[arch-general] [arch-dev-public] Trimming down our default kernel configuration

[Bigby James]

On Fri, Mar 28, 2014 at 12:54:44PM +0200, Arthur Țițeică wrote:
> It raises a question mark that the two most important components of a system 
> (systemd and the kernel) have security measures disabled.
> 
> People in this thread like to put out the over subjective "lightweight" factor 
> but still there are no bug reports or any other solid evidence that the kernel 
> ate their computers since apparmor, selinux and audit were semi-silently 
> enabled a few builds back.
> 
> The facts will remain though:
> 
> * the kernel will still be "everything and the kitchen sink".
> * no provable performance enhancement so far.
> * security measures will get back at square 1.
> 

There seems to be a general, significant misunderstanding floating around this
thread. The "security features" in question are not passive; their mere
existence within the binary kernel does not improve security. They are modules
that allow users to fine-tune certain security features through the kernel using
third-party tools, features that are almost exclusively useful for server
administration (since, if you're the only one with access to your single-user
machine, they won't tell you anything you can't already see without them).

If you've never installed and configured the SELinux/AppArmor/Tomoyo userspace
packages, you've never had the security they purport to provide. Hence the point
of removing their modules from the kernel isn't performance; it's that  *no one
uses them,* and they clutter up the kernel configuration for no good reason at
all, making it more tedious to maintain and just a bit more annoying to
configure for individual users for absolutely no benefit.

-- 
"A common mistake that people make when trying to design something completely foolproof is to underestimate the ingenuity of complete fools." - Douglas Adams