc->yhot);
-
-+ if (pixel32 != NULL) {
-+ free(pixel32);
-+ }
-+
- X_LOCK;
- XFree_wr(xfc);
- X_UNLOCK;
-@@ -1367,7 +1350,7 @@ static int get_exact_cursor(int init) {
- return(which);
- }
-
--int store_cursor(int serial, unsigned long *data, int w, int h, int cbpp,
-+int store_cursor(int serial, uint32_t *data, int w, int h, int cbpp,
- int xhot, int yhot) {
- int which = CURS_ARROW;
- int use, oldest, i;
-@@ -1453,7 +1436,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "sc: %d %d/%d %d - %d %d\n", serial, w, h, cbpp, xhot, yhot);
- }
-
- /* place cursor into our collection */
-- cursors[use]->rfb = pixels2curs((uint32_t*)data, w, h, xhot, yhot, bpp/8);
-+ cursors[use]->rfb = pixels2curs(data, w, h, xhot, yhot, bpp/8);
-
- /* update time and serial index: */
- curs_times[use] = now;
-diff --git a/src/cursor.h b/src/cursor.h
-index 0cd42d1..e8ed248 100644
---- a/src/cursor.h
-+++ b/src/cursor.h
-@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ extern int alpha_blend;
- extern int alt_arrow;
- extern int alt_arrow_max;
-
--
- extern void first_cursor(void);
- extern void setup_cursors_and_push(void);
- extern void initialize_xfixes(void);
-@@ -64,7 +63,7 @@ extern void set_no_cursor(void);
- extern void set_warrow_cursor(void);
- extern int set_cursor(int x, int y, int which);
- extern int check_x11_pointer(void);
--extern int store_cursor(int serial, unsigned long *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot);
-+extern int store_cursor(int serial, uint32_t *data, int w, int h, int cbpp, int xhot, int yhot);
- extern unsigned long get_cursor_serial(int mode);
- extern rfbCursorPtr pixels2curs(uint32_t *pixels, int w, int h, int xhot, int yhot, int Bpp);
- void save_under_cursor_buffer(rfbClientPtr cl);
-diff --git a/src/screen.c b/src/screen.c
-index bda4690..395b503 100644
---- a/src/screen.c
-+++ b/src/screen.c
-@@ -1206,10 +1206,10 @@ void vnc_reflect_got_update(rfbClient *cl, int x, int y, int w, int h) {
- void vnc_reflect_got_cursorshape(rfbClient *cl, int xhot, int yhot, int width, int height, int bytesPerPixel) {
- static int serial = 1;
- int i, j;
-- char *pixels = NULL;
-- unsigned long r, g, b;
-- unsigned int ui = 0;
-- unsigned long red_mask, green_mask, blue_mask;
-+ uint32_t *pixels = NULL;
-+ uint32_t r, g, b;
-+ uint32_t ui = 0;
-+ uint32_t red_mask, green_mask, blue_mask;
-
- if (cl) {}
- if (unixpw_in_progress) {
-@@ -1230,21 +1230,20 @@ void vnc_reflect_got_cursorshape(rfbClient *cl, int xhot, int yhot, int width, i
- green_mask = (client->format.greenMax << client->format.greenShift);
- blue_mask = (client->format.blueMax << client->format.blueShift);
-
-- pixels = (char *)malloc(4*width*height);
-+ pixels = (uint32_t *)malloc(4*width*height);
- for (j=0; j<height; j++) {
- for (i=0; i<width; i++) {
-- unsigned int* uip;
- unsigned char* uic;
- int m;
- if (bytesPerPixel == 1) {
-- unsigned char* p = (unsigned char *) client->rcSource;
-- ui = (unsigned long) *(p + j * width + i);
-+ uint8_t* p = (uint8_t *) client->rcSource;
-+ ui = (uint32_t) *(p + j * width + i);
- } else if (bytesPerPixel == 2) {
-- unsigned short* p = (unsigned short *) client->rcSource;
-- ui = (unsigned long) *(p + j * width + i);
-+ uint16_t* p = (uint16_t *) client->rcSource;
-+ ui = (uint32_t) *(p + j * width + i);
- } else if (bytesPerPixel == 4) {
-- unsigned int* p = (unsigned int *) client->rcSource;
-- ui = (unsigned long) *(p + j * width + i);
-+ uint32_t* p = (uint32_t *) client->rcSource;
-+ ui = (uint32_t) *(p + j * width + i);
- }
- r = (red_mask & ui) >> client->format.redShift;
- g = (green_mask & ui) >> client->format.greenShift;
-@@ -1261,12 +1260,11 @@ void vnc_reflect_got_cursorshape(rfbClient *cl, int xhot, int yhot, int width, i
- if (m) {
- ui |= 0xff000000;
- }
-- uip = (unsigned int *)pixels;
-- *(uip + j * width + i) = ui;
-+ *(pixels + j * width + i) = ui;
- }
- }
-
-- store_cursor(serial++, (unsigned long*) pixels, width, height, 32, xhot, yhot);
-+ store_cursor(serial++, pixels, width, height, 32, xhot, yhot);
- free(pixels);
- set_cursor(cursor_x, cursor_y, get_which_cursor());
- }
Deleted: fix-buffer-overflows.patch
===================================================================
--- fix-buffer-overflows.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
+++ fix-buffer-overflows.patch 2018-02-15 01:15:30 UTC (rev 317075)
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-diff -Naur x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/win_utils.c x11vnc-0.9.13/src/win_utils.c
---- x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/win_utils.c 2016-10-07 23:26:03.248600761 +0200
-+++ x11vnc-0.9.13/src/win_utils.c 2016-10-07 23:26:51.919256706 +0200
-@@ -262,8 +262,8 @@
- }
-
- last_snap = now;
-- if (num > stack_list_len + blackouts) {
-- int n = 2*num;
-+ if (num + blackouts > stack_list_len) {
-+ int n = 2 * (num + blackouts);
- free(stack_list);
- stack_list = (winattr_t *) malloc(n*sizeof(winattr_t));
- stack_list_len = n;
-diff -Naur x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/xrecord.c x11vnc-0.9.13/src/xrecord.c
---- x11vnc-0.9.13-ori/src/xrecord.c 2016-10-07 23:26:03.248600761 +0200
-+++ x11vnc-0.9.13/src/xrecord.c 2016-10-07 23:27:49.566700470 +0200
-@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@
- data = (char *)req;
- data += sz_xConfigureWindowReq;
-
-- for (i=0; i<req->length; i++) {
-+ for (i = 0; i < req->length - sz_xConfigureWindowReq / 4 && i < 4; i++) {
- unsigned int v;
- /*
- * We use unsigned int for the values. There were
Deleted: openssl-detect.patch
===================================================================
--- openssl-detect.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
+++ openssl-detect.patch 2018-02-15 01:15:30 UTC (rev 317075)
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From 5889645bd3e63cf02c3fcad942d7edef1b4df472 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
-Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 10:56:24 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix openssl 1.1.x detection
-
-The SSL_library_init function has been renamed to OPENSSL_init_ssl from
-openssl 1.1.0 on. While the old name still exists as a define for
-backwards compatibility, this breaks detection in the library itself.
-Update configure.ac to just detect the library instead of specific
-functions.
-
-Signed-off-by: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
----
- configure.ac | 7 +++----
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -351,12 +351,11 @@ fi
- AH_TEMPLATE(HAVE_X509_PRINT_EX_FP, [open ssl X509_print_ex_fp available])
- if test "x$with_ssl" != "xno"; then
- if test "x$HAVE_LIBCRYPTO" = "xtrue"; then
-- AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, SSL_library_init,
-+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES(OPENSSL, [openssl >= 1.0.0],
- SSL_LIBS="-lssl -lcrypto"
-- [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBSSL) HAVE_LIBSSL="true"], ,
-- -lcrypto)
-+ [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBSSL) HAVE_LIBSSL="true"], ,)
- else
-- AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, SSL_library_init,
-+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES(OPENSSL, [openssl >= 1.0.0],
- SSL_LIBS="-lssl"
- [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBSSL) HAVE_LIBSSL="true"], ,)
- fi
Deleted: openssl-support.patch
===================================================================
--- openssl-support.patch 2018-02-15 01:14:13 UTC (rev 317074)
+++ openssl-support.patch 2018-02-15 01:15:30 UTC (rev 317075)
@@ -1,481 +0,0 @@
-From d37dac6963c2fb65cf577a6413657621cbcb406a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
-Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2016 14:43:57 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Support openssl 1.1.0
-
-Compatibility patch for openssl 1.1.0 and later. The 1.0.2 API should
-still work. Note that openssl 1.1.0 builds now have SSLv3 disabled per
-default, so clients will have to support TLS to connect securely.
-
-Signed-off-by: Bert van Hall <bert.vanhall at avionic-design.de>
----
- README | 16 +++++++
- src/enc.h | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- src/sslhelper.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- 3 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
-
---- a/README
-+++ b/README
-@@ -871,6 +871,14 @@ make
- place. As of x11vnc 0.9.4 there is also the --with-ssl=DIR configure
- option.
-
-+ Note that from OpenSSL 1.1.0 on SSLv2 support has been dropped and
-+ SSLv3 deactivated at build time per default. This means that unless
-+ explicitly enabled, OpenSSL builds only support TLS (any version).
-+ Since there is a reason for dropping SSLv3 (heard of POODLE?), most
-+ distributions do not enable it for their OpenSSL binary. In summary
-+ this means compiling x11vnc against OpenSSL 1.1.0 or newer is no
-+ problem, but using encryption will require a viewer with TLS support.
-+
- On Solaris using static archives libssl.a and libcrypto.a instead of
- .so shared libraries (e.g. from www.sunfreeware.com), we found we
- needed to also set LDFLAGS as follows to get the configure to work:
-@@ -4228,6 +4236,14 @@ connect = 5900
- protocol handshake. x11vnc 0.9.6 supports both simultaneously when
- -ssl is active.
-
-+ Note: With the advent of OpenSSL 1.1.0, SSLv2 is dropped and SSLv3
-+ deactivated per default. A couple broken ciphers have also gone, most
-+ importantly though is that clients trying to connect to x11vnc will
-+ now have to support TLS if encryption is to be used. You can of
-+ course always cook up your own build and run time OpenSSL 1.1.x if
-+ SSLv3 is absolutely required, but it isn't wise from a security point
-+ of view.
-+
-
- SSL VNC Viewers:. Viewer-side will need to use SSL as well. See the
- next FAQ and here for SSL enabled VNC Viewers, including SSVNC, to
---- a/src/enc.h
-+++ b/src/enc.h
-@@ -454,8 +454,10 @@ extern void enc_do(char *ciph, char *key
- p++;
- if (strstr(p, "md5+") == p) {
- Digest = EVP_md5(); p += strlen("md5+");
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L && !defined OPENSSL_NO_SHA0
- } else if (strstr(p, "sha+") == p) {
- Digest = EVP_sha(); p += strlen("sha+");
-+#endif
- } else if (strstr(p, "sha1+") == p) {
- Digest = EVP_sha1(); p += strlen("sha1+");
- } else if (strstr(p, "ripe+") == p) {
-@@ -696,7 +698,11 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
- */
- unsigned char E_keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char D_keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *E_ctx, *D_ctx;
-+#else
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX E_ctx, D_ctx;
-+#endif
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-
- unsigned char buf[BSIZE], out[BSIZE];
-@@ -739,11 +745,16 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
- encsym = encrypt ? "+" : "-";
-
- /* use the encryption/decryption context variables below */
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ E_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-+ D_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-+ ctx = encrypt ? E_ctx : D_ctx;
-+#else
-+ ctx = encrypt ? &E_ctx : &D_ctx;
-+#endif
- if (encrypt) {
-- ctx = &E_ctx;
- keystr = E_keystr;
- } else {
-- ctx = &D_ctx;
- keystr = D_keystr;
- }
-
-@@ -877,9 +888,9 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
- in_salt = salt;
- }
-
-- if (ivec_size < Cipher->iv_len && !securevnc) {
-+ if (ivec_size < EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(Cipher) && !securevnc) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s - WARNING: short IV %d < %d\n",
-- prog, encstr, ivec_size, Cipher->iv_len);
-+ prog, encstr, ivec_size, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(Cipher));
- }
-
- /* make the hashed value and place in keystr */
-@@ -1033,6 +1044,11 @@ static void enc_xfer(int sock_fr, int so
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s - close sock_fr\n", prog, encstr);
- close(sock_fr);
-
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(E_ctx);
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(D_ctx);
-+#endif
-+
- /* kill our partner after 2 secs. */
- sleep(2);
- if (child) {
-@@ -1101,14 +1117,24 @@ static int securevnc_server_rsa_save_dia
- }
-
- static char *rsa_md5_sum(unsigned char* rsabuf) {
-- EVP_MD_CTX md;
-+ EVP_MD_CTX *md;
- char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmp[16];
- char md5str[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 8];
- unsigned int i, size = 0;
-
-- EVP_DigestInit(&md, EVP_md5());
-- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, rsabuf, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
-- EVP_DigestFinal(&md, (unsigned char *)digest, &size);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-+#else
-+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-+#endif
-+ EVP_DigestInit(md, EVP_md5());
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, rsabuf, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
-+ EVP_DigestFinal(md, (unsigned char *)digest, &size);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
-+#else
-+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
-+#endif
-
- memset(md5str, 0, sizeof(md5str));
- for (i=0; i < size; i++) {
-@@ -1225,7 +1251,7 @@ static void sslexit(char *msg) {
-
- static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, int conn2) {
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX init_ctx;
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *init_ctx;
- unsigned char keystr[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char *rsabuf, *rsasav;
- unsigned char *encrypted_keybuf;
-@@ -1364,8 +1390,15 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
- /*
- * Back to the work involving the tmp obscuring key:
- */
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&init_ctx);
-- rc = EVP_CipherInit_ex(&init_ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, initkey, NULL, 1);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ init_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
-+#else
-+
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX init_ctx_obj;
-+ init_ctx = &init_ctx_obj;
-+#endif
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(init_ctx);
-+ rc = EVP_CipherInit_ex(init_ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, initkey, NULL, 1);
- if (rc == 0) {
- sslexit("securevnc_setup: EVP_CipherInit_ex(init_ctx) failed");
- }
-@@ -1374,6 +1407,9 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
- n = read(server, (char *) buf, BSIZE);
- fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: data read: %d\n", n);
- if (n < 0) {
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx);
-+#endif
- exit(1);
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: initial data[%d]: ", n);
-@@ -1381,13 +1417,19 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
- /* decode with the tmp key */
- if (n > 0) {
- memset(to_viewer, 0, sizeof(to_viewer));
-- if (EVP_CipherUpdate(&init_ctx, to_viewer, &len, buf, n) == 0) {
-+ if (EVP_CipherUpdate(init_ctx, to_viewer, &len, buf, n) == 0) {
- sslexit("securevnc_setup: EVP_CipherUpdate(init_ctx) failed");
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx);
-+#endif
- exit(1);
- }
- to_viewer_len = len;
- }
-- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&init_ctx);
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(init_ctx);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(init_ctx);
-+#endif
- free(initkey);
-
- /* print what we would send to the viewer (sent below): */
-@@ -1448,7 +1490,7 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
-
- if (client_auth_req && client_auth) {
- RSA *client_rsa = load_client_auth(client_auth);
-- EVP_MD_CTX dctx;
-+ EVP_MD_CTX *dctx;
- unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *signature;
- unsigned int ndig = 0, nsig = 0;
-
-@@ -1462,8 +1504,13 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
- exit(1);
- }
-
-- EVP_DigestInit(&dctx, EVP_sha1());
-- EVP_DigestUpdate(&dctx, keystr, SECUREVNC_KEY_SIZE);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ dctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-+#else
-+ dctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-+#endif
-+ EVP_DigestInit(dctx, EVP_sha1());
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(dctx, keystr, SECUREVNC_KEY_SIZE);
- /*
- * Without something like the following MITM is still possible.
- * This is because the MITM knows keystr and can use it with
-@@ -1474,7 +1521,7 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
- * he doesn't have Viewer_ClientAuth.pkey.
- */
- if (0) {
-- EVP_DigestUpdate(&dctx, rsasav, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(dctx, rsasav, SECUREVNC_RSA_PUBKEY_SIZE);
- if (!keystore_verified) {
- fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup:\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup: Warning: even *WITH* Client Authentication in SecureVNC,\n");
-@@ -1497,7 +1544,12 @@ static void securevnc_setup(int conn1, i
- fprintf(stderr, "securevnc_setup:\n");
- }
- }
-- EVP_DigestFinal(&dctx, (unsigned char *)digest, &ndig);
-+ EVP_DigestFinal(dctx, (unsigned char *)digest, &ndig);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(dctx);
-+#else
-+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(dctx);
-+#endif
-
- signature = (unsigned char *) calloc(RSA_size(client_rsa), 1);
- RSA_sign(NID_sha1, digest, ndig, signature, &nsig, client_rsa);
---- a/src/sslhelper.c
-+++ b/src/sslhelper.c
-@@ -799,8 +799,13 @@ static int pem_passwd_callback(char *buf
-
- /* based on mod_ssl */
- static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *callback_ctx) {
-- X509_STORE_CTX store_ctx;
-+ const ASN1_INTEGER *revoked_serial;
-+ X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx;
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10100000L
-+ X509_OBJECT *obj;
-+#else
- X509_OBJECT obj;
-+#endif
- X509_NAME *subject;
- X509_NAME *issuer;
- X509 *xs;
-@@ -820,11 +825,19 @@ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *
-
- /* Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _subject_ of
- * the current certificate in order to verify it's integrity. */
-+ store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
-+ X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10100000L
-+ obj = X509_OBJECT_new();
-+ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, subject, obj);
-+ crl = X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(obj);
-+#else
- memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
-- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
-- rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj);
-- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx);
-+ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj);
- crl=obj.data.crl;
-+#endif
-+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(store_ctx);
-+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx);
-
- if(rc>0 && crl) {
- /* Log information about CRL
-@@ -850,7 +863,11 @@ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *
- rfbLog("Invalid signature on CRL\n");
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx,
- X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
-+#else
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#endif
- if(pubkey)
- EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
- return 0; /* Reject connection */
-@@ -864,45 +881,78 @@ static int crl_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *
- rfbLog("Found CRL has invalid nextUpdate field\n");
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx,
- X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
-+#else
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#endif
- return 0; /* Reject connection */
- }
- if(X509_cmp_current_time(t)<0) {
- rfbLog("Found CRL is expired - "
- "revoking all certificates until you get updated CRL\n");
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
-+#else
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#endif
- return 0; /* Reject connection */
- }
-- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
-+#else
-+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#endif
- }
-
- /* Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _issuer_ of
- * the current certificate in order to check for revocation. */
-+ store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
-+ X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10100000L
-+ obj = X509_OBJECT_new();
-+ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, obj);
-+ crl = X509_OBJECT_get0_X509_CRL(obj);
-+#else
- memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
-- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, revocation_store, NULL, NULL);
-- rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj);
-- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx);
-+ rc=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(store_ctx, X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj);
- crl=obj.data.crl;
-+#endif
-+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(store_ctx);
-+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx);
-
- if(rc>0 && crl) {
- /* Check if the current certificate is revoked by this CRL */
- n=sk_X509_REVOKED_num(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl));
- for(i=0; i<n; i++) {
- revoked=sk_X509_REVOKED_value(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl), i);
-- if(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(revoked->serialNumber,
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ revoked_serial = X509_REVOKED_get0_serialNumber(revoked);
-+#else
-+ revoked_serial = revoked->serialNumber;
-+#endif
-+ if(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(revoked_serial,
- X509_get_serialNumber(xs)) == 0) {
-- serial=ASN1_INTEGER_get(revoked->serialNumber);
-+ serial=ASN1_INTEGER_get(revoked_serial);
- cp=X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, NULL, 0);
- rfbLog("Certificate with serial %ld (0x%lX) "
- "revoked per CRL from issuer %s\n", serial, serial, cp);
- OPENSSL_free(cp);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(callback_ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
-+#else
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#endif
- return 0; /* Reject connection */
- }
- }
-- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ X509_OBJECT_free(obj);
-+#else
-+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
-+#endif
- }
-
- return 1; /* Accept connection */
-@@ -951,6 +1001,8 @@ static int switch_to_anon_dh(void);
-
- void openssl_init(int isclient) {
- int db = 0, tmp_pem = 0, do_dh;
-+ const SSL_METHOD *method;
-+ char *method_name;
- FILE *in;
- double ds;
- long mode;
-@@ -992,13 +1044,17 @@ void openssl_init(int isclient) {
- ssl_client_mode = 0;
- }
-
-- if (ssl_client_mode) {
-- if (db) fprintf(stderr, "SSLv23_client_method()\n");
-- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_client_method() );
-- } else {
-- if (db) fprintf(stderr, "SSLv23_server_method()\n");
-- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_server_method() );
-- }
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ method = ssl_client_mode ? TLS_client_method() : TLS_server_method();
-+ if (db)
-+ method_name = ssl_client_mode ? "TLS_client_method()" : "TLS_server_method()";
-+#else
-+ method = ssl_client_mode ? SSLv23_client_method() : SSLv23_server_method();
-+ if (db)
-+ method_name = ssl_client_mode ? "SSLv23_client_method()" : "SSLv23_server_method()";
-+#endif
-+ if (db) fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", method_name);
-+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
-
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- rfbLog("openssl_init: SSL_CTX_new failed.\n");
-@@ -1520,16 +1576,18 @@ static int add_anon_dh(void) {
- }
-
- static int switch_to_anon_dh(void) {
-+ const SSL_METHOD *method;
- long mode;
-
- rfbLog("Using Anonymous Diffie-Hellman mode.\n");
- rfbLog("WARNING: Anonymous Diffie-Hellman uses encryption but is\n");
- rfbLog("WARNING: susceptible to a Man-In-The-Middle attack.\n");
-- if (ssl_client_mode) {
-- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_client_method() );
-- } else {
-- ctx = SSL_CTX_new( SSLv23_server_method() );
-- }
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ method = ssl_client_mode ? TLS_client_method() : TLS_server_method();
-+#else
-+ method = ssl_client_mode ? SSLv23_client_method() : SSLv23_server_method();
-+#endif
-+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- return 0;
- }
-@@ -1896,6 +1954,7 @@ static void pr_ssl_info(int verb) {
- SSL_CIPHER *c;
- SSL_SESSION *s;
- char *proto = "unknown";
-+ int ssl_version;
-
- if (verb) {}
-
-@@ -1905,13 +1964,21 @@ static void pr_ssl_info(int verb) {
- c = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
- s = SSL_get_session(ssl);
-
-+ if (s) {
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+ ssl_version = SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(s);
-+#else
-+ ssl_version = s->ssl_version;
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
- if (s == NULL) {
- proto = "nosession";
-- } else if (s->ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
-+ } else if (ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
- proto = "SSLv2";
-- } else if (s->ssl_version == SSL3_VERSION) {
-+ } else if (ssl_version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- proto = "SSLv3";
-- } else if (s->ssl_version == TLS1_VERSION) {
-+ } else if (ssl_version == TLS1_VERSION) {
- proto = "TLSv1";
- }
- if (c != NULL) {
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